The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference

In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order to establish a substantive conclusion. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions supposedly undermining the standard methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is unjustified. I argue that the many extant responses to Machery et al.’s critique do little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as they do not show how to justify the problematic assumption. I then argue that it can in principle be justified by an appeal to Carnapian explication. I show how to apply the explication defence to arguments from reference given by Andreasen (for the biological reality of race) and by Churchland (against the existence of beliefs and desires)

Extending ontological categorization through a dual process conceptual architecture

In this work we present a hybrid knowledge representation system aiming at extending the representational and reasoning capabilities of classical ontologies by taking into account the theories of typicality in conceptual processing. The system adopts a categorization process inspired to the dual process theories and, from a representational perspective, is equipped with a heterogeneous knowledge base that couples conceptual spaces and ontological formalisms. The system has been experimentally assessed in a conceptual categorization task where common sense linguistic descriptions were given in input, and the corresponding target concepts had to be identified. The results show that the proposed solution substantially improves the representational and reasoning \ue2\u80\u9cconceptual\ue2\u80\u9d capabilities of standard ontology-based systems

Dimensions of wisdom perception across twelve countries on five continents.

Wisdom is the hallmark of social judgment, but how people across cultures recognize wisdom remains unclear-distinct philosophical traditions suggest different views of wisdoms cardinal features. We explore perception of wise minds across 16 socio-economically and culturally diverse convenience samples from 12 countries. Participants assessed wisdom exemplars, non-exemplars, and themselves on 19 socio-cognitive characteristics, subsequently rating targets wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. Analyses reveal two positively related dimensions-Reflective Orientation and Socio-Emotional Awareness. These dimensions are consistent across the studied cultural regions and interact when informing wisdom ratings: wisest targets-as perceived by participants-score high on both dimensions, whereas the least wise are not reflective but moderately socio-emotional. Additionally, individuals view themselves as less reflective but more socio-emotionally aware than most wisdom exemplars. Our findings expand folk psychology and social judgment research beyond the Global North, showing how individuals perceive desirable cognitive and socio-emotional qualities, and contribute to an understanding of mind perception

Nothing at Stake in Knowledge

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism

Inappropriate stereotypical inferences? An adversarial collaboration in experimental ordinary language philosophy

This paper trials new experimental methods for the analysis of natural language reasoning and the (re)development of critical ordinary language philosophy in the wake of J.L. Austin. Philosophical arguments and thought experiments are strongly shaped by default pragmatic inferences, including stereotypical inferences. Austin suggested that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are at the root of some philosophical paradoxes and problems, and that these can be resolved by exposing those verbal fallacies. This paper builds on recent efforts to empirically document inappropriate stereotypical inferences that may drive philosophical arguments. We demonstrate that previously employed questionnaire-based output measures do not suffice to exclude relevant confounds. We then report an experiment that combines reading time measurements with plausibility ratings. The study seeks to provide evidence of inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs that have been suggested to lie at the root of the influential ‘argument from illusion’. Our findings support a diagnostic reconstruction of this argument. They provide the missing component for proof of concept for an experimental implementation of critical ordinary language philosophy that is in line with the ambitions of current ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy

The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking

Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?

I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy