103 research outputs found
The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference
In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order to establish a substantive conclusion. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions supposedly undermining the standard methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is unjustified. I argue that the many extant responses to Machery et al.âs critique do little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as they do not show how to justify the problematic assumption. I then argue that it can in principle be justified by an appeal to Carnapian explication. I show how to apply the explication defence to arguments from reference given by Andreasen (for the biological reality of race) and by Churchland (against the existence of beliefs and desires)
Extending ontological categorization through a dual process conceptual architecture
In this work we present a hybrid knowledge representation system aiming at extending the representational and reasoning capabilities of classical ontologies by taking into account the theories of typicality in conceptual processing. The system adopts a categorization process inspired to the dual process theories and, from a representational perspective, is equipped with a heterogeneous knowledge base that couples conceptual spaces and ontological formalisms. The system has been experimentally assessed in a conceptual categorization task where common sense linguistic descriptions were given in input, and the corresponding target concepts had to be identified. The results show that the proposed solution substantially improves the representational and reasoning \ue2\u80\u9cconceptual\ue2\u80\u9d capabilities of standard ontology-based systems
Nothing at Stake in Knowledge
In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism
Inappropriate stereotypical inferences? An adversarial collaboration in experimental ordinary language philosophy
This paper trials new experimental methods for the analysis of natural language reasoning and the (re)development of critical ordinary language philosophy in the wake of J.L. Austin. Philosophical arguments and thought experiments are strongly shaped by default pragmatic inferences, including stereotypical inferences. Austin suggested that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are at the root of some philosophical paradoxes and problems, and that these can be resolved by exposing those verbal fallacies. This paper builds on recent efforts to empirically document inappropriate stereotypical inferences that may drive philosophical arguments. We demonstrate that previously employed questionnaire-based output measures do not suffice to exclude relevant confounds. We then report an experiment that combines reading time measurements with plausibility ratings. The study seeks to provide evidence of inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs that have been suggested to lie at the root of the influential âargument from illusionâ. Our findings support a diagnostic reconstruction of this argument. They provide the missing component for proof of concept for an experimental implementation of critical ordinary language philosophy that is in line with the ambitions of current âevidentialâ experimental philosophy
The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in âreflectiveâ thinking
Why Donât Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?
I bet you donât practice your philosophical intuitions. Whatâs your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophersâ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy
For whom does determinism undermine moral responsibility? Surveying the conditions for free will across cultures
Getting Acquainted with Kant
My question here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has
nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is
essentially conceptual. However there is a sense in which this debate
concerning the content of intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has
to do with the terms in which the debate is set, and part to do with
confusion over the connection between Kantâs own views and contemporary
concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, I think
much of the substance of the debate concerning Kantâs views on the
content of experience can be salvaged by reframing it in terms of a
debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between
different cognitive capacities. Below, in Section 2, I clarify the
notion of âcontentâ I take to be at stake in the interpretive debate.
Section 3 presents reasons for thinking that intuition cannot have
content in the relevant sense. I then argue, in Section 4, that the
debate be reframed in terms of dependence. We should distinguish between
Intellectualism, according to which all objective representation
(understood in a particular way) depends on acts of synthesis by the
intellect, and Sensibilism, according to which at least some forms of
objective representation are independent of any such acts (or the
capacity for such acts). Finally, in Section 5, I further elucidate the
cognitive role of intuition. I articulate a challenge which Kant
understands alethic modal considerations to present for achieving
cognition, and argue that a version of Sensibilism that construes
intuition as a form of acquaintance is better positioned to answer this
challenge than Intellectualism
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