On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games

We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and thereby to give rise to a new environment. A coalition that considers a deviation needs to take the consequences into account because from the deviation point on, the game is no longer played with the original set of players. The deviating coalition becomes the new grand coalition which, in turn, induces a new dynamic game. The stage games of the new dynamical game depend on all previous allocation including those that have materialized from the deviating time on. We define three types of core solutions: fair core, stable core and credible core. We characterize the first two in case where the instantaneous game depends on the last allocation (rather than on the whole history of allocations) and the third in the general case. The analysis and the results resembles to a great extent the theory of non-cooperative dynamic games.Comment: 25 page

Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems

Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction

Trans-specialization understanding in international technology alliances: The influence of cultural distance

In the information age, the firm's performance hinges on combining partners' specialist knowledge to achieve value co-creation. Combining knowledge from different specialties could be a costly process in the international technology alliances (ITAs) context. We argue that the combination of different specializations requires the development of "trans-specialization understanding" (TSU) instead of the internalization of partners' specialist knowledge. This article examines the extent to which inter-firm governance in ITAs shapes TSU, and whether the development of TSU is endangered by cultural distance. We hypothesize that relational governance, product modularity, and cultural distance influence TSU development, which in turn influences firm performance. We collected data from 110 non-equity ITAs between software and hardware firms participating in the mobile device sector. We analyzed the data using partial least squares path modeling. Our findings suggest that TSU largely depends on product modularity and relational governance in alliances. However, while cultural distance negatively moderates the path from relational governance to TSU, it has no effect on the relationship between product modularity and TSU. Based on this, we conclude that product modularity can substitute for relational governance when strong relational norms are not well-developed in international alliances. Thus cultural distance does not invariably amount to a liability in ITAs

Rationally constructing the dimensions of the political sphere

Social construction, Political dimensions, Voting,