Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of “bid space”. The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets

Brief wide-field photostimuli evoke and modulate oscillatory reverberating activity in cortical networks

Cell assemblies manipulation by optogenetics is pivotal to advance neuroscience and neuroengineering. In in vivo applications, photostimulation often broadly addresses a population of cells simultaneously, leading to feed-forward and to reverberating responses in recurrent microcircuits. The former arise from direct activation of targets downstream, and are straightforward to interpret. The latter are consequence of feedback connectivity and may reflect a variety of time-scales and complex dynamical properties. We investigated wide-field photostimulation in cortical networks in vitro, employing substrate-integrated microelectrode arrays and long-term cultured neuronal networks. We characterized the effect of brief light pulses, while restricting the expression of channelrhodopsin to principal neurons. We evoked robust reverberating responses, oscillating in the physiological gamma frequency range, and found that such a frequency could be reliably manipulated varying the light pulse duration, not its intensity. By pharmacology, mathematical modelling, and intracellular recordings, we conclude that gamma oscillations likely emerge as in vivo from the excitatory-inhibitory interplay and that, unexpectedly, the light stimuli transiently facilitate excitatory synaptic transmission. Of relevance for in vitro models of (dys)functional cortical microcircuitry and in vivo manipulations of cell assemblies, we give for the first time evidence of network-level consequences of the alteration of synaptic physiology by optogenetics

Numerical Solution of Orbital Combat Games Involving Missiles and Spacecraft

Orbital dynamic games, Pursuit-evasion games, Two-sided optimization,

Leakage and Protocol Composition in a Game-Theoretic Perspective

International audienceIn the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information Flow (QIF), the adversary typically tries to interfere with the system in the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender, on the other hand, typically tries to decrease leakage by introducing some controlled noise. This noise introduction can be modeled as a type of protocol composition, i.e., a probabilistic choice among different protocols, and its effect on the amount of leakage depends heavily on whether or not this choice is visible to the adversary. In this work we consider operators for modeling visible and invisible choice in protocol composition, and we study their algebraic properties. We then formalize the interplay between defender and adversary in a game-theoretic framework adapted to the specific issues of QIF, where the payoff is information leakage. We consider various kinds of leakage games, depending on whether players act simultaneously or sequentially, and on whether or not the choices of the defender are visible to the adversary. Finally, we establish a hierarchy of these games in terms of their information leakage, and provide methods for finding optimal strategies (at the points of equilibrium) for both attacker and defender in the various cases