22 research outputs found
Pathos in the Theaetetus
This paper is a test case for the claim, made famous by Myles Burnyeat, that the ancient Greeks did not recognize subjective truth or knowledge. After a brief discussion of the issue in Sextus Empiricus, I then turn to Plato's discussion of Protagorean views in the Theaetetus. In at least two passages, it seems that Plato attributes to Protagoras the view that our subjective experiences constitute truth and knowledge, without reference to any outside world of objects. I argue that these passages have been misunderstood and that on the correct reading, they do not say anything about subjective knowledge. I then try out what I take to be the correct reading of the passages. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of causes in Greek epistemology
Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic
This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the conclusion, and second, that the premises of a proof are actually used to derive the conclusion. Turning to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, I argue that there is evidence that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic satisfies both conditions. Moreover, Aristotle at one point explicitly addresses the potential harmfulness of syllogisms with unused premises. Here, I argue that Aristotle’s analysis allows for a rejection of such syllogisms on formal grounds established in the foregoing parts of the Prior Analytics. In a final section I consider the view that Aristotle distinguished between validity on the one hand and syllogistic validity on the other. Following this line of reasoning, Aristotle’s logic might not be a relevance logic, since relevance is part of syllogistic validity and not, as modern relevance logic demands, of general validity. I argue that the reasons to reject this view are more compelling than the reasons to accept it and that we can, cautiously, uphold the result that Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic
Potentiality in Aristotle's psychology and ethics
The distinction between potentiality and actuality in Aristotle has its origin in Platonic ethics. In his psychological and ethical works Aristotle’s notion of potentiality is embedded in a causal framework that is characteristic of life in general. A key theme is the distinction of various meanings of ‘to know’. In his early work the possession of knowledge is distinguished from its use. In De anima Aristotle adds the potentiality for acquiring knowledge as characteristic of the genus human being. He argues that the stages of actualization of knowledge are instances of a more comprehensive biological and ethical development. Life is the fulfillment of soul as formal, efficient and final cause, with the potentiality of body as material cause. The unity of body and soul is derived from the causal nexus of potentiality and actuality, like a power and the instrument in which it resides. In such cases potentiality is complex and depends on numerous conditions. Failure of full realization may occur when any of the necessary conditions of the development and realization of the fulfillment of human life are lacking, whether in the environment (e.g. climate), the body (illness, drunkenness), or the soul (natural virtue, firm character, attention).Political Philosophy and Ethic
Remembering events and remembering looks
I describe and discuss one particular dimension of disagreement in the philosophical literature on episodic memory. One way of putting the disagreement is in terms of the question as to whether or not there is a difference in kind between remembering seeing x and remembering what x looks like. I argue against accounts of episodic memory that either deny that there is a clear difference between these two forms of remembering, or downplay the difference by in effect suggesting that the former contains an additional ingredient not present in the latter, but otherwise treating them as the same thing. I also show that a recent ‘minimalist’ approach to episodic memory (Clayton & Russell in Neuropsychologia 47 (11): 2,330–2,340, 2009; Russell & Hanna in Mind & Language 27 (1): 29–54, 2012) fails to give a satisfactory explanatory account of the difference between the two types of remembering. I finish by sketching an alternative approach to episodic memory, which turns on the idea that episodic recollection recruits a specific form of causal reasoning that provides for a concrete sense in which remembered events are remembered as belonging to the past