Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of “bid space”. The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets

Characterization of cancer stem-like cells in chordoma

Object. Chordomas are locally aggressive bone tumors known to arise from the remnants of the notochord. Because chordomas are rare, molecular studies aimed at developing new therapies are scarce and new approaches are needed. Chordoma cells and cancer stem-like cells share similar characteristics, including self-renewal, differentiation, and resistance to chemotherapy. Therefore, it seems possible that chordomas might contain a subpopulation of cancer stem-like cells. The aim of this study is to determine whether cancer stem-like cells might be present in chordomas