Statistical signatures of critical behavior in small systems

The cluster distributions of different systems are examined to search for signatures of a continuous phase transition. In a system known to possess such a phase transition, both sensitive and insensitive signatures are present; while in systems known not to possess such a phase transition, only insensitive signatures are present. It is shown that nuclear multifragmentation results in cluster distributions belonging to the former category, suggesting that the fragments are the result of a continuous phase transition.Comment: 31 pages, two columns with 30 figure

Unravelling the size distribution of social groups with information theory on complex networks

The minimization of Fisher's information (MFI) approach of Frieden et al. [Phys. Rev. E {\bf 60} 48 (1999)] is applied to the study of size distributions in social groups on the basis of a recently established analogy between scale invariant systems and classical gases [arXiv:0908.0504]. Going beyond the ideal gas scenario is seen to be tantamount to simulating the interactions taking place in a network's competitive cluster growth process. We find a scaling rule that allows to classify the final cluster-size distributions using only one parameter that we call the competitiveness. Empirical city-size distributions and electoral results can be thus reproduced and classified according to this competitiveness, which also allows to correctly predict well-established assessments such as the "six-degrees of separation", which is shown here to be a direct consequence of the maximum number of stable social relationships that one person can maintain, known as Dunbar's number. Finally, we show that scaled city-size distributions of large countries follow the same universal distribution

Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?

We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975-2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in established OECD democracies nor in other months. The effect is larger in democracies with many poor and uneducated voters, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and in East-Asia and the Pacific. We argue that the election month monetary expansion is related to systemic vote buying which requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before elections. The finely timed increase in M1 is consistent with this; is inconsistent with a monetary cycle aimed at creating an election time boom; and it cannot be, fully, accounted for by alternative explanations