Peer effects in risk taking: Envy or conformity?

We examine two explanations for peer effects in risk taking: relative payoff concerns and preferences that depend on peer choices. We vary experimentally whether individuals can condition a simple lottery choice on the lottery choice or the lottery allocation of a peer. We find that peer effects increase significantly, almost double, when peers make choices, relative to when they are allocated a lottery. In both situations, imitation is the most frequent form of peer effect. Hence, peer effects in our environment are explained by a combination of relative payoff concerns and preferences that depend on peer choices. Comparative statics analyses and structural estimation results suggest that a norm to conform to the peer may explain why peer choices matter. Our results suggest that peer choices are important in generating peer effects and hence have important implications for modeling as well as for policy

g-Factor anisotropy of hole quantum wires induced by the Rashba interaction

We present calculations of the g factors for the lower conductance steps of 3D hole quantum wires. Our results prove that the anisotropy with magnetic field orientation, relative to the wire, originates in the Rashba spin-orbit coupling. We also analyze the relevance of the deformation, as the wire evolves from 3D towards a flat 2D geometry. For high enough wire deformations, the perpendicular g factors are greatly quenched by the Rashba interaction. On the contrary, parallel g factors are rather insensistive to the Rashba interaction, resulting in a high g factor anisotropy. For low deformations we find a more irregular behavior which hints at a sample dependent scenario.Comment: 7 pages, 6 figures (expanded from previous version

Relational Contracting Under the Threat of Expropriation – Experimental Evidence

We examine how relational contracting in credit and investment relationships is affected by the potential expropriation of funds. We implement credit relationships in which repayment is not third-party enforceable, i.e. borrowers can default on their loans. In our main treatment the borrower can expropriate the lender’s funds: a defaulting borrower can reinvest the loaned funds in future periods. In a control treatment borrowers cannot expropriate borrowed funds, i.e. if they default they cannot reinvest these funds in future periods. We find that potential expropriation decreases the overall volume of credit as lenders offer smaller loans in initial periods. Borrowers are more likely to default in earlier periods of the relationship when expropriation is possible, especially when they receive large loans. Together these results suggest that relational contracts may be particularly difficult to establish in markets where the expropriation of funds is feasible. This finding is relevant to credit markets in which lenders’ rights are weak, but also to sovereign lending, as well as to foreign direct investment in countries with weak investor protection.Relational contracts;Investor protection;Banking;Sovereign debt;Foreign direct investment.

Peer Effects in Risk Taking

This paper examines the effect of peers on individual risk taking. In the absence of informational motives, we investigate why social utility concerns may drive peer effects. We test for two main channels: utility from payoff differences and from conforming to the peer. We show experimentally that social utility generates substantial peer effects in risk taking. These are mainly explained by utility from payoff differences, in line with outcomebased social preferences. Contrary to standard assumptions, we show that estimated social preference parameters change significantly when peers make active choices, compared to when lotteries are randomly assigned to them