Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?

We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed pricesetting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payo equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves if the most plausible equilibrium is realized in the market. Hence, in this case it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists

Quantum Theory and Time Asymmetry

The relation between quantum measurement and thermodynamically irreversible processes is investigated. The reduction of the state vector is fundamentally asymmetric in time and shows an observer-relatedness which may explain the double interpretation of the state vector as a representation of physical states as well as of information about them. The concept of relevance being used in all statistical theories of irreversible thermodynamics is shown to be based on the same observer-relatedness. Quantum theories of irreversible processes implicitly use an objectivized process of state vector reduction. The conditions for the reduction are discussed, and I speculate that the final (subjective) observer system might even be carried by a spacetime point.Comment: Latex version of a paper published in 1979 (with minor revisions), 18 page

Unilateral versus coordinated effects:comparing the impact on consumer welfare of alternative merger outcomes

The nature of tacitly collusive behaviour often makes coordination unstable, and this may result in periods of breakdown, during which consumers benet from reduced prices. This is allowed for by adding demand uncertainty to the Compte et al. (2002) model of tacit collusion amongst asymmetric rms. Breakdowns occur when a rm cannot exclude the possibility of a deviation by a rival. It is then possible that an outcome with collusive behaviour, subject to long/frequent break downs, can improve consumer welfare compared to an alternative with sustained unilateral conduct. This is illustrated by re-examining the Nestle/Perrier merger analyzed by Compte et al., but now also taking into account the potential for welfare losses arising from unilateral behaviour