Persuasive argumentation and epistemic attitudes

These slides present the main notions and results of a work under construction that was presented in the 2nd DaLí Workshop, Dynamic Logic: New Trends and Applications in Porto, 9 October, 2019 and later published in the Lectures Notes in Computer Science (vol 12005). The work develops a formal study of persuasive dialogues among individuals, taking into account the epistemic attitudes of the involved agents. Abstract argumentation and dynamic epistemic logic provide the necessary tools for such an analysis. The interested reader is referred to the paper for further detailsUniversidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

Detecting Deontic Conflicts in Dynamic Settings

Regulations, through the use of obligations and permissions, are widely used in modern society to define acceptable behaviours. Thus it is indeed important that these regulations do not conflict with each other and contain contradicting obligations. In the present paper we focus on identifying conflicts between obligations in dynamic settings. We first show the need of an alternative semantics rather than the more classic modelled by standard deontic logic. Second we introduce a new semantics for the obligations capable of representing and reasoning about them in these dynamic settings, and lastly we use it to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions to identify conflicting obligations

From Classical to Non-monotonic Deontic Logic Using ASPIC+

In this paper we use formal argumentation to design non-monotonic deontic logics, based on two monotonic deontic logics. In particular, we use the structured argumentation theory ASPIC to define non-monotonic variants of well-understood modal logics. We illustrate the approach using argumentation about free-choice permission

Inconsistency-adaptive dialogical logic

Even when inconsistencies are present in our premise set, we can sensibly distinguish between good and bad arguments relying on these premises. In making this distinction, the inconsistency-adaptive approach of Batens strikes a particularly nice balance between inconsistency-tolerance and inferential strength. In this paper, we use the machinery of Batens’ approach to extend the paraconsistent approach to dialogical logic as developed by Rahman and Carnielli. In bringing these frameworks closer together, we obtain a dynamic mechanism for the systematic study of dialogues in which two parties exchange arguments over a central claim, in the possible presence of inconsistencies