Analysis of stabilization operators in a Galerkin least-squares finite element discretization of the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations

In this paper the design and analysis of a dimensionally consistent stabilization operator for a time-discontinuous Galerkin least-squares finite element method for unsteady viscous flow problems governed by the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations, is discussed. The analysis results in a class of stabilization operators which satisfy essential conditions for the stability of the numerical discretization

A study of intraspecific hybrid lines derived from the reciprocal crosses between wild accessions and cultivated cowpeas (Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp.)

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LYING ABOUT WHAT YOU KNOW OR ABOUT WHAT YOU DO?

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less-and thereby lies less frequently-when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying. © 2013 by the European Economic Association

Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-riding depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less, and thereby lies less frequently, when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-riding and less lying.Information transmission;lying;communication;experiment

Hiding an Inconvenient Truth: Lies and Vagueness (Revision of DP 2008-107)

When truth conflicts with efficiency, can verbal communication destroy efficiency? Or are lies or vagueness used to hide inconvenient truths? We consider a sequential 2-player public good game in which the leader has private information about the value of the public good. This value can be low, high, or intermediate, with the latter case giving rise to a prisoners dilemma. Without verbal communication, efficiency is achieved, with contributions for high or intermediate values. When verbal com- munication is added, the leader has an incentive to hide the precise truth when the value is intermediate. We show experimentally that, when communication about the value must be precise, the leader frequently lies, preserving efficiency by exaggerating. When communication can be vague, the leader turns to vague messages when the value is intermediate, but not when it is high. Thus, she implicitly reveals all values. Inter- estingly, efficiency is still preserved, since the follower ignores messages altogether and does not seem to realize that vague messages hide inconvenient truths.Communication;Efficiency;Lying;Public Goods.