Optimization problem for extremals of the trace inequality in domains with holes

We study the Sobolev trace constant for functions defined in a bounded domain \O that vanish in the subset $A.$ We find a formula for the first variation of the Sobolev trace with respect to hole. As a consequence of this formula, we prove that when \O is a centered ball, the symmetric hole is critical when we consider deformation that preserve volume but is not optimal for some case.Comment: 13 page

Indirect lattice evidence for the Refined Gribov-Zwanziger formalism and the gluon condensate ⟨A2⟩\braket{A^2} in the Landau gauge

We consider the gluon propagator $D(p^2)$ at various lattice sizes and spacings in the case of pure SU(3) Yang-Mills gauge theories using the Landau gauge fixing. We discuss a class of fits in the infrared region in order to (in)validate the tree level analytical prediction in terms of the (Refined) Gribov-Zwanziger framework. It turns out that an important role is played by the presence of the widely studied dimension two gluon condensate $\braket{A^2}$. Including this effect allows to obtain an acceptable fit up to 1 \'{a} 1.5 GeV, while corroborating the Refined Gribov-Zwanziger prediction for the gluon propagator. We also discuss the infinite volume extrapolation, leading to the estimate $D(0)=8.3\pm0.5\text{GeV}^{-2}$. As a byproduct, we can also provide the prediction $\braket{g^2 A^2}\approx 3\text{GeV}^2$ obtained at the renormalization scale $\mu=10\text{GeV}$.Comment: 17 pages, 10 figures, updated version, accepted for publication in Phs.Rev.

On the motion of a heavy rigid body in an ideal fluid with circulation

Chaplygin's equations describing the planar motion of a rigid body in an unbounded volume of an ideal fluid involved in a circular flow around the body are considered. Hamiltonian structures, new integrable cases, and partial solutions are revealed, and their stability is examined. The problems of non-integrability of the equations of motion because of a chaotic behavior of the system are discussed.Comment: 25 pages, 4 figure

MODELS OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND MEDICO-ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF THE ORTHOTICS DEPARTMENT IN A HOSPITAL

This publication shows the relationship of one of the three proposed financial and economic models of orthotics offices, assisting patients with different pathologies of the musculoskeletal system, depending on the category of the hospital. The models of orthotics offices subjected to the analysis differ by a financing source; the system of an assessment of the dominating and minor indicators of their functioning is developed. Possible economic efficiency of the work of this office, working in the compulsory health insurance system is shown in the group of patients (n = 30) with a fracture of the distal end of the radius, and has made more than 377 000,0 rubles per year (according to 2014)

Analysis of social efficiency of the orthotics department in municipal hospital

In this article we analyzed social efficiency of orthotics department at the Central Municipal Hospital of Ulyanovsk. The study was conducted in the period of 2013-2014 years in patients with different diseases. All respondents of experimental (n = 150) and control (n2 = 150) groups who participated in the study expressed positively about the purpose and use of orthoses - "good" (nt = 63,7 %; n2 = 80,7 %) or "no answer" (nt = 36,3 %; n2 = 19,3 %). It shows a high level of social efficiency of provided type of care. Work of orthotics department will increase the number of orthotic devices used to improve the quality of life of patients

Revenue decentralization, central oversight and the political budget cycle : evidence from Israel

This paper examines whether revenue decentralization and direct external financial supervision affect the incidence and strength of political budget cycles, using a panel of Israeli municipalities during the period 1999-2009. We find that high dependence on central government transfers—as reflected in a low share of locally raised revenues in the municipality’s budget—exacerbates political budget cycles, while tight monitoring—exercised through central government appointment of external accountants to debt accumulating municipalities—eliminates them. These results suggest that political budget cycles can result from fiscal institutions that create soft budget constraints: that is, where incumbents and rational voters can expect that the costs of pre-election expansions will be partly covered later by the central government