Weak Parity

We study the query complexity of Weak Parity: the problem of computing the parity of an n-bit input string, where one only has to succeed on a 1/2+eps fraction of input strings, but must do so with high probability on those inputs where one does succeed. It is well-known that n randomized queries and n/2 quantum queries are needed to compute parity on all inputs. But surprisingly, we give a randomized algorithm for Weak Parity that makes only O(n/log^0.246(1/eps)) queries, as well as a quantum algorithm that makes only O(n/sqrt(log(1/eps))) queries. We also prove a lower bound of Omega(n/log(1/eps)) in both cases; and using extremal combinatorics, prove lower bounds of Omega(log n) in the randomized case and Omega(sqrt(log n)) in the quantum case for any eps>0. We show that improving our lower bounds is intimately related to two longstanding open problems about Boolean functions: the Sensitivity Conjecture, and the relationships between query complexity and polynomial degree.Comment: 18 page

On Algorithmic Statistics for space-bounded algorithms

Algorithmic statistics studies explanations of observed data that are good in the algorithmic sense: an explanation should be simple i.e. should have small Kolmogorov complexity and capture all the algorithmically discoverable regularities in the data. However this idea can not be used in practice because Kolmogorov complexity is not computable. In this paper we develop algorithmic statistics using space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity. We prove an analogue of one of the main result of `classic' algorithmic statistics (about the connection between optimality and randomness deficiences). The main tool of our proof is the Nisan-Wigderson generator.Comment: accepted to CSR 2017 conferenc

On the Limits of Depth Reduction at Depth 3 Over Small Finite Fields

Recently, Gupta et.al. [GKKS2013] proved that over Q any $n^{O(1)}$-variate and $n$-degree polynomial in VP can also be computed by a depth three $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit of size $2^{O(\sqrt{n}\log^{3/2}n)}$. Over fixed-size finite fields, Grigoriev and Karpinski proved that any $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit that computes $Det_n$ (or $Perm_n$) must be of size $2^{\Omega(n)}$ [GK1998]. In this paper, we prove that over fixed-size finite fields, any $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit for computing the iterated matrix multiplication polynomial of $n$ generic matrices of size $n\times n$, must be of size $2^{\Omega(n\log n)}$. The importance of this result is that over fixed-size fields there is no depth reduction technique that can be used to compute all the $n^{O(1)}$-variate and $n$-degree polynomials in VP by depth 3 circuits of size $2^{o(n\log n)}$. The result [GK1998] can only rule out such a possibility for depth 3 circuits of size $2^{o(n)}$. We also give an example of an explicit polynomial ($NW_{n,\epsilon}(X)$) in VNP (not known to be in VP), for which any $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit computing it (over fixed-size fields) must be of size $2^{\Omega(n\log n)}$. The polynomial we consider is constructed from the combinatorial design. An interesting feature of this result is that we get the first examples of two polynomials (one in VP and one in VNP) such that they have provably stronger circuit size lower bounds than Permanent in a reasonably strong model of computation. Next, we prove that any depth 4 $\Sigma\Pi^{[O(\sqrt{n})]}\Sigma\Pi^{[\sqrt{n}]}$ circuit computing $NW_{n,\epsilon}(X)$ (over any field) must be of size $2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n}\log n)}$. To the best of our knowledge, the polynomial $NW_{n,\epsilon}(X)$ is the first example of an explicit polynomial in VNP such that it requires $2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n}\log n)}$ size depth four circuits, but no known matching upper bound

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations

We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be expressed as $v_if(S)$, where $v_i$ is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function $f$ is publicly known. Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For an ad shown in a set $S$ of ad-slots, $f(S)$ is, say, the number of {\em unique} viewers reached by the ad, and $v_i$ is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b) From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function simplifies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more amenable to better approximation factors. We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts any $\alpha$-approximation non-truthful algorithm ($\alpha \leq 1$) for this problem into $\Omega(\frac{\alpha}{\log{n}})$ and $\Omega(\alpha)$-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respectively

Towards More Practical Linear Programming-based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Design

R. Lavy and C. Swamy (FOCS 2005, J. ACM 2011) introduced a general method for obtaining truthful-in-expectation mechanisms from linear programming based approximation algorithms. Due to the use of the Ellipsoid method, a direct implementation of the method is unlikely to be efficient in practice. We propose to use the much simpler and usually faster multiplicative weights update method instead. The simplification comes at the cost of slightly weaker approximation and truthfulness guarantees

On the expressive power of read-once determinants

We introduce and study the notion of read-$k$ projections of the determinant: a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$ is called a {\it read-$k$ projection of determinant} if $f=det(M)$, where entries of matrix $M$ are either field elements or variables such that each variable appears at most $k$ times in $M$. A monomial set $S$ is said to be expressible as read-$k$ projection of determinant if there is a read-$k$ projection of determinant $f$ such that the monomial set of $f$ is equal to $S$. We obtain basic results relating read-$k$ determinantal projections to the well-studied notion of determinantal complexity. We show that for sufficiently large $n$, the $n \times n$ permanent polynomial $Perm_n$ and the elementary symmetric polynomials of degree $d$ on $n$ variables $S_n^d$ for $2 \leq d \leq n-2$ are not expressible as read-once projection of determinant, whereas $mon(Perm_n)$ and $mon(S_n^d)$ are expressible as read-once projections of determinant. We also give examples of monomial sets which are not expressible as read-once projections of determinant

A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design without Money for Facility Games

In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible, and the cost of an agent can be defined as the distance between her location and the closest facility. In an obnoxious facility game, each agent wants to be far away from all facilities, and her utility is the distance from her location to the facility set. The objective of each agent is to minimize her cost or maximize her utility. An agent may lie if, by doing so, more benefit can be obtained. We are interested in social choice mechanisms that do not utilize payments. The game designer aims at a mechanism that is strategy-proof, in the sense that any agent cannot benefit by misreporting her address, or, even better, group strategy-proof, in the sense that any coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying. Meanwhile, it is desirable to have the mechanism to be approximately optimal with respect to a chosen objective function. Several models for such approximation mechanism design without money for facility games have been proposed. In this paper we briefly review these models and related results for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and meanwhile we present a general framework for approximation mechanism design without money for facility games

Simple extractors via constructions of cryptographic pseudo-random generators

Trevisan has shown that constructions of pseudo-random generators from hard functions (the Nisan-Wigderson approach) also produce extractors. We show that constructions of pseudo-random generators from one-way permutations (the Blum-Micali-Yao approach) can be used for building extractors as well. Using this new technique we build extractors that do not use designs and polynomial-based error-correcting codes and that are very simple and efficient. For example, one extractor produces each output bit separately in $O(\log^2 n)$ time. These extractors work for weak sources with min entropy $\lambda n$, for arbitrary constant $\lambda > 0$, have seed length $O(\log^2 n)$, and their output length is $\approx n^{\lambda/3}$.Comment: 21 pages, an extended abstract will appear in Proc. ICALP 2005; small corrections, some comments and references adde