Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness:On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories

Opinion on 'Responsible Dual Use' Political, Security, Intelligence and Military Research of Concern in Neuroscience and Neurotechnology

Current and newly emerging insights and technologies arising from research in brain sciences increase capabilities to access, assess and affect thought, emotion and behaviour. While much of this research and development is directed towards clinical use, it also has applications in other settings, notably in the political, security, intelligence and military (PSIM) domains. This is often referred to in terms of ‘Dual Use’. Many of these potential uses raise important social and ethical questions which demand the attention of all those involved in the research, administration, management and regulation of neuroscience research and related technological developments, including those in information and communication technologies (ICT) and robotics. In this Opinion, we suggest that we can increase our ability to identify which programmes and projects of research, development and innovation are ‘of concern’ by applying the principles of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) to the concept of ‘dual use’ and distinguishing between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ systems of research and technological development. We therefore use the term ‘dual use research of concern’ (DURC) to refer to neuroscience research and technological innovations, and brain inspired developments in information and communication technologies, for use in the political, security, intelligence and military domains, which are either directly of concern because of their potential for use in ways that threaten the peace, health, safety, security and well-being of citizens, or are undertaken without responsible regard to such potential uses. To ensure ongoing attention to these issues, the Opinion proposes recommendations for the Human Brain Project, the European Union and the wider neuroscience and ICT community

Cognitive disorders in patients with chronic kidney disease: Approaches to prevention and treatment

Background: Cognitive impairment is common in patients with chronic kidney disease (CKD), and early intervention may prevent the progression of this condition. Methods: Here, we review interventions for the complications of CKD (anemia, secondary hyperparathyroidism, metabolic acidosis, harmful effects of dialysis, the accumulation of uremic toxins) and for prevention of vascular events, interventions that may potentially be protective against cognitive impairment. Furthermore, we discuss nonpharmacological and pharmacological methods to prevent cognitive impairment and/or minimize the latter's impact on CKD patients' daily lives. Results: A particular attention on kidney function assessment is suggested during work-up for cognitive impairment. Different approaches are promising to reduce cognitive burden in patients with CKD but the availabe dedicated data are scarce. Conclusions: There is a need for studies assessing the effect of interventions on the cognitive function of patients with CKD

Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines : An Inside-Out Approach

In today’s society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with “consciousness” and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain’s capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable (“outside”) properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a “hard” threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.Human Brain Project SGA

Can neuroscience contribute to practical ethics? A critical review and discussion of the methodological and translational challenges of the neuroscience of ethics

Neuroethics is an interdisciplinary field that arose in response to novel ethical challenges posed by advances in neuroscience. Historically, neuroethics has provided an opportunity to synergize different disciplines, notably proposing a two-way dialogue between an 'ethics of neuroscience' and a 'neuroscience of ethics'. However, questions surface as to whether a 'neuroscience of ethics' is a useful and unified branch of research and whether it can actually inform or lead to theoretical insights and transferable practical knowledge to help resolve ethical questions. In this article, we examine why the neuroscience of ethics is a promising area of research and summarize what we have learned so far regarding its most promising goals and contributions. We then review some of the key methodological challenges which may have hindered the use of results generated thus far by the neuroscience of ethics. Strategies are suggested to address these challenges and improve the quality of research and increase neuroscience's usefulness for applied ethics and society at large. Finally, we reflect on potential outcomes of a neuroscience of ethics and discuss the different strategies that could be used to support knowledge transfer to help different stakeholders integrate knowledge from the neuroscience of ethics