Common Causes and The Direction of Causation

Is the common cause principle merely one of a set of useful heuristics for discovering causal relations, or is it rather a piece of heavy duty metaphysics, capable of grounding the direction of causation itself? Since the principle was introduced in Reichenbach’s groundbreaking work The Direction of Time (1956), there have been a series of attempts to pursue the latter program—to take the probabilistic relationships constitutive of the principle of the common cause and use them to ground the direction of causation. These attempts have not all explicitly appealed to the principle as originally formulated; it has also appeared in the guise of independence conditions, counterfactual overdetermination, and, in the causal modelling literature, as the causal markov condition. In this paper, I identify a set of difficulties for grounding the asymmetry of causation on the principle and its descendents. The first difficulty, concerning what I call the vertical placement of causation, consists of a tension between considerations that drive towards the macroscopic scale, and considerations that drive towards the microscopic scale—the worry is that these considerations cannot both be comfortably accommodated. The second difficulty consists of a novel potential counterexample to the principle based on the familiar Einstein Podolsky Rosen (EPR) cases in quantum mechanics

On more realistic environment distributions for defining, evaluating and developing intelligence

One insightful view of the notion of intelligence is the ability to perform well in a diverse set of tasks, problems or environments. One of the key issues is therefore the choice of this set, which can be formalised as a `distribution¿. Formalising and properly defining this distribution is an important challenge to understand what intelligence is and to achieve artificial general intelligence (AGI). In this paper, we agree with previous criticisms that a universal distribution using a reference universal Turing machine (UTM) over tasks, environments, etc., is perhaps amuch too general distribution, since, e.g., the probability of other agents appearing on the scene or having some social interaction is almost 0 for many reference UTMs. Instead, we propose the notion of Darwin-Wallace distribution for environments, which is inspired by biological evolution, artificial life and evolutionary computation. However, although enlightening about where and how intelligence should excel, this distribution has so many options and is uncomputable in so many ways that we certainly need a more practical alternative. We propose the use of intelligence tests over multi-agent systems, in such a way that agents with a certified level of intelligence at a certain degree are used to construct the tests for the next degree. This constructive methodology can then be used as a more realistic intelligence test and also as a testbed for developing and evaluating AGI systems.We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We also thank the funding from the Spanish MEC and MICINN for projects TIN2009-06078-E/TIN, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2007-00022 and TIN2010-21062- C02, for MEC FPU grant AP2006-02323, and Generalitat Valenciana for Prometeo/2008/051Hernández Orallo, J.; Dowe, DL.; España Cubillo, S.; Hernández-Lloreda, MV.; Insa Cabrera, J. (2011). On more realistic environment distributions for defining, evaluating and developing intelligence. En Artificial General Intelligence. Springer Verlag (Germany). 6830:82-91. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22887-2_9S82916830Dowe, D.L.: Foreword re C. S. Wallace. Computer Journal 51(5), 523–560 (2008); Christopher Stewart WALLACE (1933-2004) memorial special issueDowe, D.L.: Minimum Message Length and statistically consistent invariant (objective?) Bayesian probabilistic inference - from (medical) “evidence”. Social Epistemology 22(4), 433–460 (2008)Dowe, D.L.: MML, hybrid Bayesian network graphical models, statistical consistency, invariance and uniqueness. In: Bandyopadhyay, P.S., Forster, M.R. (eds.) Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Statistics, vol. 7, pp. 901–982. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2011)Dowe, D.L., Hajek, A.R.: A computational extension to the Turing Test. 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Compression and intelligence: social environments and communication

Compression has been advocated as one of the principles which pervades inductive inference and prediction - and, from there, it has also been recurrent in definitions and tests of intelligence. However, this connection is less explicit in new approaches to intelligence. In this paper, we advocate that the notion of compression can appear again in definitions and tests of intelligence through the concepts of `mind-reading¿ and `communication¿ in the context of multi-agent systems and social environments. Our main position is that two-part Minimum Message Length (MML) compression is not only more natural and effective for agents with limited resources, but it is also much more appropriate for agents in (co-operative) social environments than one-part compression schemes - particularly those using a posterior-weighted mixture of all available models following Solomonoff¿s theory of prediction. We think that the realisation of these differences is important to avoid a naive view of `intelligence as compression¿ in favour of a better understanding of how, why and where (one-part or two-part, lossless or lossy) compression is needed.We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments, and we thank Kurt Kleiner for some challenging and ultimately very helpful questions in the broad area of this work. We also acknowledge the funding from the Spanish MEC and MICINN for projects TIN2009-06078-E/TIN, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2007-00022 and TIN2010-21062-C02, and Generalitat Valenciana for Prometeo/2008/051.Dowe, DL.; Hernández Orallo, J.; Das, PK. (2011). Compression and intelligence: social environments and communication. En Artificial General Intelligence. Springer Verlag (Germany). 6830:204-211. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22887-2_21S2042116830Chaitin, G.J.: Godel’s theorem and information. 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On environment difficulty and discriminating power

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-014-9257-1This paper presents a way to estimate the difficulty and discriminating power of any task instance. We focus on a very general setting for tasks: interactive (possibly multiagent) environments where an agent acts upon observations and rewards. Instead of analysing the complexity of the environment, the state space or the actions that are performed by the agent, we analyse the performance of a population of agent policies against the task, leading to a distribution that is examined in terms of policy complexity. This distribution is then sliced by the algorithmic complexity of the policy and analysed through several diagrams and indicators. The notion of environment response curve is also introduced, by inverting the performance results into an ability scale. We apply all these concepts, diagrams and indicators to two illustrative problems: a class of agent-populated elementary cellular automata, showing how the difficulty and discriminating power may vary for several environments, and a multiagent system, where agents can become predators or preys, and may need to coordinate. Finally, we discuss how these tools can be applied to characterise (interactive) tasks and (multi-agent) environments. These characterisations can then be used to get more insight about agent performance and to facilitate the development of adaptive tests for the evaluation of agent abilities.I thank the reviewers for their comments, especially those aiming at a clearer connection with the field of multi-agent systems and the suggestion of better approximations for the calculation of the response curves. The implementation of the elementary cellular automata used in the environments is based on the library 'CellularAutomaton' by John Hughes for R [58]. I am grateful to Fernando Soler-Toscano for letting me know about their work [65] on the complexity of 2D objects generated by elementary cellular automata. I would also like to thank David L. Dowe for his comments on a previous version of this paper. This work was supported by the MEC/MINECO projects CONSOLIDER-INGENIO CSD2007-00022 and TIN 2010-21062-C02-02, GVA project PROMETEO/2008/051, the COST - European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research IC0801 AT, and the REFRAME project, granted by the European Coordinated Research on Long-term Challenges in Information and Communication Sciences & Technologies ERA-Net (CHIST-ERA), and funded by the Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad in Spain (PCIN-2013-037).José Hernández-Orallo (2015). On environment difficulty and discriminating power. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 29(3):402-454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-014-9257-1S402454293Anderson, J., Baltes, J., & Cheng, C. T. (2011). 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(Ed.), 3rd International Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (pp. 182–183). Atlantis Press Extended report at http://users.dsic.upv.es/proy/anynt/unbiased.pdf .Hernández-Orallo, J., & Dowe, D. L. (2010). Measuring universal intelligence: Towards an anytime intelligence test. Artificial Intelligence, 174(18), 1508–1539.Hernández-Orallo, J., Dowe, D. L., España-Cubillo, S., Hernández-Lloreda, M. V., & Insa-Cabrera, J. (2011). On more realistic environment distributions for defining, evaluating and developing intelligence. In J. Schmidhuber, K. R. Thórisson, & M. Looks (Eds.), LNAI series on artificial general intelligence 2011 (Vol. 6830, pp. 82–91). Berlin: Springer.Hernández-Orallo, J., Dowe, D. L., & Hernández-Lloreda, M. V. (2014). Universal psychometrics: Measuring cognitive abilities in the machine kingdom. Cognitive Systems Research, 27, 50–74.Hernández-Orallo, J., Insa, J., Dowe, D. L. & Hibbard, B. (2012). Turing tests with turing machines. In A. 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Berlin: Springer.Insa-Cabrera, J., Dowe, D. L., España-Cubillo, S., Hernández-Lloreda, M. V., & Hernández-Orallo, J. (2011). Comparing humans and AI agents. In J. Schmidhuber, K. R. Thórisson, & M. Looks (Eds.), LNAI series on artificial general intelligence 2011 (Vol. 6830, pp. 122–132). Berlin: Springer.Knuth, D. E. (1973). Sorting and searching, volume 3 of the art of computer programming. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Kotovsky, K., & Simon, H. A. (1990). What makes some problems really hard: Explorations in the problem space of difficulty. Cognitive Psychology, 22(2), 143–183.Legg, S. (2008). Machine super intelligence. PhD thesis, Department of Informatics, University of Lugano, June 2008.Legg, S., & Hutter, M. (2007). Universal intelligence: A definition of machine intelligence. Minds and Machines, 17(4), 391–444.Leonetti, M. & Iocchi, L. (2010). Improving the performance of complex agent plans through reinforcement learning. 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Mechanisms, Then and Now: From Metaphysics to Practice

For many old and new mechanists, Mechanism is both a metaphysical position and a thesis about scientific methodology. In this paper we discuss the relation between the metaphysics of mechanisms and the role of mechanical explanation in the practice of science, by presenting and comparing the key tenets of Old and New Mechanism. First, by focusing on the case of gravity, we show how the metaphysics of Old Mechanism constrained scientific explanation, and discuss Newton’s critique of Old Mechanism. Second, we examine the current mechanistic metaphysics, arguing that it is not warranted by the use of the concept of mechanism in scientific practice, and motivate a thin conception of mechanism (the truly minimal view), according to which mechanisms are causal pathways for a certain effect or phenomenon. Finally, we draw analogies between Newton’s critique of Old Mechanism and our thesis that the metaphysical commitments of New Mechanism are not necessary in order to illuminate scientific practice