Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism

The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables that systematically affect processing. The relevant process type for a given token is given by the complete algorithmic characterization of the token, along with the values of all the causally relevant parameters. The typing that results is far removed from the typings of folk psychology, and from much of the epistemology literature. But it is principled and empirically grounded, and shows good prospects for yielding the desired epistemological verdicts. The paper articulates and elaborates the theory, drawing out some of its consequences. Toward the end, the fleshed-out theory is applied to two important case studies: hallucination and cognitive penetration of perception

Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception

Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards by which experiences are evaluated. I examine recent defenses of inferentialism by Susanna Siegel, Peter Markie, and Matthew McGrath and argue that the prospects for inferentialism are di

Proper Function, Reliability and Warrant

Should we be impressed by Plantinga’s radical take on episteme warrant? Not really. The author of this paper is convinced by Plantinga’s negative arguments against former theories of warrant but critical of the proposed theory of proper functionality. The Case of the God-Given Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion does not work for Plantinga, as can be illustrated clearly be analyzing the Part-Time Mind Reader from an old The Twilight Zone episode. External reliability is important, sure, but the cognizer herself must recognize that the faculty or process is reliable. Contra Plantinga, the author formulates a new theory of warrant that takes into account cognitive means, things like “I saw it” and “I read it in the newspaper,” which vary in reliability by person, context, etc. These are necessarily weaker justifications than those Plantinga puts forth unsuccessfully, but they do align with Humean coherence. The author believes his proposed new theory improves upon its influences

Factivity, hallucination, and justification

Veridically perceiving puts us in a better epistemic position than, say, hallucinating does, at least in that veridical perception affords knowledge of our environment in a way that hallucination does not. But is there any further epistemic advantage? Some authors have recently argued that veridical perception provides a superior epistemic benefit over hallucination not just concerning knowledge, but concerning justification as well. This contrasts with a traditional view according to which experience provides justification irrespective of whether it’s veridical or hallucinatory. I think both views are mistaken. Although this traditional view should be rejected in favor of one on which some hallucinations are epistemically worse than veridical perceptions (and some are not), I don’t believe there is good reason to think that the mere fact of hallucination—or factivity more generally—has any consequences for justification. Susanna Schellenberg has endorsed both the traditional and the factive views (for different elements or kinds of perceptual justification), and I critique her views in detail, though I also draw out more general epistemological lessons about factivity and evidence

Three grades of iconicity in perception

Perceptual representations are sometimes said to be iconic, or picture-like. But what does this mean, and is it true? I suggest that the most fruitful way to understand iconicity is in terms of similarity, but there are three importantly different grades of similarity that that might hold between perceptual representations and their objects, and these should be distinguished. It is implausible that all perceptual representations achieve even the weakest grade of iconicity, but I speculatively suggest a “Kantian” view, whereby all perceptual representation involves fillers placed in a “strongly iconic” spatial framework. Those fillers will likely be hybrid structures, with varying grades of iconicity combined with non-iconic elements

Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?

The New Evil Demon Problem is supposed to show that straightforward versions of reliabilism are false: reliability is not necessary for justification after all. I argue that it does no such thing. The reliabilist can count a number of beliefs as justified even in demon worlds, others as unjustified but having positive epistemic status nonetheless. The remaining beliefs---primarily perceptual beliefs---are not, on further reflection, intuitively justified after all. The reliabilist is right to count these beliefs as unjustified in demon worlds, and it is a challenge for the internalist to be able to do so as well

Experiential evidence?

Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of introspection but which generalizes to theories of perceptual justification as wel

What we talk about when we talk about epistemic justification

Stewart Cohen argues that much contemporary epistemological theorizing is hampered by the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ is a term of art (rather than something we all pretheoretically understand) and one that is never given any serious explication in a non-tendentious, theory-neutral way. He suggests that epistemologists are therefore better off theorizing in terms of rationality, rather than in terms of ‘epistemic justification’. Against this, I argue that even if the term ‘epistemic justification’ is not broadly known, the concept it picks out is quite familiar, and partly because it’s a term of art, justification talk is a better vehicle for philosophical theorizing. ‘Rational’ is too unclear for our philosophical purposes, and the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ gets fleshed out by appeal to substantive, controversial theses is no obstacle to its playing the needed role in epistemological theorizing

The Agricultural Genome to Phenome Initiative (AG2PI): creating a shared vision across crop and livestock research communities

Predicting phenotype from genotype is a central challenge in biology. By understanding genomic information to predict and improve traits, scientists can address the challenges and opportunities of achieving sustainable genetic improvement of complex, economically important traits in agriculturally relevant species. Converting the enormous, recent technical advances in all areas of genomics and phenomics into sustained and ecologically responsible improvements in food and fuel production is complex. It will require engaging agricultural genome to phenome (G2P) experts, drawing from a broad community, including crop and livestock scientists and essential integrative disciplines (e.g., engineers, economists, data and social scientists). To achieve this vision, the USDA NIFA-funded project inaugurating the Agricultural Genome to Phenome Initiative (AG2PI) is working to: Develop a cohesive vision for agricultural G2P research by identifying research gaps and opportunities; advancing community solutions to these challenges and gaps; and rapidly disseminating findings to the broader community. Towards these ends, this AG2PI project is organizing virtual field days, conferences, training workshops, and awarding seed grants to conceive new insights (details at www.ag2pi.org). Since October 2020, more than 10,000 unique participants from every inhabited continent have engaged in these activities. To illustrate AG2PI’s scope, we present survey results on agricultural G2P research needs and opportunities, highlighting opinions and suggestions for the future. We invite stakeholders interested in this complex but critical effort to help create an optimal, sustainable food supply for society and challenge the community to add to our vision for future accomplishments by a fully actualized AG2PI enterprise

Human SNP links differential outcomes in inflammatory and infectious disease to a FOXO3-regulated pathway

The clinical course and eventual outcome, or prognosis, of complex diseases varies enormously between affected individuals. This variability critically determines the impact a disease has on a patient’s life but is very poorly understood. Here, we exploit existing genome-wide association study data to gain insight into the role of genetics in prognosis. We identify a noncoding polymorphism in FOXO3A (rs12212067: T > G) at which the minor (G) allele, despite not being associated with disease susceptibility, is associated with a milder course of Crohn’s disease and rheumatoid arthritis and with increased risk of severe malaria. Minor allele carriage is shown to limit inflammatory responses in monocytes via a FOXO3-driven pathway, which through TGFβ1 reduces production of proinflammatory cytokines, including TNFα, and increases production of anti-inflammatory cytokines, including IL-10. Thus, we uncover a shared genetic contribution to prognosis in distinct diseases that operates via a FOXO3-driven pathway modulating inflammatory responses. PAPERCLIP