The Boundaries of Democracy

This book provides a general theory of democratic inclusion for the present world. It presents an original contribution to our understanding of the democratic ideal by explaining how democratic inclusion can apply to individuals in a variety of contexts: the workplace, social clubs, religious institutions, the family, and, of course, the state. The book explores the problem of democratic inclusion, what it means to be subject to de facto authority, how this conception translates into legal systems, and the relationship between territorial claims by the state, and law’s claim to legitimate authority. The volume will be of interest to scholars and researchers of politics, especially political theory and democracy

The Boundaries of Democracy

This book provides a general theory of democratic inclusion for the present world. It presents an original contribution to our understanding of the democratic ideal by explaining how democratic inclusion can apply to individuals in a variety of contexts: the workplace, social clubs, religious institutions, the family, and, of course, the state. The book explores the problem of democratic inclusion, what it means to be subject to de facto authority, how this conception translates into legal systems, and the relationship between territorial claims by the state, and law’s claim to legitimate authority. The volume will be of interest to scholars and researchers of politics, especially political theory and democracy

Public services demokratiska uppdrag : Fri åsiktsbildning och offentligt förnuft

The democratic significance of public broadcasting corporations has gained  renewed urgency as a result of developments in the outside world and the ongoing public service committee (Dir. 2023:27). According to the accepted view, public broadcasting corporations serve democracy by strengthening the free expression of opinion. This paper argues that this argument is not sufficient. In addition to strengthening the free formation of opinions, the mission must be understood as part of democracy’s self-defense. The substance of this mission derives from the values and principles defined in the Swedish constitution (Regeringsformen). Based on the idea of a “public reason”, the democratic argument for public broadcasting corporations is that they contribute to an informative, balanced and restrained public sphere that enables a democratic overlapping consensus among citizens with otherwise conflicting interests and

Democracy

Democracy is a term that is used to denote a variety of distinct objects and ideas. Democracy describes either a set of political institutions or an ideal of collective self-rule. Democracy can also be short for a normative principle of either legitimacy or justice. Finally, democracy might be used to denote an egalitarian attitude. These four uses of the term should be kept distinct and raises separate conceptual and normative issues. The value of democracy, whether democratic political institutions or democratic self-rule, is either instrumental, non-instrumental, or both. The non-instrumental value of democracy derives either from the alleged fairness of majority rule or from the value of the social relationships enabled by participation in democratic procedures. The instrumental value of democracy lends support from a growing body of empirical research. Yet, the claim that democracy has a positive causal effect on public goods is inconclusive with respect to the moral justification of democratic institutions. Normative reasons for democracy’s instrumental value must instead appeal to the fact that it contributes to equality, liberty, truth, or the realization of popular will. Democracy as a principle of either political legitimacy or justice is a normative view that evades concerns with the definition and value of democracy. Normative democracy is a claim about the conditions either for legitimacy or justice of either public authority or coercion. Debates in normative democracy are largely divorced from the conceptual and empirical concerns that inform studies of democracy elsewhere. The boundaries of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions is a question that applies to all four uses of democracy. The boundary question raises three distinct issues. The first is the extent of inclusion required among the members of the unit. The second is if membership in the unit is necessary for inclusion or if people that are not recognized as members are on certain conditions also entitled to participate. The third and final issue concerns the boundaries of the unit itself.Artikel publicerad i Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics [online].</p

Three Conceptions of Law in Democratic Theory

Democratic theory tends to proceed on the assumption that law requires democratic legitimation because it is coercive. However, the claim that law requires democratic legitimation is distinct from claims about the nature of law. This paper takes issue with the notion that law is coercive by an exploration of three distinct understandings of the nature of law: the state-based conception of law, law as the rules of institutionalized normative systems, and law as social norms. Drawing on insights from legal and democratic theory, the paper defends the view that the ‘law’ to which democratic claims apply are the rules of conduct of institutionalized normative systems. Since rules that belong to such systems are found in associations beyond or below the level of the state, the scope of democratic participation is significantly wider than is usually recognized

Democratic Legitimacy, Institutions for Future Generations and the Problem of Constitutional Power

Recognising widely held concerns regarding ‘presentist’ biases in democratic institutions, thischapter challenges the contention that democratic legitimacy inexorably requires the inclusion of futuregenerations in democratic decisions. According to two requirements of democratic legitimacy – inclusionand constitutional empowerment – people should be empowered to participate in decisions about policyand law, and to determine the rules structuring the political framework. Drawing a distinction betweenthese requirements, this chapter contends that though it may be feasible to ‘include’ future generations forproxy representation, future generations cannot enjoy ‘constitutional power’.This chapter applies two separate understandings of constitutional power to future generations, the‘constituent power’ to create constitutional frameworks, and the ‘constituted power’ to amend suchframeworks’ norms. It contends that neither is achievable for unborn people and that full intergener‐ational democratic legitimacy is therefore impossible. Reason for concern with the long-term effectsof contemporary policies and political systems still remain, of course. But in attending to them, justicerather than democratic legitimacy should guide our judgments

Popular sovereignty facing the deep state. The rule of recognition and the powers of the people

This paper investigates the relationship between the idea of popular sovereignty and the conditions for legal validity and argue that the latter imposes definitive limits to the former. Popular sovereignty has been defined as the condition when the will of the people is the "supreme authority in the state". Following this conception, there is no authority above the people and this is traditionally understood to mean that the authority of the people is above the constitution. Legal validity, though admittedly still debated, is here understood along Hart's "rule of recognition" According to which the validity of norms ultimately depends on the social practices of public officials. Though presumably uncontroversial that democratic peoples are entitled to remake the constitution, the powers of the people with respect to the substance of the law are nevertheless limited with respect to decisions of legal validity. The most basic rules in a legal system are not found in the constitution as they are the rules deciding what is to count as a legal norm within that system. They are more fundamental than the constitution because they also define what norms is the constitution legally speaking

Authority and Coercion Beyond the State? The Limited Applicability of Legitimacy Standards for Extraterritorial Border Controls

Extraterritorial border controls prevent migrants from arriving at the territory of the state and effectively undermine rights to apply for asylum and protections against non-refoulement. As a result, a wealth of scholarship argues that external border controls are illegitimate exercises of state power. This paper challenges two versions of this argument, first, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject migrants to morally impermissible forms of coercion and, second, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject migrants to illegitimate claims to authority. Against coercion-based accounts of legitimacy, this paper defends the view that while carrier-sanctions are coercive, the coerciveness of a policy is not relevant to its legitimacy. What is relevant is instead whether the authority claimed by the state is legitimate. Against authority-based accounts, this paper argues that states are unable to claim authority in the relevant sense over migrants that are present in the territories of other states. The paper concludes by suggesting that the charge that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate should shift towards the state that allows carriers to enforce these policies on their territories. No state has the legitimate authority to permit other states to pressure carriers to prevent migrants in need of protection from travelling. The state that introduces carrier-sanction legislation, on the other hand, is not exercising illegitimate authority though they may act contrary to demands of justice