Weed Control as a Collective Action Problem: Quantifying group effects on individual behavior, and clarifying the theoretical frame

Weeds reduce the biodiversity and productivity of agricultural systems, and are a problem both around the world, and in Montana. Weeds are challenging to control because their effective dispersal mechanisms enable cross-boundary colonization, and so managers must engage diverse groups of private landowners. Researchers have recognized weed control is a collective action problem, but there is little research quantifying the role of collective factors on an individual’s decision to control. To fully understand the motivations behind independent weed control, I initiated a study to quantitatively assess different types of landowners and their weed control behaviors, the relationship between collective interest variables and individual landowners’ willingness to engage in weed control behaviors. I identified a k-means cluster analysis as a way to segment the Montana landowner population, and the Collective Interest Model as a way to understand the influence of collective factors on an individual’s decision to control for weeds, while holding individual factors constant. I surveyed 4,500 Montana landowners, and analyzed results using descriptives and ordinarily least squares regression. I found five different groups of landowners, and that collective factors, such as an injunctive norm and the belief weeds are a cross boundary problem, were significantly correlated with willingness to engage in three different weed control behaviors. This suggests if weed control outreach explicitly promotes collective messages, it may be able to more effectively engage landowners. In addition, I believe that weed control has been mis-classified in the literature as a common pool resource problem, instead it should be considered a public good problem. I present reasoning that weeds are a public good problem and draw on solutions to public good problems generally and adapt them to weed control

Collective Aspects of Mitigating Interactions Between Large Carnivores and Humans

Understanding how to coexist with wildlife is of critical importance for successful conservation, particularly for large carnivores, who pose risks to human safety, livestock, and game species. In Montana (USA), black and grizzly bears occur across much of the western half of the state. In particular, grizzly bears are protected by the Endangered Species Act and their populations and ranges are expanding, resulting in increased overlap between humans and bears. Interactions with bears can be mitigated when landowners take certain actions to secure bear attractants – such as using bear resistant garbage cans and feed storage, using electric fences, removing livestock carcasses, and taking down bird feeders in the spring and fall. Few studies have examined what drives uptake of these actions, but factors include perceived risks and benefits and personal experience at the individual level. This research aims to understand how individual and collective aspects drive uptake of actions to secure bear attractants. We administered a mail-back questionnaire to Montana landowners and used the collective interest model to determine the relative effects of collective and individual factors in influencing whether landowners secure bear attractants. We developed logistic regression models for each behavior. Collective aspects that drove behavior included social norms (i.e., what individuals think they should do and what others are doing) and network centrality (i.e., how much social influence an individual has). This research suggests that outreach campaigns that only highlight the risks of large carnivores could be substantially improved by describing the collective aspects of mitigation

Opportunities for better use of collective action theory in research and governance for invasive species management

Sònia Graham va finalitzar el seu treball quan treballava a l'ICTA, que ha col·laborat al seu finançament amb fons Maria de Maeztu.Unidad de excelencia María de Maeztu MdM-2015-0552Controlling invasive species presents a public-good dilemma. Although environmental, social, and economic benefits of control accrue to society, costs are borne by only a few individuals and organizations. For decades, policy makers have used incentives and sanctions to encourage or coerce individual actors to contribute to the public good, with limited success. Diverse, subnational efforts to collectively manage invasive plants, insects, and animals provide effective alternatives to traditional command-and-control approaches. Despite this work, there has been little systematic evaluation of collective efforts to determine whether there are consistent principles underpinning success. We reviewed 32 studies to identify the extent to which collectiveaction theories from related agricultural and environmental fields explain collaborative invasive species management approaches; describe and differentiate emergent invasive species collective-action efforts; and provide guidance on how to enable more collaborative approaches to invasive species management. We identified 4 types of collective action aimed at invasive species-externally led, community led, comanaged, and organizational coalitions-that provide blueprints for future invasive species management. Existing collective-action theories could explain the importance attributed to developing shared knowledge of the socialecological system and the need for social capital. Yet, collection action on invasive species requires different types of monitoring, sanctions, and boundary definitions. We argue that future government policies can benefit from establishing flexible boundaries that encourage social learning and enable colocated individuals and organizations to identify common goals, pool resources, and coordinate efforts

Opportunities for better use of collective action theory in research and governance for invasive species management

Controlling invasive species presents a public-good dilemma. Although environmental, social, and economic benefits of control accrue to society, costs are borne by only a few individuals and organizations. For decades, policy makers have used incentives and sanctions to encourage or coerce individual actors to contribute to the public good, with limited success. Diverse, subnational efforts to collectively manage invasive plants, insects, and animals provide effective alternatives to traditional command-and-control approaches. Despite this work, there has been little systematic evaluation of collective efforts to determine whether there are consistent principles underpinning success. We reviewed 32 studies to identify the extent to which collective-action theories from related agricultural and environmental fields explain collaborative invasive species management approaches; describe and differentiate emergent invasive species collective-action efforts; and provide guidance on how to enable more collaborative approaches to invasive species management. We identified 4 types of collective action aimed at invasive species-externally led, community led, comanaged, and organizational coalitions-that provide blueprints for future invasive species management. Existing collective-action theories could explain the importance attributed to developing shared knowledge of the social-ecological system and the need for social capital. Yet, collection action on invasive species requires different types of monitoring, sanctions, and boundary definitions. We argue that future government policies can benefit from establishing flexible boundaries that encourage social learning and enable colocated individuals and organizations to identify common goals, pool resources, and coordinate efforts

Collective factors drive individual invasive species control behaviors: evidence from private lands in Montana, USA

Invasive terrestrial plants globally threaten agricultural and natural systems. Prolific dispersal mechanisms enable "weeds" to colonize across ownership boundaries, constituting a collective action problem where effective control requires contributions from multiple actors. Researchers have long recognized the cross-boundary nature of weed control, yet most studies have focused on whether actor-specific characteristics, such as sociodemographics and cognition, influenced individual weed control behaviors. More recent work has begun to explore the drivers of communal control efforts, i.e., cooperatives, group actions. Few studies have empirically investigated how the collective aspects of weed invasions influence individual control behaviors. Here we provide quantitative evidence of a relationship between collective aspects of the weed control problem and landowners' willingness to engage in individual weed control efforts. In a mail-back survey of Montana landowners (n = 1327) we found collective factors, such as injunctive norms and the belief that weeds are a cross-boundary problem, were significantly correlated with willingness to engage in three different weed control behaviors. Each behavior was correlated with a unique suite of collective factors suggesting that successful interventions must be behavior-specific. These results add to a growing body of evidence that the collective nature of invasive species control is critical for understanding human behavioral responses