Smart or Selfish - When Smart Guys Finish Nice

In three different variants of an one-shot public good game I analyze the relationship between cooperation and cognitive abilities, assessed through the cognitive reflection test (CRT). In a between-subjects design, the baseline case is contrasted with two treatment conditions that allow to control for two potentially moderating factors: By employing a test for the presence of confusion, the first condition scrutinizes whether higher cognitive abilities are correlated with cooperation proper or simply grant a better understanding of the incentive structure. The second condition explores the proposition that the link between cognitive abilities and cooperation could depend on the complexity of the decision situation. To exogenously create a cognitively more demanding choice setting, subjects had to decide under time pressure. I find a strong and positive relationship between CRT-scores and cooperation, that is not driven by confusion. Time pressure has a strongly moderating effect on this relationship

Five Essays on Cooperation with an Application to Climate Change Mitigation

This dissertation comprises five essays on the topic of cooperation and climate change mitigatio

What do we learn from public good games about voluntary climate action? Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Evidence from public good game experiments holds the promise of instructive and cost-effective insights to inform environmental policy-making, for example on climate change mitigation. To fulfill the promise, such evidence needs to demonstrate generalizability to the specific policy context. This paper examines whether and under which conditions such evidence generalizes to voluntary mitigation decisions. We observe each participant in two different decision tasks: a real giving task in which contributions are used to directly reduce CO2 emissions and a public good game. Through two treatment variations, we explore two potential shifters of generalizability in a within-subjects design: the structural resemblance of contribution incentives between the tasks and the role of the subject pool, students and non-students. Our findings suggest that cooperation in public good games is linked to voluntary mitigation behavior, albeit not in a uniform way. For a standard set of parameters, behavior in both tasks is uncorrelated. Greater structural resemblance of the public goods game leads to sizable correlations, especially for student subjects

Improving compliance with COVID-19 guidance: a workplace field experiment

Compliance with hygiene and other safety measures in the workplace was an important component of society's strategy for reducing infections at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular before vaccinations were widely available. We report the results of a field trial of well-established behavioural interventions (social norms, pledging and messenger effects) we implemented to improve compliance with such measures in an occupational setting. We use daily reports of own and other's behaviour to assess the effects of these interventions and supplement these subjective (self-reported) measures with objective data on hand sanitiser usage. The behavioural interventions tested have statistically significant but quantitatively moderate effects on subjective compliance measures and minimal effects on hand sanitiser usage. All effects of our interventions are short-term in nature and dissipate shortly after implementation. Our findings thus provide at most weak support for the notion that typical behavioural interventions can help support compliance with infection prevention measures in the workplace

Cooperation in Public Good Games. Calculated or Confused?

Recent experiments suggest that contribution decisions in a public goods game (PGG) are more likely to be cooperative if based on intuition rather than reflection. This paper (i) reinvestigates the behavioral impact of so-called cognitive style in the PGG; and (ii) connects it with an earlier literature on the role of cognitive failure (confusion). This is motivated by the possibility that the method of time pressure, commonly used to identify cognitive style, invites confusion as a confounding factor. Two channels for such confounds are identified and experimentally tested: A heterogeneous treatment effect of time pressure depending on subject's confusion status and a direct impact of time pressure on subjects' likelihood of being confused. Our reinvestigation on the behavioral impact of time pressure confirms that cognitive style matters, but that deliberation rather than intuition drives cooperation. The confounding effect of confusion is not found to be direct, but to operate through a heterogeneous treatment effect. Time pressure selectively reduces average contributions among those subjects whose contributions can confidently be interpreted as cooperative rather than confused

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for the role of subjective utility differences under time pressure

Economists are increasingly interested in the cognitive basis of pro-social behavior. Using response time data, several authors have claimed that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conflicting empirical evidence, we provide theoretical arguments showing under which circumstances an increase in "fair" behavior due to time pressure provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects choices under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person prisoner’s dilemma and binary dictator games. As in previous experiments, we exogenously manipulate response times by placing subjects under time pressure or forcing them to delay their decisions. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option across all choice situations. Our main finding is that time pressure does not increase the fraction of fair choices relative to time delay irrespective of the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair option. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive"

Investigations of decision processes at the intersection of psychology and economics

In recent years, there has been growing interest in capturing, manipulating, and analyzing the effects of decision-making processes that underlie economic choice. This editorial discusses these recent developments by contextualizing the six contributions to the special issue “Cognition and Economic Behavior” within the broader scope of the existing literature

Turbulent Rayleigh-B\'enard convection described by projected dynamics in phase space

Rayleigh-B\'enard convection, i.e. the flow of a fluid between two parallel plates that is driven by a temperature gradient, is an idealised setup to study thermal convection. Of special interest are the statistics of the turbulent temperature field, which we are investigating and comparing for three different geometries, namely convection with periodic horizontal boundary conditions in three and two dimensions as well as convection in a cylindrical vessel, in order to work out similarities and differences. To this end, we derive an exact evolution equation for the temperature probability density function (PDF). Unclosed terms are expressed as conditional averages of velocities and heat diffusion, which are estimated from direct numerical simulations. This framework lets us identify the average behaviour of a fluid particle by revealing the mean evolution of fluid of different temperatures in different parts of the convection cell. We connect the statistics to the dynamics of Rayleigh-B\'enard convection, giving deeper insights into the temperature statistics and transport mechanisms. We find that the average behaviour is described by closed cycles in phase space that reconstruct the typical Rayleigh-B\'enard cycle of fluid heating up at the bottom, rising up to the top plate, cooling down and falling down again. The detailed behaviour shows subtle differences between the three cases