The Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission: An Early Appraisal

The Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission has now been in existence for two and a half years, having been established by the Law Reform Act 19691 and constituted by an Order of the Governor in Council on January 25, 1972. As the members of the Commission are appointed for a period of two years, the term of appointment of the first members of the Commission expired on January 25 this year, but new members were not in fact appointed until June 25 this year. From February to June, the Commission was more or less in limbo. In view of the recent appointment of the new members and the commencement of a new era in the Commission\u27s activities, it is the purpose of these notes first to review the progress of the Commission in its first two years and second, to suggest ways in which the Commission might be improved or operate more effectively in future. The notes are divided into parts, each dealing with one aspect of the Commission and its activities - its construction, its terms of reference, its powers and the fetters on its powers, its programme and plans for the future, its procedure for implementing its plans, its finances, its relationship with the different branches of the legal profession and its general function in the community. The intention is not be be unduly critical of the Commission at this early stage, but rather to offer some constructive suggestions for its future development

Recent Developments in Stem Cell Research: Social, Ethical, and Legal Issues for the Future (George P. Smith II Lecture)

On February 12, 2009, Professor Skene delivered the George P. Smith II Lecture at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Undertaking Research in Other Countries: National Ethico-Legal Barometers and International Ethical Consensus Statements

Is it ethical for scientists to conduct or to benefit from research in another country if that research would be unlawful, or not generally accepted, in their own country

Ethical Standards for Human-to-Animal Chimera Experiments in Stem Cell Research

The purpose of this report is to offer investigators and members of SCRO and animal research committees well-grounded ethical standards for evaluating research involving the transfer of multipotent and pluripotent human stem cells and their direct derivatives into animal systems. This report is deliberately written in general terms so that its recommendations can apply to diverse institutions and international settings. Thus, investigators and reviewers should aspire to these proposed ethical standards while exercising appropriate judgment in individual situations

Arguments against people "owning" their own bodies, body parts and tissue

© 2002 Loane SkeneThere are a number of reasons why people should not, as a general principle, be recognised as having proprietary rights in their own body, body parts and tissue. This paper commences with some of the arguments against recognising such rights then examines in more detail the arguments that have been put forward in favour of recognising them. In relation to the latter, counter-arguments are put to each argument. The author argues that the counter-arguments outweigh the arguments. This leads to her conclusion that the law should not recognise proprietary rights in bodies, body parts or tissue in favour of the people from whom they came, though proprietary rights may arise in favour of a third person, by principles that suggested in the paper

The Schiavo and Korp cases: Conceptualising end-of-life decision making

Copyright confirmation in progress. Any queries to [email protected] incompetent, terminally ill patient can be viewed in two ways – as a person who is dying, when futile, life-prolonging treatment can be lawfully withdrawn; or a person with a disability, for whom a guardian must be appointed to decide about treatment. Terri Schiavo’s husband took the first view and her parents the second. Maria Korp was regarded as dying when treatment was withdrawn. The difference in conceptualising a patient’s situation is critical. Where a patient is dying, treatment can be lawfully withdrawn whatever the view of the relatives; they cannot require treatment to be continued. Where a patient has a disability and a surrogate decision maker is appointed, the focus is on what the patient would have wanted in such circumstances, so that the surrogate can act in accordance with the patient’s wishes. That deflects attention from the fundamental legal principle that whatever a patient or the relatives want, they are not legally entitled to demand treatment that doctors consider futile in the circumstances