Advancement And Validation Of A Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle Model Utilizing Experimental Data From Vehicle Testing

The objective of the research into modeling and simulation was to provide an iterative improvement to the Wayne State EcoCAR 2 team\u27s math-based design tools for use in evaluating different outcomes based on hybrid powertrain architecture tweaks, controls code development and testing. This thesis includes the results of the team\u27s work in the EcoCAR 2 competition for university student teams to create and test a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle for reducing petroleum oil consumption, pollutant emissions, and Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. Plant model validations and advancements brought the vehicle plant model directionally closer to the actual vehicle\u27s experimental data and achieved a significant error reduction in 10 of 11 metrics detailed in the research. The EcoCAR 2 competition events provided the opportunity for the team to get experimental data of the vehicle\u27s behavior on the vehicle chassis dyno and the vehicle on road testing from General Motors proving ground test tracks. Experimental data was used from 5 sources to validate and advance the vehicle plant model: 1. Component Test Benches 2. HIL Test Bench 3. Component on Dynamometer (Dyno) 4. Vehicle on Chassis Dyno 5. Vehicle On Road The advancement of the electric motor powertrain and the vehicle chassis portions of the vehicle plant model provided significant error reduction (at least a 10% reduction) in: * Dynamic Performance metrics (2 of 3 had more than 10% error reduction): o 9% --\u3e 0% 0-60 mph Acceleration o 15% --\u3e 19% 50-70 mph Acceleration o 37% --\u3e 3% Braking Distance, 60-0 mph deceleration * Emissions & Energy Consumption metrics (8 of 8 had more than 10% error reduction): Utility Factor (UF) is from SAE J1711 standard for measuring the exhaust emissions and fuel economy of HEV\u27s and PHEV\u27s o 49% --\u3e 16% Total Vehicle Range (ESS + Fuel Tank) o 11% --\u3e 0.2% Charge Depletion Range o 43% --\u3e 24% Charge Sustaining Fuel Consumption o 47% --\u3e 27% UF-Weighted Fuel Energy Consumption o 9% --\u3e 1% UF-Weighted AC Electric Energy consumption o 38% --\u3e 21% UF-Weighted Total Energy Consumption o 45% --\u3e 26% UF-Weighted Well To Wheel Petroleum Energy Use o 43% --\u3e 31% UF-Weighted Well To Wheel GHG Emissions However, significant error (more than 10%) still exists and more work is needed in: * 1 of 3 Dynamic Performance metrics * 6 of 8 Emissions & Energy Consumption metrics Future work includes adding a torque converter plant model between the engine plant model and the transmission plant model on the front wheel drive powertrain, implementing identified advancements into the engine and transmission plant models, and additional analysis for validation of the engine and transmission plant models. The vehicle plant model now provides higher confidence and higher accuracy (in most cases) for the simulation results, making the vehicle plant model significantly more useful for evaluating fuel economy, dynamic performance, and emissions improvement results when testing the team\u27s controls code changes for optimization

Pretrial Practice: Teaching Law Students How to Prepare Cases for Trial in a Simulation Course

With a colleague, Jack Guttenberg, I team-teach a four-credit, one-semester simulation course at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law called Pretrial Practice. We have taught Pretrial Practice seven times since we first offered it in the spring of 1988. The course takes students through the process of preparing two cases for trial, beginning with initial client interviews and culminating in one case with a settlement negotiation and, in the other, a final pretrial conference with a local judge.Pretrial Practice provides students with an opportunity, in one semester, to engage in all the activities necessary to develop and prepare a case for trial in a law office setting. Very few of our law school\u27s courses give students a chance to prepare cases for litigation. Most of our skills courses introduce students to the process of trying a case or presenting an appellate argument. These courses begin with a prepared set of facts presented in a simulated record. The students have little or no opportunity to establish additional facts to fill out the record. Nor do they have an opportunity to talk with a client and determine the client\u27s concerns and goals. The purpose of these courses is to teach litigation skills, not to teach students what to do before they walk into the courtroom

Pretrial Practice: Teaching Law Students How to Prepare Cases for Trial in a Simulation Course

With a colleague, Jack Guttenberg, I team-teach a four-credit, one-semester simulation course at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law called Pretrial Practice. We have taught Pretrial Practice seven times since we first offered it in the spring of 1988. The course takes students through the process of preparing two cases for trial, beginning with initial client interviews and culminating in one case with a settlement negotiation and, in the other, a final pretrial conference with a local judge.Pretrial Practice provides students with an opportunity, in one semester, to engage in all the activities necessary to develop and prepare a case for trial in a law office setting. Very few of our law school\u27s courses give students a chance to prepare cases for litigation. Most of our skills courses introduce students to the process of trying a case or presenting an appellate argument. These courses begin with a prepared set of facts presented in a simulated record. The students have little or no opportunity to establish additional facts to fill out the record. Nor do they have an opportunity to talk with a client and determine the client\u27s concerns and goals. The purpose of these courses is to teach litigation skills, not to teach students what to do before they walk into the courtroom

Ethics and the Settlement of Civil Rights Cases: Can Attorneys Keep Their Virtue and Their Fees

The Civil Rights Attorneys\u27 Fees Award Act of 1976 authorizes an award of fees to the prevailing party in a civil rights action. The United State Supreme Court, in Evans v. Jeff D., has interpreted the Fees Act to authorize the parties in a civil rights action to negotiate settlement of fees and merits jointly. The Court did not determine whether joint fees-merits negotiation is ethical. The author of this article contends that joint negotiation is ethical. He further contends that it is ethical for plaintiff\u27s attorney to reject an offer of settlement if the offer is coupled with a demand that he waive attorneys\u27 fees

Right to Talk: Has Justice Antonin Scalia Compromised His Objectivity with a Public Remark?

With two assisted suicide cases scheduled for argument before the Supreme Court this term, Justice Antonin Scalia already has publicly staked out his position on the issue. While sentiments he expressed in 1990 in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, are well-known, Scalia told an audience at Catholic University late last year that it is absolutely plain there is no [constitutional] right to die. Is it proper for sitting judges to make such statements? While no one would deny Scalia his First Amendment right to say what he pleases, that hardly quells concerns about the advisability of making such statements. Vincent Martin Bonventre, a professor at Albany Law School in New York state, contends that Scalia crossed a line, robbing the public of its confidence in justices\u27 open-mindedness and willingness to consider each case on its own merits. For Lloyd B. Snyder, a professor at Cleveland-Marshall Law School, not only is Scalia well within the boundaries of propriety, but he has done lawyers and potential litigants a favor by speaking so openly

Lawyer Deception to Uncover Wrongdoing

A Colorado district attorney used deception to get a man who had murdered three people and was threatening to kill again to surrender himself to the police. Following this, the Colorado Attorney Regulation Counsel charged the attorney with violating Rules 8.4(c) and 4.3 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. This article discusses the Rule 8.4(c) charge. Colorado and Ohio have identical provisions in their Codes of Professional Conduct on dishonesty and violations of professional conduct rules

Ethics and the Settlement of Civil Rights Cases: Can Attorneys Keep Their Virtue and Their Fees?

The Civil Rights Attorneys\u27 Fees Award Act of 1976 authorizes an award of fees to the prevailing party in a civil rights action. The United State Supreme Court, in Evans v. Jeff D., has interpreted the Fees Act to authorize the parties in a civil rights action to negotiate settlement of fees and merits jointly. The Court did not determine whether joint fees-merits negotiation is ethical. The author of this article contends that joint negotiation is ethical. He further contends that it is ethical for plaintiff\u27s attorney to reject an offer of settlement if the offer is coupled with a demand that he waive attorneys\u27 fees

Bringing Ohio\u27s Legal Ethics into the 21st Century

The time has come for Ohio to replace the Code of Professional Responsibility with a set of standards based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The author offers seven reasons for doing so

Rhetoric, Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech by Attorneys

There are two problems with permitting litigation about attorney speech to proceed without requiring bar disciplinary agencies to present empirical data or other evidence to support claims that restrictions on attorney speech are necessary. First, the history of bar association restrictions on attorney speech should make us skeptical that the bar rules are based on lofty ideals about protection of the public. The restrictions began as rules promulgated by elite corporate lawyers whose effect was to limit the activities of their less affluent brethren who were representing criminal defendants and other impoverished clients. The purpose of the rules was to enhance the image of the corporate lawyers not to protect the public. Fostering the image that members of the bar are gentlemen is not a sufficient reason for suppressing speech. Second, the clients pay the ultimate price when attorney speech is excessively surpressed. The price is too high to permit a decision about the constitutionality of suppression to be made without evidentiary support. Excessive suppression of attorney advertising prevents consumers from being able to obtain information about how to get legal assistance at an affordable price. Excessive restriction on trial publicity prevents clients from being able to respond adequately to false or damaging information reported in the press. The Supreme Court should not decide cases about rules restricting attorney speech that have the potential to threaten the welfare of clients, without demanding proof that the rules are necessary to protect against real harm

Lawyer Deception to Uncover Wrongdoing

A Colorado district attorney used deception to get a man who had murdered three people and was threatening to kill again to surrender himself to the police. Following this, the Colorado Attorney Regulation Counsel charged the attorney with violating Rules 8.4(c) and 4.3 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. This article discusses the Rule 8.4(c) charge. Colorado and Ohio have identical provisions in their Codes of Professional Conduct on dishonesty and violations of professional conduct rules