They Should All Go (Again)! Forty Years of Democracy in Argentina

On 22 October, Argentines will elect a new president, half of the Chamber of Deputies, one-third of the Senate, and a few provincial governors. In a context of rampant inflation, steady poverty, and renewed corruption, the established political coalitions are being challenged by a far-right outsider. Prospects for democracy and the economy look gloomy as Argentina celebrates 40 years of democracy. In 1983 Argentina initiated the longest spell of democratic life in its history, leaving behind past instability. The country has since overcome its challenges without democratic interruption and, arguably, without seriously affecting support for democracy. Its remarkable achievements also set a global example, such as the 1980s' military trials. However, the incapacity to stabilise its own currency in the long run, with monthly inflation reaching double digits since August 2023, has led to disenchantment with politics and politicians. This is giving real chances to Javier Milei, who campaigns against the "political caste," and proposes to dollarise the economy and close the Central Bank. The slogan "Que se vayan todos!" spontaneously arising during popular protests and riots in December 2001 comes to mind. Then on the streets, now at the polls, anger and disappointment abound. Argentina is about to test its democratic resilience again. Political cooperation will be necessary to protect democracy and address the economic crisis, which its political parties have been able to offer in the past. Whether, after years of polarisation, they will be up to the task remains to be seen

Los Congresos en América Latina: legislaturas reactivas, potencialmente activas

This article analyzes the role of Latin American parliaments in the processes of formulation and implementation of public policies during the current period of democratization. The starting point of this analysis is the already established characterization of these parliaments as reactive legislatures, which not only acknowledges that the legislative initiative belongs to the president, but also that parliamentary reactions are wide and varied. Then, the article emphasizes the multifunctional role of parliaments, that is, the fact that they participate in the production of laws as well as in activities of political control, the latter often disregarded in current characterizations.Este artículo analiza el papel de los parlamentos latinoamericanos en los procesos de elaboración e implementación de políticas públicas durante el presente período democrático. Se toma como punto de partida la caracterización de los parlamentos de la región como legislaturas reactivas. Dicha caracterización reconoce, por un lado, que la iniciativa legislativa recae en general en el Presidente y, por otro, que las reacciones de los parlamentos no sólo pueden variar sino que el espectro de tal variación es bastante amplio. A continuación, se destaca aquí la multifuncionalidad de los parlamentos, esto es, su participación tanto en la elaboración de las leyes como en el desempeño de funciones de control político, lo cual no ha sido suficientemente resaltado en la literatura sobre el tema

Sequences of presidential-term-Limit reforms: Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa

In this article we take a longitudinal view on presidential-term-limit reforms in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa since the third wave of democratization. Many countries in the two regions (re-)introduced term limits at this time as a democratic safeguard against personal rule and power abuses. Since then, term limits have been contested by a plethora of reform attempts. Such reforms are commonly seen as a risk to democracy since stable institutions are considered essential for democratic consolidation, while term-limit eliminations are associated with processes of autocratization. From the literature on democratic consolidation, institutionalization and presidential-term-limit reforms we distil theoretical expectations on term-limit-reform paths across time and examine how they relate to the evolution of the political regime. To empirically investigate reform paths across regions we apply the research method of sequence analysis. We find that the stability of term-limit rules is more prevalent than expected, but that this stability sometimes masks institutional ineffectiveness under authoritarian regimes. Rule instability induced by frequent reforms can be part of a piecemeal path towards autocratization, but it can also reflect an open-ended tug of war between authoritarian tendencies and democratic resistance

The Institutional Presidency from a Comparative Perspective: Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s

This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency - meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive - in Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the changes that have come about regarding the size of the institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system - that is, to the political challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly been based on the case of the United States. Our empirical references, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, typical cases of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively allow us to show the impact of the type of government on the number and type of presidential agencies

Presidential Term Limits in Africa and Latin America: Contested but Resilient

Today, the great majority of African and Latin American countries have presidential term limits inscribed in their constitutions. Yet, Bolivia's Evo Morales and Guinea's Alpha Condé are only recent examples of incumbents trying to extend their time in office - and of the acute political conflicts that follow from these bold moves. A presidential term limit is the constitutional rule that restricts the number of terms that the president of a given state may serve. In presidential systems, such limits are a key check on the power of the incumbent. Their goal is to constrain personalism, prevent power abuse, and to promote party competition and alternation in power. In practice, term limits have not always been an effective instrument to stop the president from taking office again and again. Since the 1990s, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have been hit by an amendment fever that today accumulates to about 60 approved reforms and additional failed attempts. Term limits have been abolished, amended, or re-interpreted recurrently, but have certainly not disappeared from the political scene entirely. In contrast to power holders' attacks on term limits, survey results from Africa show that the societies they govern value this constitutional rule. Besides, in several countries popular protests have repeatedly sought to defend term limits against incumbents aspiring to extending their time in office beyond the term limits imposed by their constitutions. Term-limit abolition is a good indicator of a democratic backlash, and usually the last step in a series of institutional assaults that previously led to the concentration of power. But term limits are more often relaxed and circumvented than they are abolished. These additional executive moves can also impact democracy negatively and provoke societal conflicts. Therefore, all adjustments of the term-limit rule should be observed closely by integrating them in systematic monitoring activities, and addressed directly in political dialogues

The Political Limits of Presidential Impeachment: Lessons from Latin America

Impeachment is an important check on executive authority in presidential democracies. It is the constitutional tool for removing power-hungry presidents who threaten democracy, break the law, or get involved in corruption or other scandalous behaviour. Further, the mere existence of impeachment as a constitutional check on presidents may deter presidential misconduct. However, as recent examples in Latin America show, impeachment also opens the door for partisan interests and opportunistic political behaviour. Impeachment is a real threat for presidents without a legislative basis of support, while those with majorities are shielded, despite likely wrongdoings. In Brazil, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 generated popular disillusionment with all political actors, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro as president. In turn, despite a large and increasing number of impeachment requests on very serious grounds uncovered by congressional investigations, President Bolsonaro has thus far averted an impeachment process. In Peru, political polarisation, fragmentation, and continued presidential instability shows that impeaching a president may be an ineffective and even a counterproductive tool when the problem at hand is deeper and broader than the misconduct of the chief executive. Finally, whereas an impeachment may successfully remove a president, it does not provide a successor, often the vice-president, with a legitimate mandate or political backing to lead the country out of the crisis. It may actually reduce rather than enhance the legitimacy and governance capacity of the executive. External actors, such as the United States or the European Union, must be aware that impeachments are not an "easy fix." On the contrary, they may not address personal misbehaviour; instead, deep structural problems may lie behind the severe political crisis upon which impeachments mount. Therefore, external actors need to decode the underlying crisis, which could be one of representation, and address it by supporting constructive solutions that emphasise the accountability of political actors and institutions as well as responsive public policies

The many faces of Latin American presidentialism

Political developments in Latin America (LA) have repeatedly fuelled a rich, ongoing, and contentious academic debate about democracy and its deficits. LA is a region characterised by presidential democracies, a political system with arguably serious structural shortcomings. Brazil and Venezuela, both of which are currently undergoing severe political crises, are illustrative of both the perils of presidentialism and the institutional mechanisms that have enabled LA presidential democracies to survive, albeit with deficits. Latin America is home to various political models of presidential democracy, including several variants of majoritarian presidentialism and presidential dominance as well as coalition presidentialism and other ad hoc solutions for minority governments. Inter-institutional deadlocks due to presidents’ lack of adequate support in the respective Congress are perceived as a major shortcoming and a risk for presidential democracies. "Coalition presidentialism," as practiced in Brazil, has been an innovative LA solution for overcoming political deadlocks. However, the converse argument implies that without a coalition there might be no surviving president. While the Brazilian Congress is trying to remove President Rousseff by means of impeachment, Venezuelan president Maduro is orchestrating a constitutional coup to disempower Congress. In both cases the presidents face an adverse majority in Congress, but the solution to the deadlock situation is different for each case. Political stalemates between a congress and a president can be resolved by different means. On the one hand, presidents can try to sidestep and disempower the congress. On the other, minority presidents have sometimes been forced to resign, or removed by impeachment and other institutional equivalents to a "vote of non-confidence." Policy Implications If presidents are unable to control their parties or coalitions, their removal may become a real possibility, despite fixed presidential terms. Some scholars call for constitutional reforms to allow for earlier elections. We argue that impeachment should be replaced by a vote of non-confidence (by a two-thirds majority). Then the political debate would be framed less in normative terms (questioning the moral integrity of the incumbent president) and more in political-programmatic and partisan-related terms

Argentina 2019: Broken Economy, Strengthened Democracy

On 27 October 2019, the Peronist presidential ticket of Alberto Fernández and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner obtained victory in the first round of national elections, with 8 per cent more votes than President Mauricio Macri, who was seeking reelection. After a brief interregnum of Macri's four-year term, the Peronists - who had previously been in government for 12 consecutive years - will return to power in December. This time they will govern within a severely constraining situation, far away from the commodities boom that boosted redistribution policies during the "pink tide." Macri failed to deliver on his economic promises, and the coming government will face imminent debt services, in a context of high inflation. However, the elected and ruling presidents initiated the political transition with a cooperative attitude, facilitated by a calmed dollar after the adoption of strong controls to the exchange rate. Despite unsuccessful economics, Macri was able to retain more than 40 per cent of the vote. He won in six provinces, four of which are among the most populous and economically dynamic. The more modern and better-off portions of the electorate, which were less affected by the crisis, also voted in support of a balanced distribution of power and checks on the executive. Of the four governorships that renewed concurrently with the national elections, Macri retained just the City of Buenos Aires. He lost to the Frente de Todos the populous Buenos Aires province. The Peronists will govern in 14 provinces, of which 11 reelected their governors in spread elections throughout 2019. A crucial factor is how President-elect Fernández will deal with internal rivalries, especially with his vice-president. It is likely that the internal opposition will check the president as much as the external one, which is a recurrent feature in Peronist governments. Argentina has a long history of political instability, being particularly vulnerable under critical socioeconomic conditions. When stability is not a systemic feature, actors' strategies make the difference, and governing in hard times may be challenging, even for the party that has been used to deliver the longest spells in power. In 2019, the prospect of party alternation has helped to keep discontent away from the streets, but a slow (or non-existent) economic recovery will clash with impatient demands and expectations. Argentines may decide for party alternations in the midterm. In the short term, the maintenance of political cooperation seems crucial

Government Changeover without a Majority - Latin American Presidents' Executive Strategies

The recently established presidents in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are seeking to implement governmental agendas that represent a policy shift with respect to previous administrations. However, in doing so, they face political and social constraints. Executive politics - that is, the presidential approach to the design of the highest executive agencies and appointment strategies - stands out as a tool to improve presidential leeway and coordination capacity. Since late 2015 the Latin American left has faced setbacks due to the election of President Mauricio Macri of Argentina and President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of Peru, as well as former vice president Michel Temer's assumption of power in Brazil after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. In Argentina and Peru these power shifts in the presidency were accompanied by minority support in Congress. In Brazil, in contrast, Temer built a large co­alition in Congress, albeit within a highly polarised political and social context that threatens its cohesiveness and survival. To face congressional oppositions, attentive publics, and organised social sectors that seek to hinder their policy goals, Latin American presidents need to use their important constitutional policymaking powers - as well as their prerogatives to appoint officials and to design the executive's upper-level structure - wisely and strategically. The three presidents have established smaller institutional presidencies than their predecessors - that is, they have reduced their core structure of close aids and supports. At the same time, they have given more power to the cabinet ministers, as well as to the cabinet coordination units, with the goal of aligning the executive with the president's policy preferences. The constitutional powers that presidents have to conduct the policymaking process, particularly in Congress, are important governing tools, but executive politics represents an equally crucial strategy. Presidents use changes to the executive's design and political appointments to influence the creation of policies and achieve their policy goals. These are important (although often neglected) presidential tools, particularly when presidents are dealing with reform ­agendas within constraining political environments

Facing the Stress Test: Courts and Executives during the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic's onset imposed the need for immediate political reactions to protect the domestic population. For some months, decision-making was delegated to the executives while legislatures lost temporary influence. In such a situation, courts have an important role in checking the excesses of executive power. Latin American high courts decided on a broad range of pandemic-related cases and showed the willingness - when not the ability - to control executives also under the exceptional situation of the pandemic. Given the region's long history of intermediate judicial independence, one that is characterised by political interference, many expected such actions would only propel democratic backsliding during the pandemic. However, the active role of courts has largely underscored the continued relevance of institutional checks and balances. The highest courts were central to keeping in check two illiberal presidents, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, albeit with different outcomes. Whereas in Brazil the attempts to undermine judicial autonomy would be unsuccessful (and Bolsonaro eventually lost the electoral contest), Bukele's party used its majority in the Legislative Assembly to pack the court as soon as it obtained the legislative votes to do so. Unless presidents have legislative majorities to successfully manipulate an independent court, they rely on informal means of interference such as harsh rhetoric, defamation of judges on social media, or joining demonstrations against these institutions. Strong courts that control executives' power excesses bear the risk of attack by illiberal presidents. During emergencies like the current pandemic, this danger increases given the need for immediate decision-making. To overcome adversity, courts need to find allies in other institutions. Regional and international observers can help if they strongly condemn political interference with judicial independence and publicly denounce attacks against courts that may help undermine democracy