Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities

This paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. We contribute to existing knowledge by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). As an illustrative example, we describe a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model of the major agents who exploit the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.Baltic Sea cod, characteristic function, coalition game, cooperation, fisheries, nucleolus, Shapley value, sharing rules, stability of cooperation, Environmental Economics and Policy, C62, C70, Q22, Q28,

On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

Game-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. It is, however, the case that these types of models do not capture many real world mixed fisheries, where species are bio-logical independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting biodiversity preservation by setting up a two species model with the aim of ensuring both species survive harvesting of exploiters adapting a non-cooperative behaviour. The model starts out as a multi-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to include also biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the limits on the number of players preserving both species including the conditions to be satisfied. For visual purposes we simulate a two species model with different kind of interrelationship.Biodiversity preservation, non-cooperative game, multi-species fisheries, bio-economic modelling

Centralised versus Decentralised Enforcement of Fish Quotas

The purpose of this article is to consider under what circumstances it is better to have centralised enforcement of catch quotas and when it is better to leave enforcement to the countries themselves. It is shown for a two-country case that a welfare gain is obtained under centralised enforcement at the federal level. The result depends critically on the difference in the unit cost of enforcement at the federal and the Member State (regional) level. If the Member States have a sufficiently large cost advantage in enforcing quotas, they can be better off under decentralised enforcement. In addition, the result depends on the proportion of foreign fishermen in the domestic fishing zone. The higher the proportion of foreign fishermen in the domestic zone, the better the decentralised enforcement of quotas.Quota enforcement policy, fisheries management, Industrial Organization, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy, Q22, Q28.,

An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions

The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities af-fects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less cooperation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among au-thorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort com-pared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery.Coalition formation, Fisheries management, Quota enforcement, Self-enforcing policy

International management of North Sea herring

North Sea herring is a transboundary resource, shared by the EU and Norway. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the harvests or total allowable catch quotas (TACs) for this species should be divided between these two countries so that both parties are satisfied. We apply a discrete-time game-theoretic model in which we show that the EU should be allocated more than half of the TAC even if the EU has higher harvesting costs. This result is due to the distribution pattern of the herring, with a larger share of herring located in the EU zone. However, we find that according to the Nash bargaining solution, the current sharing allocates too large a share to the EU

Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery

The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic. After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years. The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. This will be done in a game theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and initial stock size. The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (2007, 2010). The case of cooperative management is analysed for different cost parameters and starting values of the stock. An interesting result is that the optimal policy gives rise to pulse fishing. As this involves effort (and harvests) varying from year to year, potentially imposing substantial social costs on the industry in years when the fishery is closed, a policy of constant effort is also considered. Finally, non-cooperative management is analysed

Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort.Atlantic salmon, bioeconomic model, coalition formation, partition function, sharing rules, stability analysis, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. A comprehensive analysis of the economic and biological fundamentals that influence the success of coalition formation is provided. The results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher would be the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.Straddling Fish Stock, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, Unregulated Fishing, Bioeconomic Model, Coalition Formation Model, Free-Riding

Is there a Finnish Animal Welfare Kuznets Curve?

Livestock Production/Industries,