On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignoranc

Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview

This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti

Dynamic Rearrangement of Cell States Detected by Systematic Screening of Sequential Anticancer Treatments

Signaling networks are nonlinear and complex, involving a large ensemble of dynamic interaction states that fluctuate in space and time. However, therapeutic strategies, such as combination chemotherapy, rarely consider the timing of drug perturbations. If we are to advance drug discovery for complex diseases, it will be essential to develop methods capable of identifying dynamic cellular responses to clinically relevant perturbations. Here, we present a Bayesian dose-response framework and the screening of an oncological drug matrix, comprising 10,000 drug combinations in melanoma and pancreatic cancer cell lines, from which we predict sequentially effective drug combinations. Approximately 23% of the tested combinations showed high-confidence sequential effects (either synergistic or antagonistic), demonstrating that cellular perturbations of many drug combinations have temporal aspects, which are currently both underutilized and poorly understood

Prediction of Amyloidogenic and Disordered Regions in Protein Chains

The determination of factors that influence protein conformational changes is very important for the identification of potentially amyloidogenic and disordered regions in polypeptide chains. In our work we introduce a new parameter, mean packing density, to detect both amyloidogenic and disordered regions in a protein sequence. It has been shown that regions with strong expected packing density are responsible for amyloid formation. Our predictions are consistent with known disease-related amyloidogenic regions for eight of 12 amyloid-forming proteins and peptides in which the positions of amyloidogenic regions have been revealed experimentally. Our findings support the concept that the mechanism of amyloid fibril formation is similar for different peptides and proteins. Moreover, we have demonstrated that regions with weak expected packing density are responsible for the appearance of disordered regions. Our method has been tested on datasets of globular proteins and long disordered protein segments, and it shows improved performance over other widely used methods. Thus, we demonstrate that the expected packing density is a useful value with which one can predict both intrinsically disordered and amyloidogenic regions of a protein based on sequence alone. Our results are important for understanding the structural characteristics of protein folding and misfolding

All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge *

Abstract In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis-the thesis that the mind extends into the world-on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level