Public Video Surveillance and the Separation of Powers

The thesis focuses on the response from the United States government on new challenges brought by the public video surveillance, in particular the privacy threat. Regarding regulating public video surveillance, the United States has gone on a different path, either from Britain with its similar political system or from China with a totally different one. The three branches of government in the U.S. are deadlocked and unable to take any meaningful actions. The Supreme Court, which is in a strong position to set national and uniform standards for privacy protection, has not found a way to break away from its own precedents. The legislative branch can do little on the national level regulations due to federalism and the distribution of law enforcement activities at the state and local level. Local legislative efforts might be helpful, but the process in each place will be complicated by concerns about public security, the interests of industry, and politicians’ imperative to take visible actions like video surveillance to fight against crimes and protect people, especially in the post-9/11 context. The executive branch might be the weakest point in the deadlock because it already bears responsibility for resolving tensions between privacy and safety. In the absence of action by the judicial and the legislative branches, self-restraint by the executive branch has become crucial in determining the actual privacy protection, however, the possibility of abuse by the executive branch may increase at the same time. Also, the United States’ local governments are not accountable to a single national authority. They must be accountable to the people. This thesis concludes that the public participation is the key to breaking through the deadlock in light of the democratic political structure in the United States

Public Video Surveillance and the Separation of Powers

The thesis focuses on the response from the United States government on new challenges brought by the public video surveillance, in particular the privacy threat. Regarding regulating public video surveillance, the United States has gone on a different path, either from Britain with its similar political system or from China with a totally different one. The three branches of government in the U.S. are deadlocked and unable to take any meaningful actions. The Supreme Court, which is in a strong position to set national and uniform standards for privacy protection, has not found a way to break away from its own precedents. The legislative branch can do little on the national level regulations due to federalism and the distribution of law enforcement activities at the state and local level. Local legislative efforts might be helpful, but the process in each place will be complicated by concerns about public security, the interests of industry, and politicians’ imperative to take visible actions like video surveillance to fight against crimes and protect people, especially in the post-9/11 context. The executive branch might be the weakest point in the deadlock because it already bears responsibility for resolving tensions between privacy and safety. In the absence of action by the judicial and the legislative branches, self-restraint by the executive branch has become crucial in determining the actual privacy protection, however, the possibility of abuse by the executive branch may increase at the same time. Also, the United States’ local governments are not accountable to a single national authority. They must be accountable to the people. This thesis concludes that the public participation is the key to breaking through the deadlock in light of the democratic political structure in the United States

From Standardization to Formality: Unintended Consequences of Police Standardization Reform of Law Enforcement in China

According to social construction theory, cases are not objective entities waiting to be discovered or revealed; they cannot exist without case-makers. Construction of a case is a subjective process of choosing, increasing, decreasing, selecting, and reshaping. Therefore, a natural gap exists between the constructed and the real world. This dissertation delves into the gap, not from the existing angle of selectiveness, but from the angle of compliance. The study uses empirical data to try to answer the following question: Since the police standardization reform of law enforcement—at least parts of them—aim at controlling the evidence-collecting process and at improving the quality of dossiers, do investigative officers actually conform to standardization rules, and do dossiers meet standardization requirements? After carefully examining the contents of 16 homicide cases collected from two police departments and interviewing the relevant participants, the study reveals unintended consequences of the standardization reform—expansion of formality. Investigative behaviors have become ceremonial or ritualized, and the outcome of those behaviors (i.e. evidence collected) is like an empty shell. It looks reasonable and ostensibly meets requirements of norms, but has little meaning, if any, and may not fulfill its original purpose. The theoretical analyses of this dissertation reflect the view that participants (i.e. investigative officers, case reviewers, or supervisors) must be embedded into the working environment where they take action for collecting and preserving evidence. Inspired by the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework proposed by Professor Elinor Ostrom, the interpretation of the study’s findings places the organizational structure of the investigative officers and the texture of the collective culture in the center of the stage. Only through the lens of influencing factors, such as conflicting norms and interests of investigative officers, can the true roots of administrative logic over judicial logic in the course of action be seen

From Standardization to Formality: Unintended Consequences of Police Standardization Reform of Law Enforcement in China

According to social construction theory, cases are not objective entities waiting to be discovered or revealed; they cannot exist without case-makers. Construction of a case is a subjective process of choosing, increasing, decreasing, selecting, and reshaping. Therefore, a natural gap exists between the constructed and the real world. This dissertation delves into the gap, not from the existing angle of selectiveness, but from the angle of compliance. The study uses empirical data to try to answer the following question: Since the police standardization reform of law enforcement—at least parts of them—aim at controlling the evidence-collecting process and at improving the quality of dossiers, do investigative officers actually conform to standardization rules, and do dossiers meet standardization requirements? After carefully examining the contents of 16 homicide cases collected from two police departments and interviewing the relevant participants, the study reveals unintended consequences of the standardization reform—expansion of formality. Investigative behaviors have become ceremonial or ritualized, and the outcome of those behaviors (i.e. evidence collected) is like an empty shell. It looks reasonable and ostensibly meets requirements of norms, but has little meaning, if any, and may not fulfill its original purpose. The theoretical analyses of this dissertation reflect the view that participants (i.e. investigative officers, case reviewers, or supervisors) must be embedded into the working environment where they take action for collecting and preserving evidence. Inspired by the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework proposed by Professor Elinor Ostrom, the interpretation of the study’s findings places the organizational structure of the investigative officers and the texture of the collective culture in the center of the stage. Only through the lens of influencing factors, such as conflicting norms and interests of investigative officers, can the true roots of administrative logic over judicial logic in the course of action be seen