Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices

Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins. (JEL D43, D82, K21, L12, L61, L65)

International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies

We examine the possible effects of private international cartels on developing countries by looking in detail at three recent cartel cases, as well as at a broader cross-section of 42 recently prosecuted international cartels. We discuss the indirect effects on developing country producers, either as competitors or co-conspirators, as well the direct effects of cartels on developing country consumers. By combining trade data with a sample of US and European prosecutions of international cartels in the 1990s, we are able to estimate the order of magnitude of the consequences of these cartels on developing countries as consumers. In 1997, the latest year for which we have trade data, developing countries imported $54.7 billion of goods from a sub-sample of 19 industries that contained a price-fixing conspiracy during the 1990s. These imports represented 5.2% of total imports and 1.2% of GDP in developing countries.

International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies

The U.S. Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have all recently voiced concern about international price- fixing cartels. The U.S. and European Union have increased prosecution of international cartels in the past decade, but very few developing countries have made similar enforcement efforts. If these cartels have significant effects on developing country consumers and producers, the lack of antitrust prosecutions by developing countries against these cartels is an important problem. Geographically limited prosecut ions may not provide sufficient disincentives to deter collusion that has worldwide benefits for colluding firms. Ongoing prosecutions of international cartels by industrialized countries may open up markets for entry by developing country producers, but these efforts may be undermined if cartels create durable barriers to entry. Western governments are also susceptible to manipulation by domestic producers using tariff barriers and anti- dumping duties to protect the home market, both during and after the price- fixing conspiracy. Thus, developing countries may need to develop their own antitrust laws and enforcement capabilities to help deter international cartel activity. A recent ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also opens up the possibility that developing country consumers may be able to exact remedies in U.S. courts. In this paper we examine the possible effects of private international cartels on developing countries by looking in detail at three recent cartel cases, as well as at a broader cross- section of forty- two recently prosecuted international cartels. We discuss the indirect effects on developing country producers, either as competitors or co- conspirators, as well the direct effects of cartels on developing country consumers. By combining trade data with a sample of US and European prosecutions of international cartels in the 1990s, we are able to make a first attempt at quantifying the order of magnitude of the consequences of these cartels on developing countries as consumers. In 1997, the latest year for which we have trade data, developing countries imported $54.7 billion of goods from a sub - sample of 19 industries that had seen a price- fixing conspiracy during the 1990s. These imports represented 5.2% of total imports and 1.2% of GDP in developing countries.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39923/2/wp538.pd

Improving the Discovery of Health Data in a Domain Repository

Presentation to the NIH Behavioral and Social Science Roundtable, Bethesda, MarylandPresentation to the NIH Behavioral and Social Science Roundtable, Bethesda, MarylandNational Institutes of Healthhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/145728/1/Levenstein NIH BSSRCC October 5 2018 FINALpptx.pptxhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/145728/3/Levenstein NIH BSSRCC October 5 2018.pd

Review of \u3cem\u3eThe End of Normal: The Great Crisis and the Future of Growth\u3c/em\u3e. James K. Galbraith. Reviewed by Charles Levenstein

James K. Galbraith, The End of Normal: The Great Crisis and the Future of Growth. Simon and Schuster (2014), 304 pages, $26.00 (hardcover),$16.00 (paperback)

The role of the general practitioner in the early management of acute myocardial infarction

The recent literature on intensive coronary care units is briefly reviewed to show that much of the new knowledge should be applied by the general practitioner who is in the most important position, being the first doctor to see the patient. A much greater responsibility now rests on the GP whose attitude and management require considerable re-orientation.A regime for the use of lignocaine and atropine is suggested for the treatment of the minor premonitory arrhythmias in an attempt to prevent the fatal major arrythmias, which are mainly responsible for the high early death rate.By better appreciation of the emergency situation, better decision making and the application of a few therapeutic rules to prevent major arrythmias, it is hoped that the GP will play a major role in reducing the mortality of acute myocardial infarction

Cartels and Collusion - Empirical Evidence

Chapter prepared for publication in Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, editors. Cartels occur in a wide range of industries and engage in a wide range of behaviors in their efforts to increase profits. In this chapter, we discuss the wide variety of techniques that cartels use to increase prices and profits. Studies of national and international markets across the twentieth century find cartels in a wide variety of products and services, and these cartels typically last between five and eight years. The most important determinant of cartel breakup is effective antitrust policy. While it has often been presumed that cartels’ demise results from cheating by member firms tempted by short term profits, empirical analysis suggests that cheating rarely destroys cartels. The potential profits from collusion provide sufficient incentives for cartels to develop creative ways to limit the temptations that inevitably arise. While scholars and policy makers have often been concerned that business cycle downturns are associated with cartel formation, the evidence we review here does not suggest strong cyclical effects. There is evidence that cartels are formed during periods of falling prices, but these are more likely to be the result of market integration or an increase in competitive intensity than macroeconomic fluctuations. Similarly, cartel breakup does not evidence strong cyclicality.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/94308/1/1182_MLevenstein.pd

Transparency, Reproducibility, and Replicability

Presentation at the American Statistical Association's Joint Statistical Meetings in Vancouver, Canada, July 29, 2018. Session on Transparency, Reproducibility, and ReplicabilityFrontier social science and evidence-based policy analyses increasingly rely on large-scale, naturally occurring data, such as administrative, transaction, and social media data. These data capture phenomena at higher frequency, lower cost, and greater timeliness than traditional methods. Using naturally occurring data for analytic purposes is not free, requiring management of governance and custody, processing, and linking to other data. Without methods for preservation and access, with appropriate provenance, naturally occurring data may be re-produced again and again, at high cost. The cost is not simply in dollars and time. There is significant cost to science, as replication is impossible. Naturally occurring data naturally changes. Analyses repeated on data without proper documentation, versioning, or provenance vary from one another for reasons having nothing to do with underlying science. The Inter-university Consortium for Social and Political Research has for over 55 years curated and disseminated social science data for re-use and replication. This paper presents steps ICPSR is taking to develop tools and protocols, including a new repository of data linkage algorithms.https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/145176/3/JSM Transparency & Reproducibility 2018.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/145176/6/JSM Transparency & Reproducibility 2018.pdfDescription of JSM Transparency & Reproducibility 2018.pdf : Presentatio