Représentations et usages des armements contemporains : pour une socio-anthropologie de la complexité technique

Thése : références bibliographiquesSophie lefeez, Représentations et usages des armements contemporains : pour une socio-anthropologie de la complexité technique, thèse de doctorat de philosophie, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne en partenariat avec le Centre d’étude des techniques, des connaissances et des pratiques (CETCOPRA), soutenue le 12 septembre 2014, un volume (557 p.) Directeur de thèseGérard dubey, professeur à l’Institut Mines-Télécom JuryCharles kirke, senior lecturer militar..

An examination of the validity of the concept of nuclear deterrence within the framework of post-cold war international relations : an analytical conflict resolution approach

Nuclear deterrence is born from the two superpowers’ relations during the Cold War as they were the first countries to get nuclear weapons and they were the main and most powerful rivals in the world. Then new actors joined the game by testing their own nuclear bombs: the UK in 1952, followed by France in 1960, China in 1964, India in 1974, and Pakistan in 1998. Israel pretends it does not have any nuclear weapons but it is an open secret that they do 1. France helped Israel to get its weapons and the nuclear explosion in 1979 off the southern coast of Africa probably involved Israel and South Africa (sourced by the Federation of American Scientists, the Wisconsin Project on Arms Control, the Center for Defense Information, etc.). This was confirmed by Mordechai Vanunu, former Israeli scientist who worked on developing the bomb. The intrusion of new nuclear countries frightened the United States and the USSR because the balance was already fragile and newcomers could break it. Would the game remain "safe" with more players? Therefore in 1968 both countries drafted a treaty to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970, at a time when five countries had successfully achieved a nuclear explosion. The NPT officially recognises only these five countries as nuclear-weapons states. They happen to be also the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council. India and Pakistan carried out a nuclear test after 1968 and are therefore referred to as non-official nuclearweapons states. The new nuclear states adopted and adapted the nuclear doctrine to their needs, their geopolitical interests and their place in international relations

Histoire de l’artillerie nucléaire de terre française, 1959-1996

Ce hors-série des Cahiers d’études et de recherches de l’armée (CERMA) s’inscrit dans une collection qui s’est donné pour vocation de traiter des objets. Celui-ci traite en particulier des systèmes d’armes nucléaires tactiques de l’armée de terre. Le sujet n’en est donc pas la politique nucléaire stricto sensu. La dissuasion française est ici abordée par les moyens de sa mise en œuvre au plan tactique : il s’agit essentiellement des matériels, mais les hommes et l’organisation ne sont pas oub..

La préparation de l’armée américaine à la transition énergétique

Les armées américaines poursuivent depuis une quinzaine d’années une politique de transition énergétique en deux volets : production autonome d’énergies renouvelables, ou au minimum consommation d’énergies renouvelables, et conversion aux biocarburants. Leurs motivations sont principalement stratégiques et économiques. Initiée par le niveau fédéral, cette politique a été appropriée différemment par chacune des trois armées ( terre, air, mer ) en fonction de leur principal poste de dépense énergétique. L’armée de terre a ainsi encouragé la production d’énergies renouvelables sur ses emprises et la conversion d’une partie de sa flotte de véhicules terrestres à l’électrique. La Navy s’est résolument engagée sur la voie des biocarburants, sans réussir toutefois à faire décoller une industrie capable de répondre aux immenses besoins du Département à la défense à un prix concurrentiel. Quant à l’armée de l’air, ses efforts ne sont guère allés au-delà de la certification de ses aéronefs à l’usage des biocarburants. En 2015, les armées étaient capables de produire environ 82 % du total de l’énergie renouvelable consommée, mais seulement 3,6 % de la consommation totale d’électricité du Département à la défense. Elles se sont alors lancées dans des projets de plus grande capacité productive. L’arrivée au pouvoir des républicains a néanmoins mis un coup d’arrêt à certains programmes et modifié les priorités. Or, les armées voient dans les énergies renouvelables principalement un moyen de renforcer leur résilience et de gagner en autonomie stratégique : elles poursuivent donc leurs actions mais de manière plus discrète.The American forces have been conducting a policy of energetic transition for about fifteen years, based on two pillars : self-production, or at least consumption, of renewable energies, and conversion to biofuels. Their motivations are mainly strategic and economic. Launched at the federal level, this policy has been assimilated differently by the three forces according to what constitutes their largest item of energy expenditure. The U.S. Army has encouraged the production of renewable energy on its bases and launched a programme to convert its terrestrial vehicles to electricity. The Navy has strongly committed to develop biofuels but failed to get the industry massively produce biofuels at a competitive price to meet the military demand. As for the Air Force, its efforts did not really get beyond the certification of its planes. In 2015, the forces could produce about 82 % of the total renewable energy consumption, but only 3.6 % of the total electricity consumption of the Department of defense. Therefore, the forces increased the productive capacity of their projects. With the Republicans in power, programmes were halted, and priorities modified. But the forces perceive the renewable energies as way to strengthen their resilience and their strategic autonomy, that is why they have pursued their actions, in a more discrete way

Contemporary weapons uses and representations : a social anthropology of technical complexity

En Irak et en Afghanistan, les EEI (engins explosifs improvisés) ont durement atteint les matériels militaires et les soldats occidentaux. Cette confrontation entre haute et faible technicité soulève la question des choix techniques. Les rapports institutionnels et les acteurs mettent habituellement en avant deux raisons pour justifier le choix de la haute technicité : la nécessité de jouir d'une supériorité technique sur l'adversaire pour vaincre, et l'imprévisibilité des futures interventions militaires. L'étude de terrain sur le système de missile antichars Milan et son successeur temporaire, le Javelin, montre que les combattants ne lient pas la polyvalence à la technicité, et que leur travail est en train d'être fonctionnalisé. En effet, les concepteurs (États-majors, DGA, industriels) ont recours à l'approche systémique pour améliorer la cohérence entre matériels et accroître la performance d'ensemble. Cette approche s'inspire de la rationalité managériale, qui pénètre de plus en plus le milieu militaire. Or, les combattants réinventent souvent leurs matériels du fait du caractère imprédictible des conflits, et la puissance née de cette rationalité gestionnaire se révèle sur le terrain en partie fragile et déréalisée. La complexité ressentie par les acteurs à propos des armements contemporains serait alors le révélateur d'une évolution technique hors sol et hors du temps commun, distante des êtres humains concrets.In Iraq and in Afghanistan, IEDs (improvised explosive devices) severely hit Western military equipment and personnel. This high-tech / low-tech face-off raises questions about technical choices. Institutional reports and actors usually justify the choice of high technicity on two grounds: the need to have technical superiority over rivals to win and the uncertainty surrounding future military interventions. A ground study about the Milan antitank missile system and his temporary successor, the Javelin, revealed versatility is not related to technicity in users' mind, and showed servants are being functionalised. Indeed, designers (military HQs, DGA, private industries) have opted for a systemic approach to increase consistency among equipment and gain in overall performance. Users have got considered as a piece of the system — serving a function. This approach owes much to managerial rationality, which has pervaded the military organisation to a high degree. However, fighters often re-invent their equipment role due to war unpredictability, while power delivered by managerial rationality proves to be partly fragile and derealised. Complexity actors detect about contemporary weapons seems to be a pointer of a technical evolution carried out above ground and beyond time, remote from concrete human beings

Grégoire Chamayou, Théorie du drone

Après s’être intéressé aux Chasses à l’homme (2010), le philosophe Grégoire Chamayou s’est tourné vers les drones, réalisant une analyse de l’usage létal des drones par les Américains. Dès les premières pages, il affirme son opposition à cette pratique et son but de montrer que la justification d’un tel usage repose sur un détournement sémantique et langagier. L’auteur rappelle à ce propos comment l’administration américaine a justifié en 2001 le recours à la chasse à l’homme. Une telle prati..

Defence industrial links between EU and US

The European Commission’s initiatives in the field of armament should lead to a deeper integration of European DTIBs in the coming years. In parallel, the links between European and American DTIBs take the form of technological and armament cooperation, and of capital links between European or American companies. This report aims at analysing the links between the US DTIB and the EU DTIB, and the consequences these links carry on cooperation between European DTIBs. These links vary by country. France has strived to preserve its strategic autonomy when developing its DTIB. Its technological and capability-related reliance on the United States has thus remained limited. Nonetheless, cooperation is sought when it is mutually beneficial while French companies seek to invest in the US market, as do other European DTIBs. The German DTIB was rebuilt belatedly after World War II, partly on the basis of French-German cooperation. German industry is now privatised and the scope of the German DTIB’s partnerships has widened to other European countries and to the US. The German supply chain is now well established in American armament programmes. The Italian DTIB has consistently pursued a policy of active cooperation, whether with the US or with EU member states. Links with the US have notably been built in the context of NATO and through bilateral agreements. In parallel, Italy has developed partnerships with European countries. Rome’s cooperation policy is thus inclusive, and has considered diverse factors such as political links, capability requirements, the need to develop certain technologies and to preserve industrial capabilities and jobs in Italy. The British DTIB has historically enjoyed deeper links with US industry, as a result of the cultural closeness between the UK and the US, and of the strategic proximity that dates back to the end of World War II. The links between US and UK DTIBs thus follow a model of strategic partnership. Nevertheless, the UK’s industrial and defence policy is also pursued within a European framework. The missile manufacturer MBDA is nowadays considered as the deepest model of transnational industrial and defence integration in Europe. While Sweden seeks to preserve its industrial capabilities in two sectors – submarines and military aircraft – it appears to be most technologically reliant on the US among the surveyed countries. It is worth noting also that these links are long-standing, dating back to the cold war and the Soviet threat, despite Sweden not being a NATO member state. The links with the US are thus very different from one country to another, and carry varying implications. While the costs of acquiring American equipment can be low despite their high technological grade, there are often constraints on their use and restrictions on technologies that will not be transferred, or that will be unusable for other partnerships. These links are also formalised through bilateral agreements promoting armament cooperation, as is the case for UK-Italian cooperation. For its part, Sweden has signed interstate agreements with the US in the field of technological cooperation. DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL LINKS BETWEEN EU AND US / September 2017 3 Since the European Council meeting in December 2013 and in its 2016 Global Strategy, the EU has set itself the task of developing "a certain degree of strategic autonomy" supposed to encourage greater competitiveness of European DTIBs. In order to promote the development of this European defence industrial policy, we must seek to ensure that the links between US and EU DTIB are mutually beneficial. To do this, two conditions must be met: -That the rules governing relations between US and EU DTIB be based on the principle of reciprocity and on equal rules of regulation of respective DTIBs. -That the rules governing relations between US and EU DTIB be defined in the context of a dialogue between the European Union and the United States and not bilaterally between each European country and the United States. Today the multiplication of bilateral agreements between the United States and European Union member states are potential obstacles to the establishment of a level playing field governing the relations between European DTIBs; There is also a lack of reciprocity and equal regulation of EU and US DTIB. This concerns different areas: access to advanced capabilities, unrestricted use of exported armament, access to cooperated technologies, rules governing investment in US and European companies, rules governing property rights over technologies, rules governing export controls. Organizing the transatlantic relationship in the field of armaments in order to have a more balanced and profitable relationship, can be achieved in two complementary ways. At the European level, the European Defence Research Program (EDRP) will have strong implications for the relations between the companies of the US DTIB and the EDTIB. The rules governing access to finance and the ownership of intellectual property rights (IPR), which will be adopted for collaborative R&T projects involving European defence companies, will result in a common framework governing the relationship between these companies and the US EDTIB: the more Europeans will collaborate among themselves in the field of defence research, the more they will be able to set common and mutually beneficial rules in their relationship with the United States. It may also be considered that some EU States will decide to engage in enhanced cooperation in the industrial defence field which could include the following rules: -Obligation to achieve a level of 30% R&T in common among the members of the enhanced cooperation, which means 10% more than the target that was defined 10 years ago by the European Defence Agency and that is regularly reminded in the objectives of the European Union; -Obligation to inform members of enhanced cooperation of agreements on defence R&T cooperation concluded with the United States so as to ensure compatibility of these agreements with existing agreements between members of enhanced cooperation. The objective is to prevent agreements with the United States from subsequently restricting the scope of existing agreements between European countries; DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL LINKS BETWEEN EU AND US / September 2017 4 　 -Obligation to systematically consider the acquisition of military equipment manufactured by one of the member countries of enhanced cooperation. This should be accompanied by reinforced security of supply rules; -The need to bring the export policies of the member states of the enhanced cooperation closer together. These rules, complementary with, and not contradictory to, those which are being defined at European Union level, would accelerate industrial defence consolidation in Europe and make it possible to consider on a more balanced, mutually equally beneficial, basis relations between the United States and the European Union in the field of armaments. These rules would also be inspired by political principles: to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the European Union when necessary. Far from forbidding cooperation between the US and the EU DTIB, such enhanced cooperation would be facilitated because cooperation between US EDTIB and EU DTIB would not be a brake on European cooperation, as it is currently still too often the case

Apocalypses

L'image de la fin d'un monde que contient le terme Apocalypse se retrouve dans de nombreuses variantes de sens commun sur l'effondrement brutal d'une civilisation. Certes, il est souvent rappelé que le terme grec Αποκάλυψις signifie révélation ou dévoilement, et la première lecture dans ce cadre devrait être religieuse. Mais l'extension dans le sens commun à la notion de catastrophe radicale se justifie puisque l'Apocalypse de Jean a bien été placée en conclusion du Nouveau Testament. Cette perspective de la fin a hanté le monde chrétien, tout particulièrement durant le premier millénaire. Elle fut une source féconde non seulement d'images de l'effondrement mais aussi des châtiments que l'humanité était obligée de subir avant sa disparition. Que vaut donc aujourd'hui cette réflexion lorsque l'homme a désenchanté le monde et pris en mains son destin où les malheurs ne peuvent plus être imputés à Dieu mais à lui-même