39 research outputs found
Observations of MMOD Impact Damage to the ISS
This paper describes meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage observations on the International Space Station (ISS). Several hundred MMOD damage sites on ISS have been documented using imagery taken from ISS windows. MMOD damage sites visible from ISS windows are typically larger approximately 5mm diameter and greater due to the larger viewer-to-surface distance. Closer inspection of these surfaces by astronauts during spacewalks reveals many smaller features that are typically less distinct. Characterization of these features as MMOD or non- MMOD is difficult, but can be partially accomplished by matching physical characteristics of the damage against typical MMOD impact damage observed on ground-based impact tests. Numerous pieces of space-exposed ISS hardware were returned during space shuttle missions. Subsequent ground inspection of this hardware has also contributed to the database of ISS MMOD impact damage. A handful of orbital replacement units (ORUs) from the ISS active thermal control and electrical power subsystems were swapped out and returned during the Space Shuttle program. In addition, a reusable logistics module was deployed on ISS for a total 59.4 days on 11 shuttle missions between 2001 and 2011 and then brought back in the shuttle payload bay. All of this returned hardware was subjected to detailed post-flight inspections for MMOD damage, and a database with over 1,400 impact records has been collected. A description of the largest observed damage features is provided in the paper. In addition, a discussion of significant MMOD impact sites with operational or design aspects is presented. MMOD impact damage to the following ISS modules/subsystems is described: (1) Solar Arrays, (2) US and Russian windows, (3) Extravehicular Activity (EVA) handrails, (4) Radiators, and (5) Russian Functional Cargo Block (FGB) module
Comparison of Risk from Orbital Debris and Meteoroid Environment Models on the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure from an impact from a meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. An extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) spacesuit impact during a US extravehicular activity (EVA) is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. A risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) by the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. Need to understand the effect of updated meteoroid and orbital debris environment models to EMU risk
Toughened Thermal Blanket for MMOD Protection
Thermal blankets are used extensively on spacecraft to provide passive thermal control of spacecraft hardware from thermal extremes encountered in space. Toughened thermal blankets have been developed that greatly improve protection from hypervelocity micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts. These blankets can be outfitted if so desired with a reliable means to determine the location, depth and extent of MMOD impact damage by incorporating an impact sensitive piezoelectric film. Improved MMOD protection of thermal blankets was obtained by adding selective materials at various locations within the thermal blanket. As given in Figure 1, three types of materials were added to the thermal blanket to enhance its MMOD performance: (1) disrupter layers, near the outside of the blanket to improve breakup of the projectile, (2) standoff layers, in the middle of the blanket to provide an area or gap that the broken-up projectile can expand, and (3) stopper layers, near the back of the blanket where the projectile debris is captured and stopped. The best suited materials for these different layers vary. Density and thickness is important for the disrupter layer (higher densities generally result in better projectile breakup), whereas a highstrength to weight ratio is useful for the stopper layer, to improve the slowing and capture of debris particles
Projectile Density Effects on Shield Performance
In the past, the orbital debris environment was modeled as consisting entirely of aluminum particles. As a consequence, most of the impact test database on spacecraft micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shields, and the resulting ballistic limit equations used to predict shielding performance, has been based on using aluminum projectiles. Recently, data has been collected from returned spacecraft materials and other sources that indicate higher and lower density components of orbital debris also exist. New orbital debris environment models such as ORDEM2008 provide predictions of the fraction of orbital debris in various density bins (high = 7.9 g/cu cm, medium = 2.8 g/cu cm, and low = 0.9-1.1 g/cu cm). This paper describes impact tests to assess the effects of projectile density on the performance capabilities of typical MMOD shields. Updates to shield ballistic limit equations are provided based on results of tests and analysis
Toughened Thermal Blankets for Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Protection
No abstract availabl
Bumper: A Tool for Analyzing Spacecraft Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk
Bumper is NASAs computer program for analyzing spacecraft micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk. Bumper was developed in the late-1980s and has been continuously used and maintained since. The user base has grown from a few government entities to now include numerous commercial entities as well. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team is responsible for all aspects of the Bumper software. Bumper has been used to characterize MMOD risk on hundreds of spacecraft. All of the International Space Station (ISS) modules, visiting vehicles and numerous external components and systems have been analyzed. Bumper was used to analyze each of the Space Shuttle missions since STS-50. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) MMOD shielding is being developed using Bumper as well. Bumper has also been used on numerous telescopes (Hubble, James Webb, and Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescopes), scientific probes (Stardust, New Horizons, Parker Solar Probe), and Earth observation satellites (Landsat, Joint Polar Satellite System). Bumper is also being used to analyze the micrometeoroid risk and support design of the Deep Space Gateway (DSG) and Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions. The HVIT Bumper Configuration Control Board (CCB) ensures that all changes to the code are approved, reviewed, and documented. Most of the changes are made to add new MMOD damage ballistic limit equations (BLEs). BLEs are typically added in response to completion of a hypervelocity impact (HVI) test series and development of an associated BLE. Other less frequent changes include updates of the debris or meteoroid environment models, feature enhancements, and feature retirement. Some BLEs are commercially sensitive and/or proprietary, so the CCB also manages code user-version control and software distribution. The current version Bumper 3 is a FORTRAN executable that utilizes a 64-bit architecture. Bumper 3 has numerous features that make it a powerful tool for analyzing spacecraft MMOD risk. Bumper uses the latest orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment models. Bumper also easily processes large spacecraft geometry models, recognizes hidden surfaces, permits BLE assignment by name or number, and conducts quality checks of the spacecraft geometry model. Bumper 3 can also be used to estimate the effects of particle penetration through thin, high-standoff distance hardware components such as solar arrays and radiators. This is done using a special HVIT-developed technique know as the 3-Part Analysis. The paper introduces the Bumper 3 MMOD risk analysis code and provides an example MMOD risk assessment showing Bumpers role in the overall MMOD protection design process
STS-118 Radiator Impact Damage
During the August 2007 STS-118 mission to the International Space Station, a micro-meteoroid or orbital debris (MMOD) particle impacted and completely penetrated one of shuttle Endeavour s radiator panels and the underlying thermal control system (TCS) blanket, leaving deposits on (but no damage to) the payload bay door. While it is not unusual for shuttle orbiters to be impacted by small MMOD particles, the damage from this impact is larger than any previously seen on the shuttle radiator panels. A close-up photograph of the radiator impact entry hole is shown in Figure 1, and the location of the impact on Endeavour s left-side aft-most radiator panel is shown in Figure 2. The aft radiator panel is 0.5-inches thick and consists of 0.011 inch thick aluminum facesheets on the front and back of an aluminum honeycomb core. The front facesheet is additionally covered by a 0.005 inch thick layer of silver-Teflon thermal tape. The entry hole in the silver-Teflon tape measured 8.1 mm by 6.4 mm (0.32 inches by 0.25 inches). The entry hole in the outer facesheet measured 7.4 mm by 5.3 mm (0.29 inches by 0.21 inches) (0.23 inches). The impactor also perforated an existing 0.012 inch doubler that had been bonded over the facesheet to repair previous impact damage (an example that lightning can strike the same place twice, even for MMOD impact). The peeled-back edge around the entry hole, or lip , is a characteristic of many hypervelocity impacts. High velocity impact with the front facesheet fragmented the impacting particle and caused it to spread out into a debris cloud. The debris cloud caused considerable damage to the internal honeycomb core with 23 honeycomb cells over a region of 28 mm by 26 mm (1.1 inches by 1.0 inches) having either been completely destroyed or partially damaged. Figure 3 is a view of the exit hole in the rear facesheet, and partially shows the extent of the honeycomb core damage and clearly shows the jagged petaled exit hole through the backside facesheet. The rear facesheet exit hole damage including cracks in the facesheet measures 14 mm by 14 mm (0.55 inches by 0.55 inches). The remnants of the impacting particle and radiator panel material blown through the rear facesheet hole also created two penetrations in the TCS blanket 115 mm (4.5 inches) behind the rear facesheet. Figure 4 shows these two impacts, which are located 75 mm (3 inches) apart. Some deposits of material were found on the payload bay door beneath the TCS blanket, but no additional damage occurred to the door. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship of the facesheet entry hole to the TCS blanket damage, which may indicate the direction of the impacting particle. The image on the left side of Figure 5 shows an overhead view of the damaged radiator after the facesheet holes were cored out of the panel. The entry hole location and the two underlying TCS blanket damage sites are annotated on the image. Section A-A, running through the entry hole and TCS blanket damage locations, describes a 25 angle from the longitudinal axis of the shuttle. The 2nd impact angle can be seen in section A-A on the right side of Figure 5. An average 17 angle of impact to the surface normal was derived by measuring the angles of the two damage sites in TCS blanket to the entry hole
Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology
A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) spacesuit used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA