22 research outputs found
Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy Production: The Case for a Refundable Production Tax Credit
The purpose of this Article is to further our understanding of how the production tax credit works and does not work as a tax incentive to promote investment in renewable energy and to fight climate change. For reasons to be discussed, the tax incentives traditionally available present a number of transaction costs and limitations that make them less effective than alternative incentives. Specifically, this Article looks at the way the production tax credit is employed in the context of wind farm development. Because similar tax incentives and market conditions are relevant to other renewable energy industries, such as the solar energy industry, the wind industry was chosen as a representative case study within this context. Though the production tax credit has been important for encouraging growth throughout the renewable energy industry, it has been especially important in the context of wind energy
Tax (Dis)Conformity, Reverse Federalism, and Social Justice Reform
This Article revisits a familiar administrative feature of state income tax law—federal-state tax conformity—through a reverse federalism lens. Federal-state tax conformity refers to the process by which states incorporate aspects of federal law into their state income tax codes. For example, states may choose to adopt federal definitions of income, or they may simply enact state level tax laws that parallel federal laws. Even when state law does “conform” to the federal law, however, differences may arise when a state legislature declines to adopt all aspects of federal law, or when a state enacts legislation to partially decouple from the federal law.These acts of “disconformity,” when state tax laws are derived from—but are not identical to—federal law, are key to operationalizing the reverse federalism potential for state tax reform. Ultimately, reverse federalist reform strategies rely on states to push national policy, either by encouraging lateral conformity across states or by spurring changes to federal law. Where others have argued that disconformity can help minimize federal encroachment on state tax systems, this Article argues that strategic disconformity can help push national policy and promote social justice goals. This theory of disconformity shifts the focus away from its defensive role within a federalist system, highlighting its capacity to serve as a powerful corrective to federal law
A Typology of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives
This Article makes several contributions to tax, poverty, and empirical legal literature. First, it defines the category of place-based investment tax incentives and identifies key elements of variation across the category. Despite their prevalence at all levels of government, place-based investment tax incentives remain undertheorized and largely undefined in the literature. The typology presented here reflects an analysis of three federal tax incentives (the New Markets Tax Credit, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and the new Opportunity Zones law) and a detailed survey of tax incentives included in state enterprise zone laws. By defining this category of tax laws and identifying the basic types of place-based investment tax incentives that exist—or may not yet exist—under current law, this Article helps situate the conversation about these tax laws within broader tax policy debates.
Second, the typology presented here can be used by both tax and poverty law researchers to help assess the applicability of existing empirical studies to specific types of place-based investment tax incentives. Social scientists have published dozens of impact studies focusing on a wide variety of place-based investment tax incentives. Those studies, which have focused on both state and federal tax laws and their impact throughout the country, have sometimes reached contradictory conclusions. The ability of legal researchers to advance the debate over place-based investment tax incentives—and to predict the impact of new laws like Opportunity Zones—depends upon making sense of these studies.
Third, this Article identifies areas for further legal and empirical research. As will be explained, community-oriented types of place-based investment tax incentives, which contain features specifically designed to benefit residents of poor communities, are uncommon under existing law. These rare types of tax incentives are theoretically promising and enjoy some empirical support; nevertheless, due in part to their rarity, they have been largely understudied. The most complete understanding of place-based investment tax incentives, therefore, will require additional research about the ideal design and impact of community-oriented investment tax incentives
How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation
INTRODUCTION
I. THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A.WHY THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES MATTERS
B. THE LOCATION OF TAX-SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN AMERICA
1. THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFITS
2. THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROJECTS
II. VISUALIZING THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A. THE BIG PICTURE: MAPPING TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
B. A CLOSER LOOK: DESCRIBING TAX-SUBSIDIZED NEIGHBORHOODS
1. NEIGHBORHOODS WITH HIGH SHARES OF MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFITS AND FEW LIHTC PROPERTIES
2. NEIGHBORHOODS WITH HIGH NUMBERS OF LIHTC PROPERTIES AND LITTLE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFIT
3. NEIGHBORHOODS IN ZIP CODES WITH BOTH LIHTC PROPERTIES AND HIGH MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFIT
III. HOW TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES REINFORCE AND REWARD SEGREGATION
A. THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION REWARDS SEGREGATION AND RESTRICTS LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING CHOICE
1. THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION REDUCES WEALTHY HOMEBUYERS’ COST OF MOVING TO HIGH QUALITY OF LIFE AREAS
2. CAPITALIZATION OF THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION REDUCES AFFORDABLE HOUSING OPTIONS FOR LOWER-INCOME HOMEBUYERS
B. THE LIHTC PROGRAM REWARDS SEGREGATION AND RESTRICTS LOWINCOME TENANTS’ RENTAL OPTIONS
1. FEDERAL TAX LAW AND STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES REWARD DEVELOPMENT OF LIHTC PROPERTIES IN SEGREGATED NEIGHBORHOODS
2. THE LIHTC PROGRAM LIMITS LOW-INCOME TENANTS’ HOUSING CHOICE
IV. EVALUATING THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES: WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REFORM
A. THE LIHTC PROGRAM’S EFFECTS ON SUPPLY AND EXTERNALITIES ARE UNCERTAIN
1. THE LIHTC PROGRAM SUFFERS FROM HIGH CROWD-OUT RATES 953 2. SOCIAL COSTS OUTWEIGH GAINS IN PROPERTY VALUE
B. INVESTING IN HIGH-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS THROUGH THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
1. POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES FROM HOMEOWNERSHIP DECLINE AT HIGH INCOME LEVELS
2. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OUTWEIGH POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH HOME CONSUMPTION
V. REFORMING TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A. NEW REASONS TO REFORM TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
B. REFORM THE LIHTC PROGRAM THROUGH QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN AMENDMENTS
1. UNCERTAIN EFFECT OF SCALING BACK THE BASIS BOOST PROVISIONS
2. PROMOTING INTEGRATION THROUGH QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLANS
C. REPLACE THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION WITH A REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT
1. UNCERTAIN IMPACT OF A PARTIAL REPEAL OF THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
2. BENEFITS OF REFUNDABLE HOUSING TAX CREDITS
D. ISSUES RAISED BY REFORM PROPOSALS
CONCLUSIO
Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial Analysis of Place-Based Tax Incentives
Place-based tax incentives, such as the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and Opportunity Zones incentives, are often used to promote investment in low-income neighborhoods. However, not all low-income neighborhoods have an equal need for investment subsidies. Subsidies for investment in already gentrifying neighborhoods, for example, may reflect inefficient inframarginal investment, and they may lead to inequitable outcomes. Critics fear that when gentrifying neighborhoods are eligible for tax incentives, they will draw investment away from the neighborhoods that need it most. However, few studies have provided empirical analysis to assess whether these concerns have merit. Through a novel geospatial analysis of the location patterns of tax-subsidized projects, this Article provides new evidence that critics’ concerns are justified.
This Article analyzes fifteen years of NMTC data to explore the location patterns of tax-subsidized projects in twenty U.S. cities. It employs two spatial analysis methods, quadrat density analysis and negative binomial regression analysis, to describe the location patterns of NMTC projects and their relationship to two variables known to correlate with gentrification: high vacancy rates and increasing rental rates. The quadrat density analysis reveals that, in most cities, NMTC project density is highest in eligible census tracts that had high vacancy rates, increasing rents, or both. The results of the negative binomial regression analysis confirmed that, in many cities, high vacancy rates or rent increases were statistically significant predictors of NMTC investment. Together, these results provide new evidence that gentrifying census tracts may draw tax-subsidized investment away from other eligible areas. They also suggest that a commonly proposed Opportunity Zones reform—to add statutory safeguards modeled after those in the NMTC—would fail to prevent tax-subsidized investment in places that are already gentrifying.
The observed spatial patterns reflect inefficient allocations, limit the NMTC program’s ability to promote equitable change, and cast doubt about whether federal regulators can effectively shape program outcomes. Opportunity Zones are likely to have similarly inefficient and inequitable outcomes. Therefore, this Article argues that statutory and administrative reforms are necessary to reduce the frequency at which tax incentives are used to subsidize investment in neighborhoods that are already gentrifying. This study has profound implications for the five-billion-dollar-per-year federal NMTC program, the $3.5 billion per year federal Opportunity Zones program, and state-level tax incentives modeled after these federal tax laws
Structural Inequality and the New Markets Tax Credit
The New Markets Tax Credit (“NMTC”) is a federal tax incentive used to promote investment in low-income neighborhoods. Many of these neighborhoods are home to historically marginalized communities. However, very few minority-led institutions participate in the NMTC program. This Article provides the first theoretical and empirical exploration of the underrepresentation of minority-led institutions in the NMTC program. Based on original interviews with representatives of Community Development Entities (“CDEs”), investors, borrowers, and consultants who participate in the NMTC program, this Article describes the “NMTC ecosystem,” a complex, relationship-driven network of NMTC program participants who influence decision-making and create opportunities for success within the NMTC program. The Article demonstrates that within the NMTC ecosystem, minority-led CDEs face structural barriers to entry similar to those that exist in purely private markets, such as unequal access to professional networks and lack of track records. Troublingly, those barriers are intensifying with time.
The underrepresentation of minority-led CDEs in the NMTC program undermines its capacity to promote equitable economic development. To remedy that problem, this Article proposes that the Treasury should increase transparency and guidance in its administrative process, engage institutional intermediaries to aid minority-led CDEs, and relax requirements that chill participation among minority-led CDEs. These insights and prescriptions have relevance well beyond the context of the NMTC. In many domains, regulators have adopted measures that aim to promote equitable community development. This Article’s findings and reform recommendations thus have important implications for the broader universe of place-based regulatory policies, including for the many other tax incentive programs that aim to promote equity and reduce economic marginalization
Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial Analysis of Place-Based Tax Incentives
Place-based tax incentives, such as the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and Opportunity Zones incentives, are often used to promote investment in low-income neighborhoods. However, not all low-income neighborhoods have an equal need for investment subsidies. Subsidies for investment in already gentrifying neighborhoods, for example, may reflect inefficient inframarginal investment, and they may lead to inequitable outcomes. Critics fear that when gentrifying neighborhoods are eligible for tax incentives, they will draw investment away from the neighborhoods that need it most. However, few studies have provided empirical analysis to assess whether these concerns have merit. Through a novel geospatial analysis of the location patterns of tax-subsidized projects, this Article provides new evidence that critics’ concerns are justified.
This Article analyzes fifteen years of NMTC data to explore the location patterns of tax-subsidized projects in twenty U.S. cities. It employs two spatial analysis methods, quadrat density analysis and negative binomial regression analysis, to describe the location patterns of NMTC projects and their relationship to two variables known to correlate with gentrification: high vacancy rates and increasing rental rates. The quadrat density analysis reveals that, in most cities, NMTC project density is highest in eligible census tracts that had high vacancy rates, increasing rents, or both. The results of the negative binomial regression analysis confirmed that, in many cities, high vacancy rates or rent increases were statistically significant predictors of NMTC investment. Together, these results provide new evidence that gentrifying census tracts may draw tax-subsidized investment away from other eligible areas. They also suggest that a commonly proposed Opportunity Zones reform—to add statutory safeguards modeled after those in the NMTC—would fail to prevent tax-subsidized investment in places that are already gentrifying.
The observed spatial patterns reflect inefficient allocations, limit the NMTC program’s ability to promote equitable change, and cast doubt about whether federal regulators can effectively shape program outcomes. Opportunity Zones are likely to have similarly inefficient and inequitable outcomes. Therefore, this Article argues that statutory and administrative reforms are necessary to reduce the frequency at which tax incentives are used to subsidize investment in neighborhoods that are already gentrifying. This study has profound implications for the five-billion-dollar-per-year federal NMTC program, the $3.5 billion per year federal Opportunity Zones program, and state-level tax incentives modeled after these federal tax laws
How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation
INTRODUCTION
I. THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A.WHY THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES MATTERS
B. THE LOCATION OF TAX-SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN AMERICA
1. THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFITS
2. THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROJECTS
II. VISUALIZING THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A. THE BIG PICTURE: MAPPING TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
B. A CLOSER LOOK: DESCRIBING TAX-SUBSIDIZED NEIGHBORHOODS
1. NEIGHBORHOODS WITH HIGH SHARES OF MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFITS AND FEW LIHTC PROPERTIES
2. NEIGHBORHOODS WITH HIGH NUMBERS OF LIHTC PROPERTIES AND LITTLE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFIT
3. NEIGHBORHOODS IN ZIP CODES WITH BOTH LIHTC PROPERTIES AND HIGH MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BENEFIT
III. HOW TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES REINFORCE AND REWARD SEGREGATION
A. THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION REWARDS SEGREGATION AND RESTRICTS LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING CHOICE
1. THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION REDUCES WEALTHY HOMEBUYERS’ COST OF MOVING TO HIGH QUALITY OF LIFE AREAS
2. CAPITALIZATION OF THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION REDUCES AFFORDABLE HOUSING OPTIONS FOR LOWER-INCOME HOMEBUYERS
B. THE LIHTC PROGRAM REWARDS SEGREGATION AND RESTRICTS LOWINCOME TENANTS’ RENTAL OPTIONS
1. FEDERAL TAX LAW AND STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES REWARD DEVELOPMENT OF LIHTC PROPERTIES IN SEGREGATED NEIGHBORHOODS
2. THE LIHTC PROGRAM LIMITS LOW-INCOME TENANTS’ HOUSING CHOICE
IV. EVALUATING THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES: WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REFORM
A. THE LIHTC PROGRAM’S EFFECTS ON SUPPLY AND EXTERNALITIES ARE UNCERTAIN
1. THE LIHTC PROGRAM SUFFERS FROM HIGH CROWD-OUT RATES 953 2. SOCIAL COSTS OUTWEIGH GAINS IN PROPERTY VALUE
B. INVESTING IN HIGH-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS THROUGH THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
1. POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES FROM HOMEOWNERSHIP DECLINE AT HIGH INCOME LEVELS
2. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OUTWEIGH POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH HOME CONSUMPTION
V. REFORMING TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A. NEW REASONS TO REFORM TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
B. REFORM THE LIHTC PROGRAM THROUGH QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN AMENDMENTS
1. UNCERTAIN EFFECT OF SCALING BACK THE BASIS BOOST PROVISIONS
2. PROMOTING INTEGRATION THROUGH QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLANS
C. REPLACE THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION WITH A REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT
1. UNCERTAIN IMPACT OF A PARTIAL REPEAL OF THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
2. BENEFITS OF REFUNDABLE HOUSING TAX CREDITS
D. ISSUES RAISED BY REFORM PROPOSALS
CONCLUSIO