Mapping the Irish Policy Space:Voter and Party Spaces in Preferential

In this note we map the Irish policy space, locating both voters and parties on the most salient policy dimensions in Ireland. Estimates of the voter locations are based on the Irish National Election Survey (INES), conducted in 2002. Estimates of the party positions are based on an expert survey of party positions conducted by the authors in late 2002. We show that respondent self-placements on a priori policy scales are highly biased and difficult to interpret, and we rely instead on building scale positions for respondents from their answers to relevant attitude questions in the INES. The results provide a methodological template for locating voters and parties in a common space – a significant problem for any analyst who wants to create an empirical elaboration of a spatial model of party competition.

Nam-lin Hur. Death and Social Order in Tokugawa Japan: Buddhism, Anti-Christianity, and the Danka System

Early Modern Japan Networ

Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-1983

The distribution of cabinet posts in multiparty coalition governments in twelve European countries in the period 1945-1983 is considered. The efficacy of three payoff theories, namely Gamson's proportional payoff, the kernel and the bargaining set, as predictors of portfolio distribution, are compared. It is found that the Gamson predictor is superior in five countries which tend to be characterized by a relatively unfragmented political system, while the bargaining set is more appropriate in the highly fragmented political systems. The kernel can be disregarded as a payoff predictor. The results provide some empirical justification for the restricted (B2) bargaining set as a payoff predictor in simple voting games with transferable value

Component-resolved Near-infrared Spectra of the (22) Kalliope System

We observed (22) Kalliope and its companion Linus with the integral-field spectrograph OSIRIS, which is coupled to the adaptive optics system at the W.M. Keck II telescope on March 25 2008. We present, for the first time, component-resolved spectra acquired simultaneously in each of the Zbb (1-1.18 um), Jbb (1.18-1.42 um), Hbb (1.47-1.80 um), and Kbb (1.97-2.38 um) bands. The spectra of the two bodies are remarkably similar and imply that both bodies were formed at the same time from the same material; such as via incomplete re-accretion after a major impact on the precursor body.Comment: 20 pages, 5 figures, 1 table. Accepted for publication in Icaru

Political science in Ireland in the early 21st century

Although political science in Ireland got off to an earlier start than almost anywhere else (with a first chair appearing in 1855, and the oldest current established chair dating back to 1908), it has faced the same challenges as those encountered elsewhere in Europe. These include a difficulty in establishing autonomy in relation to adjacent disciplines, and a problem in maintaining its own integrity given the diversity of its subfields. Nevertheless, the discipline was able to record steady progress from the 1960s onwards, as the number of staff members grew and the infrastructural support base improved. Especially since the economic crisis that began in 2008, however, the discipline has come under stress, with many of the best qualified and most mobile young academics leaving for posts abroad in a context of domestic austerity. The discipline has survived this development, though, and has been significantly reinforced by links at European level. These have helped in the development of the political science curriculum (notably, as a consequence of the “Bologna process”), and in encouraging research (an area in which the European Consortium for Political Research played a big role). The capacity of the discipline to grow and thrive, and to survive budgetary setbacks, has been assisted by its popularity with students and its continuing relevance to policy maker

Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-1983

The distribution of cabinet posts in multiparty coalition governments in twelve European countries in the period 1945-1983 is considered. The efficacy of three payoff theories, namely Gamson's proportional payoff, the kernel and the bargaining set, as predictors of portfolio distribution, are compared. It is found that the Gamson predictor is superior in five countries which tend to be characterized by a relatively unfragmented political system, while the bargaining set is more appropriate in the highly fragmented political systems. The kernel can be disregarded as a payoff predictor. The results provide some empirical justification for the restricted (B2) bargaining set as a payoff predictor in simple voting games with transferable value

Spain and European Union Constitution-building

The broad objective of this paper is to better understand how national governments form their policy position on the Draft Constitutional proposal by analysing developments in Spain. It examines the Spanish position on various parts of the European Convention based on data from expert interviews carried out in November 2003. It then evaluates the internal coordination process, focusing on the few domestic-level actors (from the Prime Ministers’ Office and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy) that have been most influential in shaping Spain’s position. Finally, it ponders the potential shift in the Spanish position given the recent Socialist victory in March 2004

Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multiparty systems

Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se from the distribution of key government pay-offs, such as cabinet portfolios, between members of the resulting government. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, taking into account knowledge of the identity of some government ‘formateur’ or even of the composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations – Gamson’s Law. This article resolves this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution that, for example, predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post. It concludes that canonical models of legislative bargaining do increase the ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se from the distribution of key government pay-offs, such as cabinet portfolios, between members of the resulting government. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, taking into account knowledge of the identity of some government ‘formateur’ or even of the composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations – Gamson’s Law. This article resolves this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution that, for example, predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post. It concludes that canonical models of legislative bargaining do increase the ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.Peer Reviewe