More than Words: Communication in Intergroup Conflicts

Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether communication mitigates or intensifies the problem of collective action. We observe the effect of different communication structures on collective action in the context of finitely repeated intergroup conflict and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if communication is restricted to one's own group as compared to a situation with no communication. However, expenditures are significantly lower if open communication within one's own group and between rivaling groups is allowed. We show that under open communication intergroup conflicts are avoided by groups taking turns in winning the contest. Our results do not only qualify the role of communication for collective action but may also provide insights on how to mitigate the destructive nature of intergroup conflicts.Communication, Conflict, Experiment, Rent-seeking

The Provision of Public Goods with Positive Group Interdependencies

This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested social dilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into two groups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoretically derived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental results demonstrate the importance of in-group beneficiaries over global efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes local level feedback. Results stress the importance of building strong local level commitment to encourage the provision of public goods with positive externalities.Public good, experiment, groups, Spillover Game, social dilemma

Competitive behavior, stress, and gender

This paper investigates whether physiological measures related to chronic and acute stress predict individual differences in willingness to compete. We measure individuals' autonomic nervous system activity in a resting state as well as under non-competitive and competitive incentive schemes using heart rate variability (HRV) measurement. We find that both baseline HRV and competition-induced changes in HRV predict willingness to compete. Notably, we find that women with low baseline HRV, a marker associated with chronic stress exposure, are more likely to choose piece rate incentives over competitive incentives than women with high baseline HRV. We observe that men with large acute HRV response to forced competition are more likely to choose tournament pay over piece rate pay than men with small acute HRV response to competition. Our results suggest that HRV can predict individual differences in willingness to compete, but HRV does not close the gender gap in willingness to compete at the aggregate level.Peer reviewe

Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects' understanding of the rule.Quadratic scoring rule, experimental methodology, experimental design

Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule.quadratic scoring rule, belief elicitation, saliency, experiment

Broken Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.public goods experiment, punishment, cooperation, networks

Luottamus elektronisilla markkinoilla

Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library.Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla.Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler.Markkinat ovat inhimillisen kehityksen edellytys. Omistusoikeus ja vapaaehtoinen vaihdanta ovat sekä yksilön että yhteiskunnan, kulttuurin, hyvinvoinnin perusta. Taloustiede on kuitenkin osoittanut markkinoiden toimivan epätäydellisesti tilanteissa, joissa informaatio on jakautunut asymmetrisesti. Hyvinvointi vapailla markkinoilla riippuu oleellisesti yksilöistä, joiden käyttämistä me emme tunne tai täysin ymmärrä. Epätäydellisen informaation aiheuttamia ongelmia on perinteisesti pyritty ratkaisemaan lainsäädännön ja hierarkisten organisaatioiden avulla. Tietotekninen vallakumous on mullistanut sosiaalisen ja taloudellisen vaihdannan kanavat. Elektroniset vaihdantajärjestelmät ylittävät kulttuurien ja kilpailevien oikeusjärjestelmien väliset rajat, jolloin sopimusten lainsäädäntöön perustuvat monitorointimekanismit ovat usein riittämättömiä. Mikäli vaihdantaa pyritään toteuttamaan olemassa olevan lainsäädännön puitteissa, tästä aiheutuvat transaktiokustannukset saattavat ylittää kaupankäynnistä aiheutuvan hyödyn, jolloin vaihdantaa ei tapahdu. Tässä työssä tutkitaan luottamukseen ja maineeseen perustuvan endogeenisesti säädellyn markkinamekanismin edellytyksiä yksilöiden välisessä vaihdannassa. Keskeinen lähtökohta on analysoida yksilöiden saatavilla olevan maineinformaation vaikutusta markkinoiden toimintaan, jotka kärsivät sekventiaalisen vaihdannan aiheuttamasta moraalikadosta. Työ vastaa empiiriseen aineistoon perustuen kysymyksiin, miksi ja milloin ihmiset luottavat toisiinsa taloudellisessa vaihdannassa. Palautejärjestelmän avulla rakennettavan luottamukseen ja maineeseen perustuvan vaihdantajärjestelmän ensisijaisena sovellusympäristönä esitetään elektroniset markkinat, erityisesti sähköiset huutokaupat. Tutkielmassa käytettävä aineisto on kerätty kokeellisen taloustieteen menetelmin laboratoriokokeissa. Aineistonkeräystä varten suunniteltiin ja kirjoitettiin tietokoneohjelma, jonka avulla koejaksot toteutettiin. Osallistujat olivat Helsingin yliopiston opiskelijoita. Työn kontribuutio on kolmiosainen: (i) kirjoitelman palautejärjestelmää koskevassa osiossa esitetään aiempaa monipuolisempi tapa yhdistää kerättyä maineinformaatiota. (ii) Työn kokeellisen osion peliasetelmaksi on rakennettu uusi ekstentensiivisen muodon luottamuspeli, joka aiemmin esitetyistä peleistä poiketen mahdollistaa tuottojen endogeenisen määräytymisen. (iii) Lopuksi ainutlaatuiseen havaintoaineistoon perustuen esitetään tarkastelutapa, jonka avulla on mahdollista tutkia yksilön luottamuspäätöksen syitä. Tutkimuksen keskeinen havainto on, että taloudellisen päätöksentekijän käyttäyminen perustuu sekä yhteisen edun että oman edun huomioimiseen, mikäli nämä ovat ristiriidassa keskenään. Tutkielmaa varten toteutetussa kokeessa maineinformaation lisäämisen havaittiin parantavan endogeenisesti organisoidun markkinapaikan tehokkuutta. Markkinoiden tehokas toiminta ei edellytä suurta osallistujajoukkoa, täydellistä informaatiota tai täydellistä ymmärrystä markkinoiden luonteesta, mikäli yksilöiden välillä on riittävä luottamusinsentiivi

The Economics of Trust in the Electronic Markets : an experimental study

Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library.Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla.Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler.Markets are the necessary prerequisite for human development. The freehold of a property and the freedom of exchange are the bedrocks of individual and societal well-being. However, economic research has proved that the markets do not efficiently allocate goods under asymmetric information. The affluence through free markets is dependent on others whose behavior we do not know or even fully understand. Conventionally, attempts to solve the problems of imperfect information have relied on jurisdiction and establishment of hierarchical organizations. The rise of the Internet has lately revolutionized the customs of social and economic exchange. Electronic marketplaces span the boundaries of cultural and juristically inconsistent territories, as a result, the prevailing contract monitoring turns out to be inadequate. Should the virtual exchange obey existing laws, the transaction costs may top the benefits of trade, and thus prevent otherwise mutually valuable transactions. In this study, we examine conditions for the endogenously emerging markets based on trust and reputation. The analysis is focused on the effects of different forms of feedback information in markets that suffer from moral hazard due to sequential trading. The study presents data-oriented evidence on why and when people trust each other in economic transactions. Electronic markets, particularly electronic auctions, are presented as the primary application context for the feedback system based on trust and reputations. The experimental data for the research were collected in a laboratory experiment taking advantage of newly designed and implemented computer application. The participants in experimental sessions were all students at the University of Helsinki. The contribution of the thesis is threefold. Firstly, we develop further the idea of tailored trustworthiness aggregates. Secondly, we introduce a novel extensive form game to model trust decisions with endogenous payoff formation. This game design unites the ordinary Trust Game with auctions. Thirdly, based on the unique data from the experiment, we tackle the motivation behind the individual’s trust decision. The experimental results in this study demonstrate that, in an economic exchange, the economic agent behaves simultaneously both fairly and selfishly. Furthermore, the expression of mixed motives appears to be sensitive to the variations in the flow of information. The data collected for this study clearly indicate that the augmentation of information improves the economic efficiency of endogenously organized marketplaces. Market efficiency does not require a large number of participants, complete information or full economic understanding, but incentives to trust each other

Applying quadratic scoring rule transparently in multiple choice setting: a note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule

Competitive Behavior, Stress, and Gender

This paper investigates whether chronic stress and acute physiological responses to competitive stress can explain individual and gender differences in competitiveness. We measure individuals' autonomic nervous system activity in a resting state as well as under non-competitive and competitive incentives in a real task using heart rate variability measurement. We find that basal heart rate variability, a proxy for chronic stress, and acute competition-induced changes in heart rate variability predict self-selection into competition. Moreover, we observe that basal heart rate variability predicts self-selection into competition for women, but not for men. Overall, we find tentative evidence for gender differences in the relationship between physiological stress and a decision to enter competitive environments. Our results suggest that individual variation in autonomic nervous system activity and physiological responses to competitive stress predict selfselection into competitive environments, but do not explain gender differences in willingness to compete