8 research outputs found

    Book Review: What is a Mathematical Concept? edited by Elizabeth de Freitas, Nathalie Sinclair, and Alf Coles

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    This is a review of What is a Mathematical Concept? edited by Elizabeth de Freitas, Nathalie Sinclair, and Alf Coles (Cambridge University Press, 2017). In this collection of sixteen chapters, philosophers, educationalists, historians of mathematics, a cognitive scientist, and a mathematician consider, problematise, historicise, contextualise, and destabilise the terms ‘mathematical’ and ‘concept’. The contributors come from many disciplines, but the editors are all in mathematics education, which gives the whole volume a disciplinary centre of gravity. The editors set out to explore and reclaim the canonical question ‘what is a mathematical concept?’ from the philosophy of mathematics. This review comments on each paper in the collection

    Human-Machine Collaboration in the Teaching of Proof

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    This paper argues that interactive theorem provers (ITPs) could play an important role in fostering students’ appreciation and understanding of proof and of mathematics in general. It shows that the ITP Lean has three features that mitigate existing difficulties in teaching and learning mathematical proof. One is that it requires students to identify a proof strategy at the start. The second is that it gives students instant feedback while allowing them to explore with maximum autonomy. The third is that elementary formal logic finds a natural place in the activity of creating proofs. The challenge in using Lean is that students have to learn its command language, in addition to mathematics course content and elementary logic

    Why 'scaffolding' is the wrong metaphor : the cognitive usefulness of mathematical representations.

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    The metaphor of scaffolding has become current in discussions of the cognitive help we get from artefacts, environmental affordances and each other. Consideration of mathematical tools and representations indicates that in these cases at least (and plausibly for others), scaffolding is the wrong picture, because scaffolding in good order is immobile, temporary and crude. Mathematical representations can be manipulated, are not temporary structures to aid development, and are refined. Reflection on examples from elementary algebra indicates that Menary is on the right track with his ‘enculturation’ view of mathematical cognition. Moreover, these examples allow us to elaborate his remarks on the uniqueness of mathematical representations and their role in the emergence of new thoughts.Peer reviewe

    How to think about informal proofs

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    This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Brendan Larvor, ‘How to think about informal proofs’, Synthese, Vol. 187(2): 715-730, first published online 9 September 2011. The final publication is available at Springer via doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0007-5It is argued in this study that (i) progress in the philosophy of mathematical practice requires a general positive account of informal proof; (ii) the best candidate is to think of informal proofs as arguments that depend on their matter as well as their logical form; (iii) articulating the dependency of informal inferences on their content requires a redefinition of logic as the general study of inferential actions; (iv) it is a decisive advantage of this conception of logic that it accommodates the many mathematical proofs that include actions on objects other than propositions; (v) this conception of logic permits the articulation of project-sized tasks for the philosophy of mathematical practice, thereby supplying a partial characterisation of normal research in the fieldPeer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

    What can the Philosophy of Mathematics Learn from the History of Mathematics?

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    “The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com”. Copyright Springer DOI: 10.1007/s10670-008-9107-0Peer reviewe
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