Political Regimes, Bureaucracy, and Scientific Productivity

Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her fairly? In the science–government relationship, an incumbent may be better off if he or she does not provide—or does not provide a fair pay to public scientists. We propose a simple game-theoretic model for understanding the trust problem in the relationship between governments and scientists. The model shows how with reliable governments (democracies), bureaucratic contracts (e.g., secure tenure) are not optimal since they have low-powered incentives (in contrast to the highpowered private-sector type of contracts) and run against scientists’ responsiveness to government demands. However, with nonreliable governments (dictatorships), bureaucratic contracts are second-best solutions because they protect scientists against the possibility of governments’ misbehavior (i.e., ex post opportunistic defections, such as canceling research programs overnight). An empirical analysis confirms the predictions: bureaucratic contracts enhance scientific productivity with nonreliable governments (dictatorships) but hamper scientific productivity with reliable governments (democracies).Publicad

A pied-piper situation : do bureaucratic researchers produce more science?

¿Puede un científico confiar en que el gobierno le va a pagar honestamente? En la relación entre la ciencia y el Estado, el gobernante sale ganando si no paga (o si no paga honradamente). Todo científico público, así, afronta el riesgo de que tras una carrera larga y difícil el gobernante cambie las reglas del juego. A pesar de que la solución a este problema de credibilidad es lo que da forma a las instituciones de la ciencia pública el problema ha sido rara vez estudiado teórica o empíricamente en los estudios de la ciencia. En este trabajo proponemos un modelo de esa relación entre gobiernos y científicos de acuerdo con la teoría de juegos que muestra la importancia del tipo de contrato que los vincula, el que sea más o menos burocrático en un sentido weberiano. Hasta cierto punto, los contratos burocráticos —como los de los funcionarios— protegen a los científicos contra el mal comportamiento de los gobernantes. Mediante esas reglas burocráticas, los contratos atan las manos del gobierno con lo que se hace creíble su compromiso a la vez que se protege el delicado sistema de recompensas de la ciencia. De esta manera se estimula la productividad tanto en calidad como en cantidad. Sin embargo, cuando se da el caso de gobiernos fiables los contratos burocráticos limitan los sistemas de incentivos y van en contra tanto de la receptividad de los científicos a las demandas de los gobiernos o de la sociedad como, al final, al interés de los gobiernos por el producto que ofrecen. En este trabajo utilizamos evidencia comparada entre países que confirma las proposiciones del modelo teórico y muestra cómo los contratos burocráticos estimulan la productividad científica en el caso de gobiernos poco confiables —como en el caso de las dictaduras— pero limitan esa productividad con gobiernos más fiables — como las democracias—

El sistema de mérito como garantía de estabilidad y eficacia en las sociedades democráticas avanzadas

This paper summarizes recent theoretical and empirical contributions in social sciences on the relevance of “quality of government” for understanding cross-country differences in citizens’ well-being. The paper explores two types of institutional factors fostering quality of government that have been systematically explored in a large number of studies. In the first place, political factors, and, in particular, how political elites are selected in a country. In the second place, bureaucratic factors, and, in particular, how public employees are selected in a country. One of the most robust findings in this literature is that meritocratic bureaucracy –understood as a non-politicized bureaucracy– has a positive and significant effect on the quality of government in advanced democracies.Este artículo resume las contribuciones recientes, tanto teóricas como empíricas, en ciencias sociales sobre la importancia de la “calidad de gobierno” para el bienestar de los ciudadanos de un país. El artículo analiza dos tipos de factores institucionales que pueden facilitar la “calidad de gobierno” y que han sido explorados sistemáticamente en un elevado número de estudios. Por un lado, los factores políticos y, en particular, cómo se seleccionan a las élites políticas en un país. Por otro, factores burocráticos y, en particular, cómo se selecciona a los empleados públicos en un país. Uno de los resultados más importantes de estos estudios es que disponer de una burocracia meritocrática –entendida como una burocracia no politizada– tiene un efecto positivo y significativo sobre la calidad de gobierno en democracias avanzadas.&nbsp

¿Por qué algunos países sufren exceso de regulación?

¿Por qué algunos países sufren exceso de regulación

Why Do Some Regions in Europe Have a Higher Quality of Government?

While most of the quantitative literature on quality of government has focused on national differences, subnational variation has been neglected, mainly due to the lack of data. This study explores subnational divergences in quality of government (understood as control of corruption, impartial treatment of citizens, and government effectiveness) using newly created subnational data including over 70 European regions. It addresses the institutional puzzle of why regions which share so many formal institutions (e.g., Northern and Southern Italy) do diverge so much in quality of government. Similar to recent political economy scholarship, our theory points to historical path dependencies. The study argues that a major factor explaining regional path dependencies is the consolidation of clientelistic networks in those regions where rulers have historically (seventeenth to nineteenth centuries) less constraints to their decisions

Political Regimes, Bureaucracy and Scientific Productivity

Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her fairly? In the science–government relationship, an incumbent may be better off if he or she does not provide—or does not provide a fair pay to public scientists. We propose a simple game-theoretic model for understanding the trust problem in the relationship between governments and scientists. The model shows how with reliable governments (democracies), bureaucratic contracts (e.g., secure tenure) are not optimal since they have low-powered incentives (in contrast to the high-powered private-sector type of contracts) and run against scientists' responsiveness to government demands. However, with nonreliable governments (dictatorships), bureaucratic contracts are second-best solutions because they protect scientists against the possibility of governments' misbehavior (i.e., ex post opportunistic defections, such as canceling research programs overnight). An empirical analysis confirms the predictions: bureaucratic contracts enhance scientific productivity with nonreliable governments (dictatorships) but hamper scientific productivity with reliable governments (democracies)