Ricostruire la fiducia nel dibattito pubblico in materia di sanità

L'articolo ricostruisce la crisi di fiducia tra i cittadini e le istituzioni sanitarie che precede la pandemia e suggerisce alcune strategie per contrastarla

The concept of disease in the time of COVID-19

Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease (disease judgements) and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick (sickness judgements). In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection with respect to four groups of people—positive and asymptomatic; positive and symptomatic; negative; and untested—and show how different concepts of disease impact on the disease and sickness judgements for these groups. The suggestion is that sickness judgements and social measures akin to those experienced during the current COVID-19 outbreak presuppose a concept of disease containing social (risk of) harm as a component. We indicate the problems that arise when adopting this kind of disease concept beyond a state of emergency

Friendship as a Political Concept: A Groundwork for Analysis

What kind of a concept is friendship, and what is its connection to politics? Critics sometimes claim that friendship does not have a role to play in the study of politics. Such objections misconstrue the nature of the concept of friendship and its relation to politics. In response, this article proposes three approaches to understanding the concept of friendship: (1) as a ‘family resemblance’ concept, (2) as an instance of an ‘essentially contested’ concept, and (3) as a concept indicating a problématique. The article thus responds to the dismissal of friendship by undertaking the groundwork for understanding what kind of a concept friendship might be, and how it might serve different purposes. In doing so, it opens the way for understanding friendship’s relation to politics

Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism

This chapter focuses on a recent revival of conceptual analysis, and the philosophical method of discovering necessary and a priori contents by describing conceptual relations. According to some philosophers, contents such as "Red is a color" are true by virtue of the deep structure of our cognitive system, and assuming that this structure is innate, such contents are true independently of experience. The chapter shows that the agenda of the inward approach contains at least two points. First, more empirical evidence needs to be found for the hypothesis of hard-wired conceptual rules, which would supplement the transcendental arguments given so far. Second, a supporter of the inward approach appears to be forced to choose between two alternative strategies. The first is to admit that conceptual relations are merely the rules of a system of representation; the second is to strive for a new version of the Transparency Thesis. © 2005 Elsevier Ltd

Dummett, Glock e Williams sulla natura e il futuro della filosofia (analitica)

Dopo aver brevemente descritto le proposte di Dummett, Glock e William mi soffermo sulle risposte dei tre autori alle domande metafilosofiche: in che cosa consiste il lavoro filosofico e qual’è il suo scopo? In che senso è diverso, se lo è, dal lavoro degli scienziati o degli storici

On the explanatory value of the concept-conception distinction

The distinction between concept and conception has been widely debated in political philosophy, whereas in the philosophy of psychology is frequently used, but rarely focused on. This paper aims at filling in this lacuna. I claim that far from being explanatorily idle, the distinction makes it possible to provide an adequate description of phenomena such as genuine disagreement, and concept contestation, which would otherwise remain implausibly puzzling. I illustrate and assess three accounts of the concept-conception distinction. Finally I propose a social externalist account, which relies on deference to experts, and builds on Tyler Burge’s ideas of many decades ago. The debate on concepts and conceptions thus shows a connection with the increasing research work on experts and expertise in psychology and social epistemology