Overcoming Expert Disagreement In A Delphi Process. An Exercise In Reverse Epistemology

Disagreement among experts is a central topic in social epistemology. What should an expert do when confronted with the different opinion of an epistemic peer? Possible answers include the steadfast view (holding to one’s belief), the abstemious view (suspending one’s judgment), and moderate conciliatory views, which specify criteria for belief change when a peer’s different opinion is encountered. The practice of Delphi techniques in healthcare, medicine, and social sciences provides a real-life case study of expert disagreement, where disagreement is gradually transformed into consensus. An analysis of Delphi shows that moderate conciliatory views are descriptively more adequate than rival views. However, it also casts doubt on whether the debate in social epistemology is explanatory relevant vis-à-vis real life cases of expert disagreement, where consensus replaces truth, and acceptance is more explanatorily relevant than belief

Saving the DSM-5? Descriptive conceptions and theoretical concepts of mental disorders

At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a certain extent, for diagnosis, is the DSM, now at its fifth edition. The main reasons for descriptivism are the aim of achieving reliability of diagnosis and improving communication in a situation of theoretical disagreement, and the Ignorance argument, which starts with acknowledgment of the relative failure of the project of finding biomarkers for most mental disorders. Descriptivism has also the advantage of capturing the phenomenology of mental disorders, which appears to be essential for diagnosis, though not exhaustive of the nature of the disease. I argue that if we rely on the distinction between conceptions (procedures of identification) and concepts (reference-fixing representations), which was introduced in the philosophical debate on the nature of concepts, we may understand a limited but valid role for descriptive characterizations, and reply to common objections addressed by those who advocate a theoretically informed approach to nosology

Moralisation of medicines: The case of hydroxychloroquine

The concept of moralisation of health behaviours was introduced in social psychology to describe the attribution of moral properties to habits and conditions like smoking or being a vegetarian. Moral properties are powerful motivators for people and institutions, as they may trigger blame, stigma, and appraisal, as well as the polarisation of interest and scientifc hype. Here I extend the concept and illustrate how medicines and treatments can be seen as if they had moral properties, too, when they come to be regarded as good or bad in the moral sense, and not just in the instrumental sense of benefting or harming health. I propose the hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) controversy of 2020 as an example of moralisation of a medicine. HCQ and chloroquine are anti-malarial drugs, whose of-label use for Covid-19 was hotly discussed in the early months of the pandemic, both in the media and within the scientifc community, and eventually dismissed when robust evidence came out. The point of the paper is to show that moralisation of health products and treatments may infuence individual and institutional decisions in signifcant ways, and also afect research. For these reasons, it should be carefully monitored and critically assesse

Whorfian Effects in Color Perception: Deep or Shallow?

This paper discusses, from the point of view of the philosophy of psychology, recent behavioral and brain studies showing effects of the diversity of language vocabulary on color perception. I examine the alternative between two different interpretations of these so-called whorfian effects, namely habitual or deep whorfianism, and shallow whorfianism. I argue that at the moment the evidence underdetermines both interpretations and the question is open. I also clarify that shallow whorfianism is not a synonym for ‘trivial whorfianism’, as some authors have suggested, but rather makes a case for the online and situated nature of human cognition

Unveiling the interplay between evidence, values and cognitive biases. The case of the failure of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine

This paper depicts a Covid science case, that of the AstraZeneca Vaxzevria vaccine, with specific focus on what happened in Italy. Given that we believe acknowledging the role of non-evidential factors in medicine is an important insight into the recent philosophy of science, we illustrate how in the case of Vaxzevria, the interplay between facts, values (both epistemic and non-epistemic) and cognitive biases may have possibly led to different institutional decisions based on the same evidence. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we provide a glossary of the relevant terms involved, that is to say, epistemic values, non-epistemic values and cognitive biases. Second, we sketch a timeline of Vaxzevria's approvals and suspensions by relevant institutional healthcare authorities with special focus on Italy and the Italian Medicines Agency. Then we show the interplay between the evidence base, epistemic as well as non-epistemic values and cognitive biases using a narrative review of political decisions along with newspaper and social media content pertaining to Vaxzevria. We briefly compare Italy with other European countries to show that different political decisions were made on the basis of the same evidence

Uvod gostujućih urednika u simpozij o biopsihosocijalnom modelu zdravlja i bolesti

Introduction to the book symposium “THE BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL MODEL OF HEALTH AND DISEASE: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS BY DEREK BOLTON AND GRANT GILLETT”.Uvod u simpozij o knjizi “BIOPSIHOSOCIJALNI MODEL ZDRAVLJA I BOLESTI: NOVI FILOZOFSKI I ZNANSTVENI RAZVOJ DEREK BOLTON I GRANT GILLETT”

Concetti, definizioni e analiticità

Classical philosophical notions, such as conceptual truth, analyticity, and a priori knowledge, have recently re-entered the mainstream philosophical debate, after fifty years of depreciation. This paper illustrates how such notions are reintroduced and discussed in a current debate on the nature of concepts, along with the idea that a concept is individuated by an implicit definition. This traditional Neopositivist device has recently been redeployed by writers such as Peacocke, Horwich, and Boghossian. Implicit definitions raise a variety of interesting issues, from semantics to epistemology: how can they succeed in fixing a concept’s semantic property, if not by convention? are they analytic, in the Quinean sense? Do they provide with a priori knowledge? Which constraints are appropriate, for some formulation genuinely to pick up the semantic property of a concept?

Moralisation of medicines: The case of Hydroxychloroquine

The concept of moralisation of health behaviours was introduced in social psychology to describe the attribution of moral properties to habits and conditions like smoking or being a vegetarian. Moral properties are powerful motivators for people and institutions, as they may trigger blame, stigma, and appraisal, as well as the polarisation of interest and scientific hype. Here I extend the concept and illustrate how medicines and treatments can be seen as if they had moral properties, too, when they come to be regarded as good or bad in the moral sense, and not just in the instrumental sense of benefiting or harming health. I propose the hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) controversy of 2020 as an example of moralisation of a medicine. HCQ and chloroquine are anti-malarial drugs, whose off-label use for Covid-19 was hotly discussed in the early months of the pandemic, both in the media and within the scientific community, and eventually dismissed when robust evidence came out. The point of the paper is to show that moralisation of health products and treatments may influence individual and institutional decisions in significant ways, and also affect research. For these reasons, it should be carefully monitored and critically assessed