340 research outputs found

    Hegemons, empires, and their elites

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    I compare ancient with modern empires and show why hegemony beyond the military realm is possible only in the modern capitalist world. I examine Germany, Spain and France, which failed to achieve hegemony, along with the three successive hegemons: the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. I identify the elites that were created and strengthened by their home polity’s empire or hegemony, and enumerate the factors that allowed some colonial elites to achieve high levels of autonomy. Colonial elite autonomy or high levels of elite unity in the metropole prevented or undermined hegemony.Comparo impérios antigos e modernos e mostro de que forma a hegemonia além da esfera militar é possível apenas no mundo capitalista moderno. Analiso a Alemanha, a Espanha e a França, que falharam no alcance da hegemonia, juntamente com três poderes hegemónicos sucessivos: Holanda, Grã-Bretanha e Estados Unidos. Identifico as elites que foram criadas e reforçadas pelos regimes imperiais ou hegemónicos dos seus países, e enumero fatores que permitiram a algumas elites coloniais alcançar elevados níveis de autonomia. A autonomia de certas elites coloniais ou os níveis elevados de unidade das elites das metrópoles impediram ou enfraqueceram a hegemonia.Cet article compare des empires anciens et modernes afin de montrer comment l’hégémonie au-delà de la sphère militaire n’est possible que dans un monde capitaliste moderne. Il analyse l’Allemagne, l’Espagne et la France qui ont échoué dans leur quête d’hégémonie, face à trois pouvoirs hégémoniques successifs : Hollande, Grande-Bretagne et États-Unis. Il identifie les élites qui ont été créées et renforcées par les régimes impériaux ou hégémoniques de leurs pays, tout en énumérant les facteurs qui ont permis à certaines élites coloniales d’atteindre des niveaux élevés d’autonomie. L’autonomie de certaines élites coloniales ou les niveaux élevés d’unité des élites des métropoles ont empêché ou affaibli l’hégémonie.Comparo imperios antiguos y modernos y muestro de qué forma la hegemonía además de la esfera militar es posible solamente en el mundo capitalista moderno. Analizo a Alemania, a España y a Francia, que fallaron en el alcance de la hegemonía, en comparación con tres poderes hegemónicos sucesivos: Holanda, Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos. Identifico las elites que fueron creadas y reforzadas por regímenes imperiales o hegemónicos de sus países, y enumero factores que permitirán a algunas elites coloniales alcanzar elevados niveles de autonomía. La autonomía de ciertas elites coloniales o los niveles de elevados de unidad de las elites de las metrópolis impedirán o debilitarán la hegemonía

    Hegemons, empires, and their elites

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    I compare ancient with modern empires and show why hegemony beyond the military realm is possible only in the modern capitalist world. I examine Germany, Spain and France, which failed to achieve hegemony, along with the three successive hegemons: the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. I identify the elites that were created and strengthened by their home polity’s empire or hegemony, and enumerate the factors that allowed some colonial elites to achieve high levels of autonomy. Colonial elite autonomy or high levels of elite unity in the metropole prevented or undermined hegemony.Comparo impérios antigos e modernos e mostro de que forma a hegemonia além da esfera militar é possível apenas no mundo capitalista moderno. Analiso a Alemanha, a Espanha e a França, que falharam no alcance da hegemonia, juntamente com três poderes hegemónicos sucessivos: Holanda, Grã-Bretanha e Estados Unidos. Identifico as elites que foram criadas e reforçadas pelos regimes imperiais ou hegemónicos dos seus países, e enumero fatores que permitiram a algumas elites coloniais alcançar elevados níveis de autonomia. A autonomia de certas elites coloniais ou os níveis elevados de unidade das elites das metrópoles impediram ou enfraqueceram a hegemonia.Cet article compare des empires anciens et modernes afin de montrer comment l’hégémonie au-delà de la sphère militaire n’est possible que dans un monde capitaliste moderne. Il analyse l’Allemagne, l’Espagne et la France qui ont échoué dans leur quête d’hégémonie, face à trois pouvoirs hégémoniques successifs : Hollande, Grande-Bretagne et États-Unis. Il identifie les élites qui ont été créées et renforcées par les régimes impériaux ou hégémoniques de leurs pays, tout en énumérant les facteurs qui ont permis à certaines élites coloniales d’atteindre des niveaux élevés d’autonomie. L’autonomie de certaines élites coloniales ou les niveaux élevés d’unité des élites des métropoles ont empêché ou affaibli l’hégémonie.Comparo imperios antiguos y modernos y muestro de qué forma la hegemonía además de la esfera militar es posible solamente en el mundo capitalista moderno. Analizo a Alemania, a España y a Francia, que fallaron en el alcance de la hegemonía, en comparación con tres poderes hegemónicos sucesivos: Holanda, Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos. Identifico las elites que fueron creadas y reforzadas por regímenes imperiales o hegemónicos de sus países, y enumero factores que permitirán a algunas elites coloniales alcanzar elevados niveles de autonomía. La autonomía de ciertas elites coloniales o los niveles de elevados de unidad de las elites de las metrópolis impedirán o debilitarán la hegemonía

    Building bridges across time and space

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    Richard Lachmann is a professor in the Department of Sociology of the University at Albany, State University of New York. He completed his B. A. with highest honors at Princeton University and his M. A. and Ph. D. at Harvard University. His research and writing are focused on Political Sociology and Comparative Historical Sociology, especially on the origins of capitalism and the decline of dominant powers. His book Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions i..

    Trump: authoritarian, just another neoliberal republican, or both?

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    I review Donald Trump’s actions as president to evaluate the extent to which he differs from longstanding Republican Party policies. I find that except for trade and immigration he has furthered existing Republican desires in the fields of tax cuts, deregulation, weakening labor unions, and the appointment of rightwing judges. I then turn to the question of whether Trump is an authoritarian. I show that while his rhetoric is an escalation of previous Republican racial demagoguery, Trump benefits more than he adds to his party’s decades-long strategy of suppressing minority and young voters, vulgarizing political discourse and normalizing brazen lying by candidates and officials, obstructing Democratic officeholders, and allowing unlimited campaign spending by rich people and corporations. I conclude that Trump is now the head of an increasingly authoritarian political party rather than a self-generated strongman. This reduces the insights one can gain from comparisons with rulers like Hitler, Putin or Erdogan.Revêm-se as ações de Donald Trump enquanto presidente para avaliar até que ponto ele difere das linhas políticas duradouras do Partido Republicano. Com exceção do comércio e da imigração, ele promoveu os desejos republicanos já existentes nos campos de cortes de impostos, desregulamentação, enfraquecimento dos sindicatos de trabalhadores e nomeação de juízes de direita. De seguida, aborda-se a questão do autoritarismo de Trump. Mostra-se que enquanto a sua retórica é uma escalada da anterior demagogia racial republicana, Trump beneficia mais do que acrescenta à estratégia de décadas do seu partido de reprimir os eleitores jovens e as minorias, vulgariza o discurso político e normaliza a insolência de candidatos e funcionários, obstrui os funcionários democratas e permite gastos de campanha ilimitados por pessoas ricas e por corporações. Conclui-se que Trump é agora o líder de um partido politico cada vez mais autoritário em vez de um um homem forte autoproduzido. Isto reduz a perceção que se pode obter das comparações com governantes como Hitler, Putin ou Erdogan.Cet article passe en revue les actions de Donald Trump afin de voir à quel point il s’éloigne des lignes politiques durables du Parti Républicain. Hormis le commerce et l’immigration, on observe une augmentation des désirs républicains déjà existants en ce qui concerne les baisses d’impôts, la déréglementation, l’affaiblissement des syndicats de travailleurs et la nomination de juges de droite. L’article aborde ensuite la question de l’autoritarisme de Trump. Il montre que tant que sa rhétorique est une escalade de la démagogie raciale républicaine existante, Trump bénéficie, plus qu’il n’y ajoute, de la stratégie poursuivie pendant des décennies par son parti de réprimer les électeurs jeunes et les minorités, il vulgarise le discours politique et normalise l’insolence des candidats et des fonctionnaires, fait obstruction aux fonctionnaires démocrates et permet des dépenses de campagnes illimitées financées par de riches particuliers et des groupes économiques. L’étude conclut que Trump est aujourd’hui le leader d’un parti politique de plus en plus autoritaire au lieu d’un homme fort qui ne doit sa réussite qu’à lui-même. Cela réduit la perception que l’on peut obtenir des comparaisons avec des gouvernants tels que Hitler, Putin ou Erdogan.Se revisan las acciones de Donald Trump como presidente para evaluar hasta qué punto él difiere de las líneas políticas duraderas del Partido Republicano. Con excepción del comercio y de la inmigración aumentaron los deseos republicanos ya existentes en términos de recortar impuestos, desreglamentar, debilitar los sindicatos de trabajadores y nominar jueces de derecha. A continuación, se aborda la cuestión del autoritarismo de Trump. Se muestra que mientras su retórica es una versión aumentada de la anterior demagogia racial republicana, Trump beneficia más de lo que aporta de la estrategia de décadas de su partido de reprimir a los electores jóvenes y de las minorías, vulgariza el discurso político y normaliza la insolencia de candidatos y funcionarios, obstruye a los funcionarios demócratas y permite gastos de campaña ilimitados a personas ricas y a corporaciones. Se concluye, que Trump es ahora el líder de un partido político cada vez más autoritario en vez de un hombre fuerte autoproducido. Esto reduce la percepción que se puede obtener de las comparaciones con gobernantes como Hitler, Putin o Erdogan

    Different paths to the modern state in Europe: the interaction between domestic political economy and interstate competition

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    Theoretical work on state formation and capacity has focused mostly on early modern Europe and on the experience of western European states during this period. While a number of European states monopolized domestic tax collection and achieved gains in state capacity during the early modern era, for others revenues stagnated or even declined, and these variations motivated alternative hypotheses for determinants of fiscal and state capacity. In this study we test the basic hypotheses in the existing literature making use of the large date set we have compiled for all of the leading states across the continent. We find strong empirical support for two prevailing threads in the literature, arguing respectively that interstate wars and changes in economic structure towards an urbanized economy had positive fiscal impact. Regarding the main point of contention in the theoretical literature, whether it was representative or authoritarian political regimes that facilitated the gains in fiscal capacity, we do not find conclusive evidence that one performed better than the other. Instead, the empirical evidence we have gathered lends supports to the hypothesis that when under pressure of war, the fiscal performance of representative regimes was better in the more urbanized-commercial economies and the fiscal performance of authoritarian regimes was better in rural-agrarian economie

    Death and the Times: Depictions of War Deaths in the United States and Israel From Vietnam and the Six-Day War to Iraq and Lebanon

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    Why has support for casualties in foreign wars declined in the United States since Vietnam? We compare The New York Times’ very different depictions of war deaths in the Vietnam and Iraq wars. Then we offer an explanation for why there has been this fundamental transformation in the ways in which American war dead are regarded and valued. We find that the change is in retrospective interpretations of the war and in memorials to the Vietnam dead after that war ended rather than in public evaluations of the geopolitical interests of the U.S. or prospects for victory in either Vietnam or Iraq. We trace the deepening personalization of war dead to specific political and cultural events within the United States rather than positing a general change in Western attitudes toward death and war. We conclude by speculating on the implications of that change for future wars and propose a research agenda to extend our findings to other countries that have fought wars in recent decades

    A signalome screening approach in the autoinflammatory disease TNF Receptor Associated Periodic Syndrome (TRAPS) highlights the anti-inflammatory properties of drugs for repurposing

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    TNF Receptor Associated Periodic Syndrome (TRAPS) is an autoinflammatory disease caused by mutations in TNF Receptor 1 (TNFR1). Current therapies for TRAPS are limited and do not target the pro-inflammatory signalling pathways that are central to the disease mechanism. Our aim was to identify drugs for repurposing as anti-inflammatories based on their ability to down-regulate molecules associated with inflammatory signalling pathways that are activated in TRAPS. This was achieved using rigorously optimised, high through- put cell culture and reverse phase protein microarray systems to screen compounds for their effects on the TRAPS-associated inflammatory signalome. 1360 approved, publically available, pharmacologically active substances were investigated for their effects on 40 signalling molecules associated with pro-inflammatory signalling pathways that are constitutively upregulated in TRAPS. The drugs were screened at four ten-fold concentrations on cell lines expressing both wild-type (WT) TNFR1 and TRAPS-associated C33Y mutant TNFR1, or WT TNFR1 alone; signalling molecule levels were then determined in cell lysates by the reverse phase protein microarray. A novel mathematical methodology was developed to rank the compounds for their ability to reduce the expression of signalling molecules in the C33Y-TNFR1 transfectants towards the level seen in the WT-TNFR1 transfectants. Seven high-ranking drugs were selected and tested by RPPA for effects on the same 40 signalling molecules in lysates of peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) from C33Y-TRAPS patients compared to PBMCs from normal controls. The fluoroquinolone antibiotic lomefloxacin, as well as others from this class of compounds, showed the most significant effects on multiple pro-inflammatory signalling pathways that are constitutively activated in TRAPS; lomefloxacin dose-dependently significantly reduced expression of 7/40 signalling molecules across the Jak/Stat, MAPK, NF-kB and PI3K/AKT pathways. This study demonstrates the power of signalome screening for identifying candidates for drug repurposing
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