EUSECTRA: European Nuclear Security Training Centre providing hands-on training and education in Nuclear Security and Safeguards

The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) inaugurated under this global name about 10 years ago and operated by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), located both on the Karlsruhe (Germany) and Ispra (Italy) sites, includes a large variety of capacity building and professional development activities which span from the hands-on training for nuclear security and safeguards actors (e.g. respectively border guards or customs and nuclear inspectors) to educational efforts in both nuclear security and safeguards. Whereas the first ones, which gave rise to the new name, focus mainly on detection, on-site assistance, crime-scene management, technical reach-back and nuclear forensics capabilities, the second includes all aspects of nuclear safeguards analytical measurements, containment and surveillance, verification technologies and methodologies etc. This paper provides an overview of the most salient developments in these areas of both technical and academic teaching engagement in the last decade and includes some hints to the potential for enhanced collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Educational Network (INSEN

The European Commission Cooperative Support Programme: Activities and Cooperation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) bases its technical and scientific programme on voluntary contributions from Member States, constituting the Member States Support Programme (MSSP). The European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (EC-SP) started in 1981 to support IAEA activities in the field of nuclear safeguards. Since its beginning, the EC-SP has been operated by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre in close collaboration and coordination with the European Commission’s Directorate General for Energy – Directorate Nuclear Safeguards implementing the EURATOM treaty. EC-SP tasks provide technology and expertise in technical areas related to the effective implementation of safeguards verification measures including the detection of undeclared materials, activities, and facilities. The EC-SP fosters cooperation with Support Programmes from European Union Member States, as well as with non-EU states with which the European Commission has specific research and development agreements, e.g., the United States Department of Energy, ABACC. Information on the research and development activities under these frameworks is shared with the IAEA and complements core EC-SP work. The paper describes the EC-SP, its modus operandi, collaborations, and main activities, namely, (a) the specific R work as part of tasks with well-defined milestones and deadlines, (b) training activities; (c) the technical support in establishing Safeguards guidelines and approaches and (d) the technical consultancy support to IAEA meetings and expert groups.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit

Nuclear Safeguards R&D and Innovation at the JRC

Nuclear safeguards are from the very origin of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and as enshrined in the EURATOM Treaty, a key duty of the European Commission and a field in which JRC has a fully unique position in Europe. In this area JRC is an un-replaceable R&D partner of Euratom safeguards authority and IAEA through its very extensive support programme. The JRC R&D safeguards programme aims in one hand at maintaining traditional safeguards at level so that deterrence to diversion from civil cycle remains high, taking into account that more installations will need to be safeguarded by EU and international authorities. This relies on development of advanced NDA, DA and CS techniques, full remote and unattended (authenticated) technology and stringent quality systems in measurements and results delivery. In another hand the RD programme put more focus on material flows in sensitive uranium and spent fuel handling facilities and use of fingerprinting techniques to cover diversion scenarios and more performing and accurate environmental sampling techniques and traces analysis. Open-source analysis and development of new tools and methodologies for the control of Import/export are areas where the effort is also increased. In the JRC R&D programme a special attention is also given to the development of accountancy and safeguards concepts for advanced fuel cycles (GenIV) as well as proliferation resistance methodology. This scientific/technical work is encompassed by appropriate training activities. This paper is about some of the new R&D and innovation activities of the JRC as part of the EU contribution to the implementation of effective nuclear safeguards inside and outside the EU.JRC.E.9-Nuclear security (Ispra

Integration of Nuclear Safeguards and Security at the JRC

At political level, security and safeguards remain in separate hands. Safeguards are implemented by international and national authorities through an international treaty, while security is an important national responsibility. At a technical level the synergies between safeguards and security lead to their integration allowing better optimization of the resources and important benefit from exchange of experience and expertise between the two systems. In this paper, we will illustrate this integration process between nuclear security and safeguards. Many examples will be presented such as: non destructive assay (NDA) in nuclear safeguard /detection and identification of illicit nuclear and radioactive materials, destructive analysis (DA) and environmental sampling in nuclear safeguards/ nuclear forensic, use of seals in nuclear security for containers, combined camera and gamma/neutron source for source localisation in luggage, Open source information, export controls are also areas were the integration is possible.JRC.E.9-Nuclear security (Ispra

COMPUCEA 2nd generation performance evaluation

COMPUCEA (Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment Assay) is used for on-site analytical measurements in support of joint Euratom-IAEA inspections during physical inventory verification (PIV) campaigns in European Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication plants. The analyses provided on site during the PIV involve the accurate determination of the uranium element content and of the U-235 enrichment in verification samples (uranium product samples of solid form , i.e. powders, pellets) selected by the Safeguards inspectors. These samples are dissolved and then measured by energy-dispersive X-ray absorption edge spectrometry (L-edge densitometry) to obtain the uranium elemental content and gamma spectrometry with a Lanthanum-bromide detector for the U-235 abundance determination. The second generation of COMPUCEA equipment is compact, rugged and ready-to use directly after transport, no cooling of the detectors with liquid nitrogen is required. A software package for comfortable instrument control and data handling has been implemented. The paper describes the technique, setup and calibration procedure of the instrument. Results from PIV campaigns and comparisons between COMPUCEA results with data obtained by remote analysis with a qualified primary analytical method are presented, which demonstrate the performance of the technique. The achieved uncertainties are well within the international target values. First results obtained with a sandwich detector configuration for enhanced detection efficiency of the passive gamma spectrometry and a small separate X-ray fluorescence unit for the pre-screening of the samples for their Gd content are discussed.JRC.E.7-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

The Euratom Safeguards On-site Laboratories at the Reprocessing Plants of La Hague and Sellafield

In the European Union, nuclear material is reprocessed from irradiated power reactor fuel at two sites ¿ La Hague in France and Sellafield in the United Kingdom. These are the largest nuclear sites within the EU, processing many hundreds of tons of nuclear material in a year. Under the Euratom Treaty, the European Commission has the duty to assure that the nuclear material is only used for declared purposes. The Directorate General for Energy (DG ENER), acting for the Commission, assures itself that the terms of Article 77 of Chapter VII of the Treaty have been complied with. In contrast to the Non Proliferation Treaty, the Euratom Treaty requires to safeguard all civil nuclear material in all EU member states ¿ including the nuclear weapons states. The considerable amount of fissile material separated per year (several tonnes) calls for a stringent system of safeguards measures. The aim of safeguards is to deter diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximizing the chance of early detection. At a broader level, it provides assurance to the public that the European nuclear industry, the EU member states and the European Union honour their legal duties under the Euratom Treaty and their commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Efficient and effective safeguards measures are essential for the public acceptance of nuclear activities.JRC.E.7-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

How a Database of Nuclear Databases Could help the Effort to Combat Trafficking

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Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NNPT or NPT) is the primary cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Currently, 189 countries are party to the treaty, with only four sovereign states abstaining: India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. The treaty is broadly interpreted as having three pillars: (1) nonproliferation, (2) disarmament, and (3) the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Five countries are recognized by the NPT as nuclear weapon states (NWSs): the United States (US), the Soviet Union (obligations and rights now assumed by Russia), France, the United Kingdom, and the People¿s Republic of China. These five nations are also the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. In accordance with the NPT, the NWSs agree to not transfer nuclear weapons to a nonnuclear weapons state (NNWS) or assist NNWSs in acquiring nuclear weapons. Additionally, the NNWSs party to the NPT agree not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons. NNWSs also agree to accept safeguards monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting material derived from the peaceful use of nuclear technology to weapons. The NPT¿s preamble also contains language affirming the desire of all signatories to halt the production of nuclear weapons worldwide and to develop an additional treaty related to complete nuclear disarmament and liquidation, including their delivery vehicles. However, the NPT wording does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty, but rather to negotiate in good faith. Some NNWSs belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement (an international organization of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power block) have interpreted the NPT as requiring the NWSs to disarm themselves and argue that these states have failed to meet their obligations.JRC.DG.E.8-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

Unveiling the History of Seized Plutonium Through Nuclear Forensic Investigation

Summary. Illicit incidents involving nuclear or other radioactive materials and the threat of nuclear terrorism are reasons for serious concern. Since 1993 more than 1300 incidents have been reported to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database. Only a small number of cases involve plutonium or plutonium containing materials. However, these cases are attributed particular attention in view of the proliferation aspects and of the radiotoxicity associated with plutonium. Efforts focus on prevention, detection and response to cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material. If the place of theft or diversion of the material can be identified, then measures of safeguards and physical protection can be implemented to prevent future thefts. Nuclear Forensic Science aims at providing clues on the origin and intended use of nuclear or other radioactive material involved in illicit incidents. The paper provides a brief description of the nuclear forensic methodology and describes in detail the challenges associated with age determination of plutonium materials.JRC.E.8-Nuclear safeguards and Securit