Contract enforcement and Argentina's long-run decline

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which contract enforcement, as captured by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson's "Contract Intensive Money", conditioned broad capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country's relative international position. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a major role in Argentina's unique experience of long-run economic decline

Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.Publicad

Institutional instability and growth in Argentina: a long-run view

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. What did originate Argentina's economic retardation?. In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which institutional instability, as captured by "Contract Intensive Money" (Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson, 1999), conditioned capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country's relative international position. Our results suggest that institutional instability played a major role in Argentina's unique historical experience of economic decline

INSTITUTIONAL INSTABILITY AND GROWTH IN ARGENTINA: A LONG-RUN VIEW

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. What did originate Argentina’s economic retardation?. In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which institutional instability, as captured by “Contract Intensive Money” (Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson, 1999), conditioned capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country’s relative international position. Our results suggest that institutional instability played a major role in Argentina’s unique historical experience of economic decline.

Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline.

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.Contract intensive money; Economic decline; Argentina;

Contract Enforcement and Argentina’s Long-Run Decline

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which contract enforcement, as captured by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson’s “Contract Intensive Money”, conditioned broad capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country’s relative international position. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a major role in Argentina’s unique experience of long-run economic decline.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPENING OF STORES AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ARTISAN TEACHING LIKE URBAN ECONOMIC "PROXY-DATA" IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BURGOS

Estas páginas pergeñan un análisis crítico de las solicitudes de licencia para la apertura de tiendas en el Burgos del siglo XVIII, parámetro combinado con la diacronía de la obtención de la maestría artesanal a través de las cartas de examen. Ello posibilita, a mi juicio, una reconstrucción aproximativa del clima económico existente en la ciudad castellana a lo largo de dicha centuria. Tiendas y cartas de examen se conjugan para ofrecernos un “Proxy-data” diagnóstico del panorama, positivo o negativo, subyacente a la economía urbana, y de sus patologías climáticas y productivas en lo agrario. El zig-zag de las series nos aproxima, también, a las palpitaciones del consumo, de la oferta y demanda generada por los habitantes de Burgos, mayor entre los más privilegiados y más paupérrima entre los menos afortunados.These pages provide a critical analysis of license applications for the opening of stores in the eighteenth-century Burgos, a parameter combined with the diachrony of obtaining artisan mastery through examination letters. This makes possible, in my opinion, an approximate reconstruction of the economic atmosphere existing in the Castilian city throughout this century. Shops and examination letters are combined to offer us a "Proxydata" diagnosis of the landscape, positive or negative, underlying the urban economy, and its climatic and productive pathologies in the agrarian field. The zig-zag of the series also brings us closer to the palpitations of consumption, of the supply and demand generated by the inhabitants of Burgos, bigger among the most privileged and more impoverished among the less fortunate

Economic Reforms and Growth in Franco’s Spain

This paper is an attempt at assessing the economic impact of market-oriented reforms undertaken during General Franco’s dictatorship, in particular, the 1959 Stabilization and Liberalization Plan. Using an index of macroeconomic distortions (IMD) the relationship between economic policies and the growth record is examined. Although a gradual reduction in macroeconomic distortions was already in motion during the 1950s, the 1959 Plan opened the way to a new institutional design that favoured a free-market allocation of resources and allowed Spain to accelerate growth and catch up with Western Europe. Without the 1950s reforms and, especially, the 1959 Plan, per capita GDP would have been significantly lower in 1975Spain, Franco’s dictatorship, Economic reforms, Stabilization, Liberalization, Growth