On Candidate-Based Analyses of Assembly Elections.

Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. This candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over assemblies are separable. We show that if preferences over assemblies are themselves derived from underlying preferences over legislative or economic outcomes, then preferences over assemblies will not in general be separable.ELECTIONS;POLITICS;VOTING

Game Theoretic Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions.

We offer a selected survey of the uses of game theory in the analysis of law.LAW;VOTING;GAMES;GAME THEORY

Multi-Defendant Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency

economic models

Multi-Defendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability

economic models ; game theory

An Experimental Study of Two-Actor Accidents

law ; accidents ; economic models

Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions under Voters' Hierarchy

International audienceSimilar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem for preference aggregation, judgment aggregation has also an intrinsic impossibility for generating consistent group judgment from individual judgments. Removing some of the pre-assumed conditions would mitigate the problem but may still lead to too restrictive solutions. It was proved that if completeness is removed but other plausible conditions are kept, the only possible aggregation functions are oligarchic, which means that the group judgment is purely determined by a certain subset of participating judges. Instead of further challenging the other conditions, this paper investigates how the judgment from each individual judge affects the group judgment in an oligarchic environment. We explore a set of intuitively demanded conditions under abstentions and design a feasible judgment aggregation rule based on the agents’ hierarchy. We show this proposed aggregation rule satisfies the desirable conditions. More importantly, this rule is oligarchic with respect to a subset of agenda instead of the whole agenda due to its literal-based characteristics

A Conflict Model for Strategists and Managers

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67210/2/10.1177_000276427201500604.pd