Toward a Three-Dimensional Model of Suicide

Cases collected from medical examiner\u27s records are used to assess a three-dimensional model of failure suicide. The data are suggestive that youthful suicide can be explained in part as a reaction to perceived failure, the perception that significant others fail to provide succor, and the belief that others also view the individual as a failure. Implications of the findings are discussed in light of the proposed model

Interactive computer-based interventions for weight loss or weight maintenance in overweight or obese people

BACKGROUND: The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that the number of obese or overweight individuals worldwide will increase to 1.5 billion by 2015. Chronic diseases associated with overweight or obesity include diabetes, heart disease, hypertension and stroke. OBJECTIVES: To assess the effects of interactive computer-based interventions for weight loss or weight maintenance in overweight or obese people. SEARCH METHODS: We searched several electronic databases, including CENTRAL, MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, LILACS and PsycINFO, through 25 May 2011. We also searched clinical trials registries to identify studies. We scanned reference lists of included studies and relevant systematic reviews. SELECTION CRITERIA: Studies were included if they were randomized controlled trials or quasi-randomized controlled trials that evaluated interactive computer-based weight loss or weight maintenance programs in adults with overweight or obesity. We excluded trials if the duration of the intervention was less than four weeks or the loss to follow-up was greater than 20% overall. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two authors independently extracted study data and assessed risk of bias. Where interventions, control conditions, outcomes and time frames were similar between studies, we combined study data using meta-analysis. MAIN RESULTS: We included 14 weight loss studies with a total of 2537 participants, and four weight maintenance studies with a total of 1603 participants. Treatment duration was between four weeks and 30 months. At six months, computer-based interventions led to greater weight loss than minimal interventions (mean difference (MD) -1.5 kg; 95% confidence interval (CI) -2.1 to -0.9; two trials) but less weight loss than in-person treatment (MD 2.1 kg; 95% CI 0.8 to 3.4; one trial). At six months, computer-based interventions were superior to a minimal control intervention in limiting weight regain (MD -0.7 kg; 95% CI -1.2 to -0.2; two trials), but not superior to infrequent in-person treatment (MD 0.5 kg; 95% -0.5 to 1.6; two trials). We did not observe consistent differences in dietary or physical activity behaviors between intervention and control groups in either weight loss or weight maintenance trials. Three weight loss studies estimated the costs of computer-based interventions compared to usual care, however two of the studies were 11 and 28 years old, and recent advances in technology render these estimates unlikely to be applicable to current or future interventions, while the third study was conducted in active duty military personnel, and it is unclear whether the costs are relevant to other settings. One weight loss study reported the cost-effectiveness ratio for a weekly in-person weight loss intervention relative to a computer-based intervention as USD 7177 (EUR 5678) per life year gained (80% CI USD 3055 to USD 60,291 (EUR 2417 to EUR 47,702)). It is unclear whether this could be extrapolated to other studies. No data were identified on adverse events, morbidity, complications or health-related quality of life. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Compared to no intervention or minimal interventions (pamphlets, usual care), interactive computer-based interventions are an effective intervention for weight loss and weight maintenance. Compared to in-person interventions, interactive computer-based interventions result in smaller weight losses and lower levels of weight maintenance. The amount of additional weight loss, however, is relatively small and of brief duration, making the clinical significance of these differences unclear

Considering Intra-individual Genetic Heterogeneity to Understand Biodiversity

In this chapter, I am concerned with the concept of Intra-individual Genetic Hetereogeneity (IGH) and its potential influence on biodiversity estimates. Definitions of biological individuality are often indirectly dependent on genetic sampling -and vice versa. Genetic sampling typically focuses on a particular locus or set of loci, found in the the mitochondrial, chloroplast or nuclear genome. If ecological function or evolutionary individuality can be defined on the level of multiple divergent genomes, as I shall argue is the case in IGH, our current genetic sampling strategies and analytic approaches may miss out on relevant biodiversity. Now that more and more examples of IGH are available, it is becoming possible to investigate the positive and negative effects of IGH on the functioning and evolution of multicellular individuals more systematically. I consider some examples and argue that studying diversity through the lens of IGH facilitates thinking not in terms of units, but in terms of interactions between biological entities. This, in turn, enables a fresh take on the ecological and evolutionary significance of biological diversity

The many faces of biological individuality

Biological individuality is a major topic of discussion in biology and philosophy of biology. Recently, several objections have been raised against traditional accounts of biological individuality, including the objections of monism (the tendency to focus on a single individuality criterion and/or a single biological field), theory-centrism (the tendency to discuss only theory-based individuation), ahistoricity (the tendency to neglect what biologists of the past and historians of biology have said about biological individuality), disciplinary isolationism (the tendency to isolate biological individuality from other scientific and philosophical domains that have investigated individuality), and the multiplication of conceptual uncertainties (the lack of a precise definition of “biological individual” and related terms). In this introduction, I will examine the current philosophical landscape about biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address these five objections. Overall, the aim of this issue is to offer a more diverse, unifying, and scientifically informed conception of what a biological individual is