To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office

Film distributors occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Cold openings provide a natural field setting to test models of limited strategic thinking. In a set of 856 widely released movies, cold opening produces a significant 15% increase in domestic box office revenue (though not in foreign markets and DVD sales), consistent with the hypothesis that some moviegoers do not infer low quality from cold opening. Structural parameter estimates indicate 1–2 steps of strategic thinking by moviegoers (comparable to experimental estimates). However, movie studios appear to think moviegoers are sophisticated since only 7% of movies are opened cold

Learning and Visceral Temptation in Dynamic Saving Experiments

This paper tests two explanations for apparent undersaving in life cycle models: bounded rationality and a preference for immediacy. Each was addressed in a separate experimental study. In the first study, subjects saved too little initially—providing evidence for bounded rationality—but learned to save optimally within four repeated life cycles. In the second study, thirsty subjects who consume beverage sips immediately, rather than with a delay, show greater relative overspending, consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. The parameter estimates of overspending obtained from the second study, but not the first, are in range of several empirical studies of saving (with an estimated β = 0.6–0.7)

Learning and Visceral Temptation in Dynamic Savings Experiments

In models of optimal savings with income uncertainty and habit formation, people should save early to create a buffer stock, to cushion bad income draws and limit the negative internality from habit formation. In experiments in this setting, people save too little initially, but learn to save optimally within four repeated lifecycles, or 1-2 lifecycles with “social learning.” Using beverage rewards (cola) to create visceral temptation, thirsty subjects who consume immediately overspend compared to subjects who only drink after time delay. The relative overspending of immediate-consumption subjects is consistent with hyperbolic discounting and dual-self models. Estimates of the present-bias choices are β=0.6-0.7, which are consistent with other studies (albeit over different time horizons)

Economic Games Quantify Diminished Sense of Guilt in Patients with Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex

Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) impairs concern for other people, as reflected in the dysfunctional real-life social behavior of patients with such damage, as well as their abnormal performances on tasks ranging from moral judgment to economic games. Despite these convergent data, we lack a formal model of how, and to what degree, VMPFC lesions affect an individual's social decision-making. Here we provide a quantification of these effects using a formal economic model of choice that incorporates terms for the disutility of unequal payoffs, with parameters that index behaviors normally evoked by guilt and envy. Six patients with focal VMPFC lesions participated in a battery of economic games that measured concern about payoffs to themselves and to others: dictator, ultimatum, and trust games. We analyzed each task individually, but also derived estimates of the guilt and envy parameters from aggregate behavior across all of the tasks. Compared with control subjects, the patients donated significantly less and were less trustworthy, and overall our model found a significant insensitivity to guilt. Despite these abnormalities, the patients had normal expectations about what other people would do, and they also did not simply generate behavior that was more noisy. Instead, the findings argue for a specific insensitivity to guilt, an abnormality that we suggest characterizes a key contribution made by the VMPFC to social behavior

Accumulation is late and brief in preferential choice

Preferential choices are often explained using models within the evidence accumulation framework: value drives the drift rate at which evidence is accumulated until a threshold is reached and an option is chosen. Although rarely stated explicitly, almost all such models assume that decision makers have knowledge at the onset of the choice of all available attributes and options. In reality however, choice information is viewed piece-by-piece, and is often not completely acquired until late in the choice, if at all. Across four eye-tracking experiments, we show that whether the information was acquired early or late is irrelevant in predicting choice: all that matters is whether or not it was acquired at all. Models with potential alternative assumptions were posited and tested, such as 1) accumulation of instantaneously available information or 2) running estimates as information is acquired. These provided poor fits to the data. We are forced to conclude that participants either are clairvoyant, accumulating using information before they have looked at it, or delay accumulating evidence until very late in the choice, so late that the majority of choice time is not time in which evidence is accumulated. Thus, although the evidence accumulation framework may still be useful in measurement models, it cannot account for the details of the processes involved in decision making

Estimating Structural Models of Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchy Thinking in the Field: The Case of Withheld Movie Critic Reviews

Film studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Because the unreviewed movies tend to be below average in quality, this practice provides a useful setting in which to test models of limited strategic thinking: Do moviegoers seem to realize that no review is a sign of low quality? A companion paper showed that in a set of all widely released movies in 2000–2009, cold opening produces a significant 20%–30% increase in domestic box office revenue, which is consistent with moviegoers overestimating quality of unreviewed movies (perhaps due to limited strategic thinking). This paper reviews those findings and provides two models to analyze this data: an equilibrium model and a behavioral cognitive hierarchy model that allows for differing levels of strategic thinking between moviegoers and movie studios. The behavioral model fits the data better, because moviegoer parameters are relatively close to those observed in experimental subjects. These results suggests that limited strategic thinking rather than equilibrium reasoning may be a better explanation for naïve moviegoer behavior

Meta-Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss-Aversion

Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We conduct a large-scale, interdisciplinary meta-analysis, to systematically accumulate knowledge from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient reported from 1992 to 2017. We examine 607 empirical estimates of loss aversion from 150 articles in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and several other disciplines. Our analysis indicates that the mean loss aversion coefficient is 1.955 with a 95% probability that the true value falls in the interval [1.820, 2.105]. We record several observable characteristics of the study designs. Few characteristics are substantially correlated with differences in the mean estimates

Accumulation is late and brief in preferential choice

Preferential choices are often explained using models within the evidence accumulation framework: value drives the drift rate at which evidence is accumulated until a threshold is reached and an option is chosen. Although rarely stated explicitly, almost all such models assume that decision makers have knowledge at the onset of the choice of all available attributes and options. In reality however, choice information is viewed piece-by-piece, and is often not completely acquired until late in the choice, if at all. Across four eye-tracking experiments, we show that whether the information was acquired early or late is irrelevant in predicting choice: all that matters is whether or not it was acquired at all. Models with potential alternative assumptions were posited and tested, such as 1) accumulation of instantaneously available information or 2) running estimates as information is acquired. These provided poor fits to the data. We are forced to conclude that participants either are clairvoyant, accumulating using information before they have looked at it, or delay accumulating evidence until very late in the choice, so late that the majority of choice time is not time in which evidence is accumulated. Thus, although the evidence accumulation framework may still be useful in measurement models, it cannot account for the details of the processes involved in decision making

Determinants of Propranolol’s Selective Effect on Loss Aversion

Research on emotion and decision making has suggested that arousal mediates risky decisions, but several distinct and often confounded processes drive such choices. We used econometric modeling to separate and quantify the unique contributions of loss aversion, risk attitudes, and choice consistency to risky decision making. We administered the beta-blocker propranolol in a double-blind, placebo-controlled within-subjects study, targeting the neurohormonal basis of physiological arousal. Matching our intervention’s pharmacological specificity with a quantitative model delineating decision-making components allowed us to identify the causal relationships between arousal and decision making that do and do not exist. Propranolol selectively reduced loss aversion in a baseline- and dose-dependent manner (i.e., as a function of initial loss aversion and body mass index), and did not affect risk attitudes or choice consistency. These findings provide evidence for a specific, modulatory, and causal relationship between precise components of emotion and risky decision making

Evidence of general economic principles of bargaining and trade from 2,000 classroom experiments

Standardized classroom experiments provide evidence about how well scientific results reproduce when nearly identical methods are used. We use a sample of around 20,000 observations to test reproducibility of behaviour in trading and ultimatum bargaining. Double-auction results are highly reproducible and are close to equilibrium predictions about prices and quantities from economic theory. Our sample also shows robust correlations between individual surplus and trading order, and autocorrelation of successive price changes, which test different theories of price dynamics. In ultimatum bargaining, the large dataset provides sufficient power to identify that equal-split offers are accepted more often and more quickly than slightly unequal offers. Our results imply a general consistency of results across a variety of different countries and cultures in two of the most commonly used designs in experimental economics