“Seafarers should be navigating by the stars”: barriers to usability in ship bridge design

Navigating a ship is a complex task that requires close interaction between navigators and technology available on the ship’s bridge. The quality of this interaction depends on human and organisational factors, but also on technological design. This is recognized by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through the SOLAS V/15 regulation that requires human factor considerations in bridge design. The objective of this paper is to investigate how tensions between the main stakeholders’ interests and perspectives in ship bridge design may influence the achievement of the goals set forth in the SOLAS V/15 regulation. This objective is explored through a qualitative study in the maritime industry, involving seafarers, shipowners, and equipment manufacturers. We find suboptimal ship bridge design usability to be connected to structural characteristics of the maritime sector, where different aims and perspectives between core stakeholders impairs alignment with respect to conception of work-as-done in the operative environment. We also find that profitability is a major driver for the blunt end stakeholders, for whom the relation between usability and profitability is perceived as a trade-off rather than of synergy. We conclude that there is a need to develop processes, enablers, and management tools to (1) update the understanding of the professional competence needed in the technology dense work environment on ship bridges today; (2) strengthen the maritime stakeholders’ awareness of the advantages of human-centred design (HCD) which are both operator well-being and system performance; (3) enable implementation of HCD into existing design and development processes; (4) provide metrics for business cases enabling informed ergonomic investment decisions.publishedVersio

Trötthet till sjöss : goda råd om hur du som arbetar ombord kan minska risken att drabbas av trötthet

Varje år inträffar en rad olyckor på grund av att vakthavande befäl varit trött eller rent av somnat på bryggan. En kartläggning vid Sjöfartsverket visar att mellan 15 och 20 procent av alla olyckor kan relateras till sömnbrist. Men trötthet är inte bara en fråga om säkerhet. Det handlar också om arbetsmiljö, personlig hälsa och om hur kroppen påverkas av nattarbete och dagsömn. Sommaren 2007 publicerades forskningsrapporten Fatigue at Sea vid VTI (Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut). Den visar att befäl ofta är trötta under vakten, ibland till den grad att de måste kämpa för att inte nicka till. Störst är problemen på fartyg med bara två nautiker. Ett syfte med forskningen var att sammanställa en lista med rekommendationer för hur trötthetsproblemen kan minskas. I den här broschyren kan du läsa om en del av dessa råd som alla är väl förankrade i svensk och utländsk forskning. Råden vänder sig till dig som arbetar ombord, men det betyder inte att du är den enda som bär ansvar för din arbetssituation - arbetsgivare och myndigheter är i högsta grad delaktiga

Lätt att göra rätt : konsten att uppdatera en brygga

Syftet med denna skrift är att skapa bättre arbetsplatser för de som arbetar ombord på mindre fartyg och att öka kunskapen om hur man kan åstadkomma detta. Denna skrift tar sin utgångspunkt i bryggan, men flera av tipsen kan tillämpas på andra arbetsplatser ombord. Den underliggande principen är MTO-tänkandet. MTO står för människa-teknik-organisation och är ett sätt att tänka på hur vi, våra uppgifter och vår omvärld utgör ett system där alla faktorer samverkar. Detta innebär t.ex. att vid både riskanalyser, arbetsplatsdesign och olycksutredningar försöker man ta hänsyn till hur vi påverkas av teknik och omgivande situationer. MTO-tänkandet strävar efter en s.k. blame-free kultur där säkerhet är viktigare än att hitta syndabockar. Vi vill också visa att i MTO-tänkandet har de som utför ett arbete möjlighet att påverka sin arbetsplats till det bättre – men för detta behövs tid, motivation och kunskap

“The technology is great when it works” : Maritime Technology and Human Integration on the Ship’s Bridge

Several recent maritime accidents suggest that modern technology sometimes can make it difficult for mariners to navigate safely. A review of the literature also indicates that the technological remedies designed to prevent maritime accidents at times can be ineffective or counterproductive. To understand why, problem-oriented ethnography was used to collect and analyse data on how mariners understand their work and their tools. Over 4 years, 15 ships were visited; the ship types studied were small and large archipelago passenger ships and cargo ships. Mariners and others who work in the maritime industry were interviewed. What I found onboard were numerous examples of what I now call integration work. Integration is about co-ordination, co-operation and compromise. When humans and technology have to work together, the human (mostly) has to co-ordinate resources, co-operate with devices and compromise between means and ends. What mariners have to integrate to get work done include representations of data and information; rules, regulations and practice; human and machine work; and learning and practice. Mariners largely have to perform integration work themselves because machines cannot communicate in ways mariners see as useful. What developers and manufacturers choose to integrate into screens or systems is not always what the mariners would choose. There are other kinds of ‘mistakes’ mariners have to adapt to. Basically, they arise from conflicts between global rationality (rules, regulations and legislation) and local rationality (what gets defined as good seamanship at a particular time and place). When technology is used to replace human work this is not necessarily a straightforward or successful process. What it often means is that mariners have to work, sometimes very hard, to ‘construct’ a cooperational human-machine system. Even when technology works ‘as intended’ work of this kind is still required. Even in most ostensibly integrated systems, human operators still must perform integration work. In short, technology alone cannot solve the problems that technology created. Further, trying to fix ‘human error’ by incremental ‘improvements’ in technology or procedure tends to be largely ineffective due to the adaptive compensation by users. A systems view is necessary to make changes to a workplace. Finally, this research illustrates the value problem-oriented ethnography can have when it comes to collecting information on what users ‘mean’ and ‘really do’ and what designers ‘need’ to make technology easier and safer to use

Integreringsarbete på fartygsbryggan

Ny teknik införs ofta ombord för att underlätta arbetet och avlasta operatören (styrmannen eller maskinisten). Införandet av den moderna integrerade teknologin verkar ha lagt till en ny och problematisk dimension till fartygsolyckor och incidenter. Vi vet sedan tidigare att människor anpassar ny teknik eller anpassar sig till den. Det har dessutom visat sig att ny teknik kan förändra eller till och med öka arbetsbördan, inte minst för att den inte är till hjälp i de situationer när den verkligen behövs - under tidsbrist. Denna artikel beskriver resultat och slutsatser från en 4-årig studie på svenska fartygsbryggor, framlagd som en akademisk avhandling vid Linköpings universitet i december 2004

Communicating intended routes in ECDIS: Evaluating technological change

Misunderstanding each other's intentions is one of the most common causes of shipping accidents. By sending out a number of waypoints ahead and displaying them on the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) a ship's intentions would be clearly visible for other ships. Displaying ships' intentions would be a major change compared to navigation today. It could be very beneficial but it could also have unintended consequences. This paper reports on findings from an evaluation looking for unintended consequences of change using system simulation. During the simulation an unanticipated behavior was observed. Bridge crews started to click and drag waypoints too negotiate crossing situations ahead of time. The behavior could be compared to agreeing over the VHF. However further research is needed to evaluate this new behavior and how it aligns to COLREGS