Alemania y el fin del sistema bipolar en política internacional

Reference is made to two events that are interrelated. The first, widely discussed throughout the world today, is the end of the bipolar system. This structure, which spread from Europe to the world, has been gradually loosened by a number of events that have undermined, on the one hand, the sense of ideological cohesion in the East, and consequently the sense of immediate danger in the West; and on the other hand, the sense of absolute protection that North American power inspired in Western Europe. The second are the effects that this fact has produced in Germany, on the Federal Republic, its citizens and its national politics, a new awakening of the sense of a German national identity and the consequent search directed towards an independent national policy among the Germans of the Federal Republic.Se hace referencia a dos acontecimientos que están interrelacionados. El primero, ampliamente comentado a través de todo el mundo actual, es el fin del sistema bipolar. Esta estructura, que se difundió desde Europa hacia el mundo, se ha ido aflojando gradualmente por una cantidad de acontecimientos que han minado por un lado, el sentido de cohesión ideológica en el Este, y en consecuencia el sentido de peligro inmediato en Occidente; y por otro lado, la sensación de protección absoluta que el poder norteamericano inspiraba a Europa Occidental. El segundo, son los efectos que este hecho ha producido en Alemania, sobre la República Federal, sus ciudadanos y su política nacional, un nuevo despertar del sentido de una identidad nacional alemana y la consiguiente búsqueda dirigida hacia una política nacional independiente entre los alemanes de la República Federal

Las doctrinas de Karl Marx y su destino

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Les doctrines de Karl Marx i llur destí

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Reassessing East-West Relations. A Macroquantitative Analysis of Trends, Premises and Consequences of East-West Cooperation and Conflict

Since the Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington summits, East-West relations are generally expected to improve rapidly. Such expectations are usually based on theoretical assumptions regarding causes and effects of detente. Eight hypotheses, most of them very central ones, are discussed and tested empirically by using time-series data for the 1960-84 period. It appears that the move toward a strategic balance is not necessarily conducive to improved East-West relations, nor do independent European efforts have a decisive impact on the shaping of major-power relations. In contrast, detente appears to be divisible: The extra-European rivalry between East and West is hardly affected by the events on the main arena. Furthermore, an improvement of relations is not a mere question of good will: cooperative initiatives by the one side are usually not responded to reciprocally by the other. Trade relations, rather than being independent stimuli promoting East-West detente, have developed their own momentum. The internal pressure on dissidents is slowly decreasing in the East, but the evidences are only weak that this is attributable to East-West detente. Notwithstanding detente, the progress in arms control and disarmament has not yet dampened the expansion of military expenditures. Finally, East-West relations itself appear to be volatile and cyclical in nature. Hence, it seems appropriate to caution against a new crisis and maybe decline of East-West relations in the nearer future