E-learning Aspects of NODES Project

The NODES project aims at promoting the use, in adult training/lifelong learning, of multimedia knowledge, in order to facilitate competitiveness, employability and mobility of adults who are victims of the digital divide or of some of its components, such as distance, initial level of knowledge, language, and use of complex technologies. Our task in the project is studying the existing free or commercial licenses e-learning software. The aim of the investigation of these systems is surveying the most important functional features, modules, standards, and hardware and software requirements. After the comparison of the e-Learning systems by several methods, have to evaluate the most important parameters, which are suitable suggestion for the project management. These parameters were evaluated. Reviewing these parameters, our suggestion is the Moodle or the aTutor

A lower bound for the kk-multicolored sum-free problem in Zmn\mathbb{Z}^n_m

In this paper, we give a lower bound for the maximum size of a $k$-colored sum-free set in $\mathbb{Z}_m^n$, where $k\geq 3$ and $m\geq 2$ are fixed and $n$ tends to infinity. If $m$ is a prime power, this lower bound matches (up to lower order terms) the previously known upper bound for the maximum size of a $k$-colored sum-free set in $\mathbb{Z}_m^n$. This generalizes a result of Kleinberg-Sawin-Speyer for the case $k=3$ and as part of our proof we also generalize a result by Pebody that was used in the work of Kleinberg-Sawin-Speyer. Both of these generalizations require several key new ideas

The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees

Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast `yes' or `no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as `yes' or `no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to weighted voting situations, where voters can cast multiple votes. Measuring the power of a party in a national assembly seems to fit this model, but in fact its power comprises of votes of individual representatives each having a single vote. These representatives may vote yes or no, or may abstain, but in some cases they are not even there to vote. We look at absentees not due to a conscious decision, but due to illness, for instance. Formally voters will be absent, say, ill, with a certain probability and only present otherwise. As in general not all voters will be present, a thin majority may quickly melt away making a coalition that is winning in theory a losing one in practice. A simple model allows us to differentiate between winning and more winning and losing and less losing coalitions reflected by a voting game that is not any more simple. We use data from Scotland, Hungary and a number of other countries both to illustrate the relation of theoretical and effective power and show our results working in the practice.a priori voting power; power index; being absent from voting; minority; Shapley-Shubik index; Shapley valuea priori voting power; power index; being absent from voting; minority; Shapley-Shubik index; Shapley value

The relationship between public balance and inflation in Europe

The study considers some of the factors determining budget balance. In particular, it investigates the relationship between budget balance and inflation. The analysis focuses on European states in the period between 1999 and 2007, and concludes that the relationship between budget balance and inflation is not demonstrable. In the literature, attempts to quantify the relationship between the two factors have faced severe difficulties. Inflation influences both the revenue side and the expenditure side of the budget, often increasing one and reducing the other at the same time. These effects might balance each other out, leaving the budget balance unchanged. --budget balance,budget deficit,inflation