Mobility and Conflict

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and wage conflict. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but such economic exclusion implies lower per capita shares and higher risk of conflict. In equilibrium, allocations are non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. Moreover, limited commitment with respect to mobility gives rise to inefficient conflict in equilibrium.conflict, inter-group mobility, political competition, resource allocation

Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest

We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instruments to redress the lack of competitive balance due to asymmetry; she can commit to an information-disclosing mechanism, and she can discriminate one of the players by biasing his effort. We characterize the optimal level of discrimination to maximize aggregate effort, showing how this inextricably determines the choice of information disclosure. Applications are found in newcomer-incumbent situations in an internal labor market, sales-force management, and research contests

Mobility and Conflict

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, society comprises two groups who compete in every period for political power, i.e. the right to allocate economic resources between the groups. Individuals can move from one group to another at a cost: this cost of mobility is the index of inter-group differences. Since mobility is costly, the group in power can keep a larger share for itself. The extent of such economic exclusion is limited by two constraints: excessive exclusion reduces the opposition’s opportunity cost of engaging in political conflict (conflict constraint) and, if a group keeps too much for itself, individuals switching from the other group will dilute the per capita share of resources (mobility constraint). In determining the optimal group size by attracting switchers, the incumbent faces a trade-off between low per capita surplus and high political strength. We characterize the resource allocations, group membership decisions and conflict decisions that arise in equilibrium. The two mechanisms of conflict and mobility act as constraints to expropriation, and the optimal sharing is dictated by which constraint binds. The extent of sharing turns out to be non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. We show that the limited commitment with respect to switching can lead to inefficient conflict in equilibrium. We also derive several testable predictions about when conflict will arise. Specifically, we show that conflict may arise when the cost of mobility is moderate, but may not necessarily emerge when the cost is high

Mobility and Conflict

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, society comprises two groups who compete in every period for political power, i.e. the right to allocate economic resources between the groups. Individuals can move from one group to another at a cost: this cost of mobility is the index of inter-group differences. Since mobility is costly, the group in power can keep a larger share for itself. The extent of such economic exclusion is limited by two constraints: excessive exclusion reduces the opposition’s opportunity cost of engaging in political conflict (conflict constraint) and, if a group keeps too much for itself, individuals switching from the other group will dilute the per capita share of resources (mobility constraint). In determining the optimal group size by attracting switchers, the incumbent faces a trade-off between low per capita surplus and high political strength. We characterize the resource allocations, group membership decisions and conflict decisions that arise in equilibrium. The two mechanisms of conflict and mobility act as constraints to expropriation, and the optimal sharing is dictated by which constraint binds. The extent of sharing turns out to be non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. We show that the limited commitment with respect to switching can lead to inefficient conflict in equilibrium. We also derive several testable predictions about when conflict will arise. Specifically, we show that conflict may arise when the cost of mobility is moderate, but may not necessarily emerge when the cost is high

Mobility and Conflict

Accepted manuscript version. Published version at <a href=http://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130055>http://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130055</a>.We study the role of intergroup mobility in the emergence of conflict. Two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources. We allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, which the opposition can accept or reject, and wage conflict. Agents can also switch group membership. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but implies a higher threat of conflict. Our main finding is that the possibility of intergroup mobility affects the likelihood of conflict in a nonmonotonic way. Open conflict can arise at intermediate costs of mobility. (JEL D71, D72, D74

Transcription through chromatin - dynamic organization of genes

In this article, we discuss the dynamic organization of eukaryotic genes into chromatin. Remodeling of chromatin confers it the ability for dynamic change. Remodeling is essential for transcriptional regulation, the first step of gene expression

Atomic Force Microscopy: a tool to unveil the mystery of biological systems

This article focuses on one of the promising and emerging nanolevel imaging techniques: Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM). In recent studies, AFM has been extensively used to understand intricate biological phenomena like prokaryotic and eukaryotic genome organization, different DNA transaction activities, protein chaperoning and also protein-nucleic acid organization in viruses

Transcription through chromatin - link to diseases and therapeutics

The expression of chromosomal genes is regulated by posttranslational modification of both histone and nonhistone chromatin proteins and ATP-dependent remodeling of chromatin. Dysfunction of the modification and remodeling machineries can lead to several diseases, which include cancer, cardiac hypertrophy, and asthma. Many genetic diseases can also lead to malfunction of the machinery. The enzymes responsible for chromatin organization are the new targets for therapeutics. Inhibitors and activators of histone acetyltransferases and inhibitors of histone deacetylases may serve as new generation drugs