ESTIMATION OF EMPLOYMENT MULTIPLIERS FOR PLANNING IN OZARKS NONMETROPOLITAN COUNTIES

Labor and Human Capital,

Analyzing the feasibility of domestic rural water supplies in Missouri with emphasis on the Ozarks region

Cover title."Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Missouri-Columbia, in cooperation with Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture."Includes bibliographical references

Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia,by Aaron L. Friedberg

Normally, a recommendation regarding for which audience a book is best suited comes at the end of the review. In this case, it comes first because Professor Aaron Friedberg provides a tight mono- graph that illuminates areas of great misunderstanding to a large population in the policy and defense communities: the debate over the concept of Air-Sea Battle (ASB) and the vernacular of mod- ern maritime strategy

Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the Making of On War, by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger

One is tempted to ask why naval officers should be interested in reading a biog- raphy of the wife of the famous Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz. In answer we might go to the words of Marie von Clausewitz herself, from her letter of dedication to Carl’s unfinished masterpiece On War: “Readers will be rightly surprised that a woman should dare to write a preface for such a work as this. My friends will need no explanation. . . . Those who knew of our happy marriage and knew that we shared every- thing, not only joy and pain but also every occupation, every concern of daily life, will realize that a task of this kind could not occupy my beloved husband without at the same time becoming thoroughly familiar to me” (preface to Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans

Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century

Commander Henry J. Hendrix has writ- ten a neat monograph based on his doctoral work. He makes two related arguments: first, that one cannot understand the diplomatic style of President Theodore Roosevelt without first understanding his attitude toward the efficacy and use of naval power; and second, that the existing literature has not adequately integrated naval and military historical methods of analysis with existing diplomatic historical approaches. Consequently, previous interpretations of Roosevelt’s foreign policy decisions, as they relate to incidents that involved the use of naval power, are incomplete, precisely because they do not fuse the diplomatic and political with the naval—especially the perspective reflected by the navalist attitudes of Theodore Roosevelt