The Democratic Legitimacy of the 2016 British Referendum on EU Membership

This is the final version. Available on open access from UACES via the DOI in this recordThis article addresses the input legitimacy of the British EU membership referendum of 2016. It considers who was given a vote in the first place, and whether those given a vote could make a reasonable choice in light of the campaign. More precisely, it assesses the following four criteria: the franchise, the presence of clarity, the amount and quality of information and the quality of public debate. The article argues that instances of direct democracy, such as referendums, require higher standards of civic behaviour from both elected representatives and voters than representative democracy. Applying these criteria to the EU referendum shows it fell short of the first two whilst it could have done better as regards the last two. The article concludes by briefly discussing what can be learnt from this referendum for the future

Actions and Beliefs: Estimating Distribution-Based Preferences Using a Large Scale Experiment with Probability Questions on Expectations

We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictator") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty.We use a large and representative sample of subjects drawn from the Dutch population.Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for equity in the population.Changes in preferences have an important impact on decisions of dictators in the dictator game and responders in the ultimatum game, but a smaller impact on decisions of proposer's in the ultimatum game, a result due to proposers subjective expectations about responders' decisions.The model which uses subjective data on expectations has better predictive power and lower noise level than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations.ultimatum game;inquity aversion;subjective expectations

Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations: A Large-Scale Experiment With a Representative Subject Pool

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers. We estimate the model on a large representative sample from the Dutch population. We find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socioeconomic characteristics of responders. Strong inequity aversion to the other player’s disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents. Responders tend to punish unfavorable offers more if they expect that fair proposals will occur with higher probability.Inequity aversion;intentions;subjective expectations

Behavioral Aspects of Bargaining and Pricing.

Some remarkable results of the studies in this thesis are that individual behavior seems to be rather well described by theories taking the (im)patience of agents into account. Fairness considerations are found to play an important role not only in bargaining situations but also in competitive markets. At the same time, the impact of fairness varies with the institutional setting. Finally, investigation into the variation of trust accross the Dutch population suggests that age and education affect a basic trust propensity.

Bullous hemorrhagic lichen sclerosus of the breast: a report of two cases and review of the literature

Lichen sclerosus (LS) is a chronic dermatologic condition characterized by atrophic porcelain-appearing plaques that can cause intense discomfort and eventually lead to destruction of local architecture. Lichen sclerosus most commonly arises in the anogenital area, but up to 20% of cases can present on extragenital skin. Rarely, LS can also present with hemorrhage and bullae; the mechanism by which this occurs is unknown. We report two cases of bullous hemorrhagic LS of the breast arising in 66-year-old and 77-year-old women. Bullous hemorrhagic LS of the breast is exceedingly rare, with few reported cases, and presents a diagnostic challenge to clinicians

You May Have to Do it Again, Rocky! An Experimental Analysis of Bargaining with Risky Joint Profits

We present an experimental study of a risky sequential bargaining to model negotiations in risky joint ventures that proceed through multiple stages.Our example is the production of a movie that may give rise to a sequel, so actors and producers negitiate sequentially.We compare the predictions of alternative theoretical approaches to understanding such a game.The game theoretic solution predicts (assuming risk neutrality) that actors are willing to accept wages below their outside option for first films in order to capture the gains from winning lucrative sequel contracts.This prediction is strongly rejected by the data.The data are better explained by either equity theory (equal splits) or by a game theoretic model where actors have uncertain risk aversion.The parameters of the game are calibrated to match data on 99 movies for 1989 available from a case study.

The agrin gene codes for a family of basal lamina proteins that differ in function and distribution

We isolated two cDNAs that encode isoforms of agrin, the basal lamina protein that mediates the motor neuron-induced aggregation of acetylcholine receptors on muscle fibers at the neuromuscular junction. Both proteins are the result of alternative splicing of the product of the agrin gene, but, unlike agrin, they are inactive in standard acetylcholine receptor aggregation assays. They lack one (agrin-related protein 1) or two (agrin-related protein 2) regions in agrin that are required for its activity. Expression studies provide evidence that both proteins are present in the nervous system and muscle and that, in muscle, myofibers and Schwann cells synthesize the agrin-related proteins while the axon terminals of motor neurons are the sole source of agrin