The role of Twitter in legitimating the Energy East Pipeline, Canada

This thesis explores the value of social media in contemporary democratic practices; more precisely, on the use of social media in Canadian tar-sands pipeline infrastructure debate through the lens of public sphere theory. The study aims to contribute to improved understanding of Twitter’s shaping the course of the proposed Energy East pipeline, its legitimacy and formation of public debate around it. It is based on a mixed-methods approach employing both qualitative and quantitative research methodology. Data was collected from a topic-specific content stream on Twitter, followed by a series of semi-structured interviews with some of the most influential users within a sample of collected tweets. The study identified the users, the content and socio-political context of tweets that are posted in connection with the pipeline as well as users’ perceptions of Twitter as a tool for online deliberative democratic practices. Findings indicate Twitter is praised for offering an enabling environment for citizen journalism on real-time events, its swiftness of information dissemination, enabling contact with individuals outside of users’ established social circles and the power to influence public opinion. However, the medium is not without limitations which diminish its role as an optimal tool for democratic online public deliberation. My study suggests the main hindrance for this is the absence of constructive debate due to Twitter’s character-limitation of posts and predominantly one-sided communicative processes that take place within this medium. Its role in Energy East debate remains constrained within informative and reactive aspects of its service on current developments on the pipeline polemics and has as such a limited influence on legitimation processes surrounding the project. I therefore conclude that Twitter represents only a fragment of what can be considered the new public sphere and definitely not one-size-fits-all solution to the contemporary legitimation crisis of proposed large-scale industrial projects such as Energy East pipeline.M-IE

Dirac parameters and topological phase diagram of Pb1-xSnxSe from magneto-spectroscopy

Pb1-xSnxSe hosts 3D massive Dirac fermions across the entire composition range for which the crystal structure is cubic. In this work, we present a comprehensive experimental mapping of the 3D band structure parameters of Pb1-xSnxSe as a function of composition and temperature. We cover a parameter space spanning the band inversion that yields its topological crystalline insulator phase. A non-closure of the energy gap is evidenced in the vicinity of this phase transition. Using magnetooptical Landau level spectroscopy, we determine the energy gap, Dirac velocity, anisotropy factor and topological character of Pb1-xSnxSe epilayers grown by molecular beam epitaxy on BaF2 (111). Our results are evidence that Pb1-xSnxSe is a model system to study topological phases and the nature of the phase transition.Comment: Submitte

Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra i kneza Pavla (1918-1941)

In the first section the author points out the situation of the Yugoslav state immediately after the end of World War I in 1918 — a situation more than unsatisfactory in both foreign and domestic affairs. As a result, the leaders implemented a policy of relaxing tensions and avoiding any eventual conflict — particularly with Italy. The Regent Alexander, who later was the King, advocated this policy of caution, malleability, and extreme moderation towards Italy. It was Alexander who discreetly pushed through the "agreement" with Italy and later, after conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo (1920), he further attempted to win Italian favor with a policy of relaxation and thereby to create a basis for cooperation. He strove to continue this policy because changes had taken place in Italy in the autumn of 1922 and the Duce, Benito Mussolini had taken power. Working from the assumption that cooperation with Italy was possible and that relaxation would convince her of this, which would in turn lead to friendship, Alexander sought a modus vivendi with the "new, young" Italy. This policy coincided with Alexander\u27s own political inclinations, for he was unfavorable to neither fascism as an ideology and operation of the far right, nor to the Duce himself. This policy was instrumented through the foreign minister M. Ninčić, and later, for a longer period of time, by V. Marinković. Under Marinković a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in Rome in 1924. Somewhat later, in 1925, the Nettun Conventions were concluded; although in the face of heavy opposition, Marinković was not able to obtain ratification until 1928. The regime in Belgrade took all possible measures for reciprocal extension of the 1924 Italian-Yugoslav treaty, but Mussolini adamantly refused. Even this setback failed to deter Alexander in his search for a way to Mussolini, and he initiated two parallel efforts on the diplomatic front with the same strategic goal. One was headed by Marinković, who engaged in a dialogue with the Italian foreign minister D. Grandi, and the other by the King himself; the latter in such great secrecy that the foreign minister himself was kept in the dark. Neither Marinković\u27s attempts with Grandi nor the King\u27s with the Italian representative, G. M. Cappi, were able to persuade Mussolini to open a new chapter in Yugoslav-Italian relations. Negotiations foundered on the question of Albania, as Italy was adamant in demanding that Yugoslavia recognize the "predominance" of Italian interests in Albania - a move Alexander was unwilling to make. When this became evident in the course of negotiations, Mussolini instrumented a radical turnabout in policy, and, after an unsuccessful uprising (the so-called "Velebit Uprising") and the Oreb assassination attempt in Zagreb, he succeeded in removing King Alexander from the political scene with the help of the Ustaše organization in Marseille, October 9, 1934. In the second section the author presents the policies of Prince Paul towards Italy and Mussolini. Prince Paul, as the regent and undoubted architect of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy after 1934, benefitted from the example of his royal predecessor and was less eager to look to Mussolini for a joint platform of future cooperation. Where Alexander had been caught between France and Italy, Prince Paul\u27s position was in essence quite different. On the one hand lay Adolf Hitler\u27s Germany, which required increasing attention, and on the other was Great Britain, with whom lay most of the Prince\u27s sympathies in any event. That was the basis for Prince Paul\u27s development of the following concept in foreign policy: a continual increase in economic ties with Germany as a potential protector from neighboring Italy\u27s excessive (and always dangerous) appetite, an easing of ties with France accompanied by a discreet reliance on Great Britain, a persistant refusal to recognize the Soviet Union, and a gradual improvement of relations with fascist Italy. This meant virtual inclusion of Yugoslavia in the neutralist camp! Conclusion of the "Belgrade Agreements" by Ciano and Stojadinović in 1937 was facilitated by the Prince\u27s greater desire to see the Ustaše organization liquidated than to increase tension over the "predominance" of Italian interests in Albania. Later developments showed the Prince\u27s calculations to have been productive in several instances. The Italian attack on Greece in 1940 introduced new elements into the general military situation and Yugoslavia\u27s situation in particular. Hitler could not permit his Axis partner to be defeated, and he therefore resolved to "straighten out" Yugoslavia before embarking on "Operation Marita" against Greece and the British Expeditionary Force in the spring of 1941, as a prelude to the enormous dimensions of his "Operation Barbarossa" against the Soviet Union. Faced with demands that Yugoslavia unhesitatingly join the Tripartite Pact, the Prince finally gave in, thereby receiving from Berlin significant concessions which were actually in direct contradiction to the Tripartite Pact treaty. Yugoslavia\u27s joining the Tripartite Pact, however, and her formal attachment to the Axis were so unpopular with the Yugoslav masses, that this anti-fascist mood of the masses served as a butress to the forces which engineered the coup d’état on March 27, 1941, bringing down the Regency and the government of Dragiša Cvetković and forcing Prince Paul into exile

Restrictions of life at high altitudes and physiological adaptations in animals

Velike visine oduvijek su privlačile ljude, naročito planinare i skijaše. No s velikim visinama dolazi i nepogodan okoliš karakteriziran velikom hladnoćom, niskim tlakom i hipoksijom. Upravo niski tlak i hipoksija stvaraju najveću opasnost za ljudsko zdravlje. Ovaj rad pregled je fizioloških procesa koji se zbivaju u tijelu, a uzrokovani su hipoksijom. Objašnjen je i pojam aklimatizacije te se opisuju neke visinske bolesti kao i njihovo liječenje. Rad razmatra prilagodbe stanovnika velikih visina (životinje i starosjedioce) na hipoksične uvjete. Dosta radova napravljeno je na ovom području, ali mnogo mehanizama još uvijek je nepoznato te zahtijevaju dodatno istraživanje. Također je potrebno istražiti bolesti i prilagodbe kod ljudi i životinja kako bi se pronašli odgovarajući životinjski modeli.High altitudes have always been attractive to people, especially mountaineer and skiers. They are charachterized by hostile environment, extreme cold, low pressure and hypoxia. Low pressure and hypoxia are charachteristics that pose the biggest threat to human health.This article is an overview of physiological processes caused in body by hypoxia. It also explanins concept of acclimatization and describes some illnesses caused by high altitudes as well as their treaments. Article also investigates adaptations of high altitude rezidents (animals and natives) on hypoxic conditions. Lot of work has been done in this area, but many mechanisms still remain unexplained and in need of future research. To find appropriate animal models future research of ilneses and adaptations in humans and animals should be conducted

THE POSITION OF THE MONARCHY OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES IN THE WORLD IN 1919

In the first part of the article the author describes the general situation in which the Yugoslav State found herself directly after the federation vas proclaimed on December 1, 1918. Her position at that time was anything but favourable and stable. She was surrounded by seven neighbours, and with six of them she was either in dispute or in conflict over their common frontiers. She was weighed down by the unfavourable conditions of the armistice of November 3, 1918 and left to herself by her war "allies" (France and Great Britain) who had their own imperialist interests in the Danube region and on the Balkan Peninsula. She was met and treated by almost incessant hostility in Italian diplomacy. At a time when Europe was greatly disturbed and deprived of the presence of two great powers (Tsarist Russia and the German Empire), at a time when traces of the recently ended war were everywhere and when the Peace Conference was to create or ratify and legalize the new political map of Europe, the Monarchy of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was almost constantly in a state of crisis. The war of 1914—1918 had devastated Serbia, but the situation was not much better in other parts of the new state either. In many regions famine threatened and the problem of food and supplies became one of the most important and most pressing. In the first few months the system of rationing from the war was kept, but in peacetime it worked even worse than during the war. Speculations flourished in the whole country, prices rose alarmingly and paper money lost value. Those who had least suffered most. To all this was added disorder in Communications, the discrimination practised by some regional governments, various difficulties in the administration, prohibitions and bureaucratic delays, the unsolved monetary question, unrest and revolt among the peasants and soldiers and above all the ill-fated and perilous policy of centralising everything. The government\u27s unexpected measure of declaring a complete freedom of trade only changed the situation in the economy from bad to worse, and the first measures taken in the direction of an agrarian reform — devised as a vent for the accumulated discontent and rebelliousness remained open, speculation flourished and corruption spread. Unemployment could be felt everywhere. The capitalists started amassing riches faster and unscrupulously and the conditions of the proletariat got worse. This provoked discontent and a revolutionary mood which manifested itself in numerous strikes and tariff actions. The process of radicalization among the working masses resulted in the Congress of Consolidation and the creation of the Socialist Worker\u27s Party of Yugoslavia (of Communists). In the second part of the article the author discusses the main problems of foreign policy and states that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes ("Serbia") did not get a good reception at the Peace Conference in Paris (1919—1920). On the contrary, it could be said that she was not only included among the countries with "limited interests" but was treated as a country with limited rights. This could be noticed at the very beginning of the work of the Conference at the discussion of the number of delegates of the countries taking part. It could be seen even better in the question of the international recognition of the new conditions in public law formed by the union of Serbia and Montenegro with the South Slav countries that had been included in the former Habsburg Monarchy ("The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs"). The Conference refused to recognize the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a whole, even though it recognized Poland and Czechoslovakia. The method of work at the Conference was unpleasant for small nations (A. Trumbić). At the first Plenary Meetings it had seemed that the small nations would be on an equal footing with the large ones. This only lasted for a short time, and then the representatives of the great powers took things into their own hands. First the Council of Ten was formed, and then the Council of Four. That Council of Four (Wilson—Lloyd George—Clemenceau— Orlando) decided all the more important questions put before the Conference without appeal. In addition Committees for certain questions were formed and they heard the requests of members or experts from certain delegations. The representatives of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were heard too. But they did not take part in the discussions of the Council of Four or in the Committees on numerous questions important for the new Yugoslav state: the question of reparations, the division of the Austro-Hungarian merchant and war fleet, the war expenses of Serbia, the liquidation of financial relations between Croatia and Hungary etc. This was especially well felt at the Conference\u27s discussions of territorial questions. The delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was in an exceptional position in this question because none of the great powers except Italy were directly interested in her territorial problems. The delegation demanded corrections towers Bulgaria that would protect the eastern frontier and the railway line Belgrade—Skopje—Salonica exposed at Vranje and Strumica. In Banat it demanded the line Danube—Tisa—Moriš and in the east the line that passes about 20 kilometres to the east of Vršac and Temišvar. The Committee in charge of these questions did not grant its requests completely. In Bačka the Committee granted it Subotica, but not Baja. In Baranja it got the triangle between the Danube and the Drava closed by the line that runs from Kis-Köszeg to the Drava at Donji Miholjac. There were no difficulties in Međimurje, but there were many with the northwestern frontier (towards Austria) and the delegation finally managed to get Maribor and the valley of the Drava, Prekomurje and a plebiscite in the Celovec basin. The question of the frontier with Italy on the Adriatic caused the most difficulties, and at one point the "Adriatic question" threatened to break up the whole Conference. After many complications the Italian side, at the end of 1919, rejected the great powers\u27 joint memorandum of December 9, and so that question remained unsolved when the Peace Conference finished its session in Paris