PriPeARL: A Framework for Privacy-Preserving Analytics and Reporting at LinkedIn

Preserving privacy of users is a key requirement of web-scale analytics and reporting applications, and has witnessed a renewed focus in light of recent data breaches and new regulations such as GDPR. We focus on the problem of computing robust, reliable analytics in a privacy-preserving manner, while satisfying product requirements. We present PriPeARL, a framework for privacy-preserving analytics and reporting, inspired by differential privacy. We describe the overall design and architecture, and the key modeling components, focusing on the unique challenges associated with privacy, coverage, utility, and consistency. We perform an experimental study in the context of ads analytics and reporting at LinkedIn, thereby demonstrating the tradeoffs between privacy and utility needs, and the applicability of privacy-preserving mechanisms to real-world data. We also highlight the lessons learned from the production deployment of our system at LinkedIn.Comment: Conference information: ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM 2018

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Pay What You Want (PWYW) can be an attractive marketing strategy to price discriminate between fair-minded and selfish customers, to fully penetrate a market without giving away the product for free, and to undercut competitors that use posted prices. We report on laboratory experiments that identify causal factors determining the willingness of buyers to pay voluntarily under PWYW. Furthermore, to see how competition affects the viability of PWYW, we implement markets in which a PWYW seller competes with a traditional seller. Finally, we endogenize the market structure and let sellers choose their pricing strategy. The experimental results show that outcome-based social preferences and strategic considerations to keep the seller in the market can explain why and how much buyers pay voluntarily to a PWYW seller. We find that PWYW can be viable in isolation, but it is less successful as a competitive strategy because it does not drive traditional posted-price sellers out of the market. Instead, the existence of a posted-price competitor reduces buyers’ payments and prevents the PWYW seller from fully penetrating the market. If given the choice, the majority of sellers opt for setting a posted price rather than a PWYW pricing. We discuss the implications of these results for the use of PWYW as a marketing strategy

Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?

We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed pricesetting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payo equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves if the most plausible equilibrium is realized in the market. Hence, in this case it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists

Viable tax constitutions

Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an outside party enforcing contracts between members of a group, no arrangement within groups can be considered to be a binding contract, and therefore the power of tax must be sanctioned by individuals on an ongoing basis. In this paper we offer, for the first time, a theoretical analysis of this fundamental compliance problem associated with taxation, obtaining predictions that in some cases point to a re-interptretation of the theoretical constructions of the public finance tradition while in others call them into question

Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity

This paper analyses alternative profiles of opportunity sets for individuals in an exchange economy, without assuming that individuals’ choices reveal coherent preferences. It introduces the concept of a ‘market-clearing single-price regime’, representing a profile of opportunity sets consistent with competitive equilibrium. It also proposes an opportunity-based normative criterion, the Strong Opportunity Criterion, which is analogous with the core in preference-based analysis. It shows that every market-clearing single-price regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion and that, in the limit as an economy is replicated, only such regimes have this property

The UN in the lab

We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Defense and Prevention. Defense consists of investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack, and generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists. In contrast, Prevention, which consists of investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack, creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. This interaction is captured using a simple 3×3 “Nested Prisoner’s Dilemma” game, with a single Nash equilibrium where both countries choose Defense. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coordination by implementing agreements to share the burden of Prevention. We introduce an institution that implements a burden-sharing policy for Prevention, and investigate experimentally whether subjects coordinate on a cooperative strategy more frequently under different levels of cost sharing. In all treatments, burden sharing leaves the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure and Nash equilibrium of the game unchanged. We compare three levels of burden sharing to a baseline in a between-subjects design, and find that burden sharing generates a non-linear effect on the choice of the efficient Prevention strategy and overall performance. Only an institution supporting a high level of mandatory burden sharing generates a significant improvement in the use of the Prevention strategy

Health Product Risk Communication: Is the message getting through?

Risk communication is an important component of improving the health and safety of Canadians. For numerous departments and agencies at all levels of government, as well as public and private organizations, effective risk communication can protect Canadians from preventable hazards. The Minister of Health, on behalf of Health Canada (the Sponsor), asked the Council of Canadian Academies (the Council) to provide an evidence-based and authoritative assessment of the state of knowledge on measurement and evaluation of health risk communication. This assessment focuses on identifying tools, evaluation methods, gaps in the literature, and barriers and facilitators to carrying out successful communication and evaluation activities. Specifically, this assessment examines the following questions: How can the effectiveness of health risk communications be measured and evaluated? • What types of instruments/tools are currently available for health risk communication? • What methodological best practices can be used to evaluate the reach, use and benefit of health risk communication? • What research could be done to inform the measurement of the effectiveness of risk communications? • What are the existing barriers to effective risk communications and what best practices exist to address these challenges? To address the charge, the Council assembled a multi-disciplinary panel of 11 experts (the Panel) from Canada and abroad. The Panel’s composition reflected a balance of expertise, experience, and demonstrated leadership in academic, clinical, and regulatory fields. Each member served as an informed individual, rather than as a representative of a particular discipline, patron, organization, or region