Can the Mind Wander Intentionally?

Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent category. Solving this puzzle is critical for advancing theoretical frameworks of mind wandering

The scientific study of passive thinking: Methods of mind wandering research

The science of mind wandering has rapidly expanded over the past 20 years. During this boom, mind wandering researchers have relied on self-report methods, where participants rate whether their minds were wandering. This is not an historical quirk. Rather, we argue that self-report is indispensable for researchers who study passive phenomena like mind wandering. We consider purportedly “objective” methods that measure mind wandering with eye tracking and machine learning. These measures are validated in terms of how well they predict self-reports, which means that purportedly objective measures of mind wandering retain a subjective core. Mind wandering science cannot break from the cycle of self-report. Skeptics about self-report might conclude that mind wandering science has methodological foundations of sand. We take a rather more optimistic view. We present empirical and philosophical reasons to be confident in self-reports about mind wandering. Empirically, these self-reports are remarkably consistent in their contents and behavioral and neural correlates. Philosophically, self-reports are consistent with our best theories about the function of mind wandering. We argue that this triangulation gives us reason to trust both theory and method

Automated Gaze-Based Mind Wandering Detection during Computerized Learning in Classrooms

We investigate the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) eye-trackers to automatically detect mind wandering—a phenomenon involving a shift in attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts—during computerized learning. Study 1 (N = 135 high-school students) tested the feasibility of COTS eye tracking while students learn biology with an intelligent tutoring system called GuruTutor in their classroom. We could successfully track eye gaze in 75% (both eyes tracked) and 95% (one eye tracked) of the cases for 85% of the sessions where gaze was successfully recorded. In Study 2, we used this data to build automated student-independent detectors of mind wandering, obtaining accuracies (mind wandering F1 = 0.59) substantially better than chance (F1 = 0.24). Study 3 investigated context-generalizability of mind wandering detectors, finding that models trained on data collected in a controlled laboratory more successfully generalized to the classroom than the reverse. Study 4 investigated gaze- and video- based mind wandering detection, finding that gaze-based detection was superior and multimodal detection yielded an improvement in limited circumstances. We tested live mind wandering detection on a new sample of 39 students in Study 5 and found that detection accuracy (mind wandering F1 = 0.40) was considerably above chance (F1 = 0.24), albeit lower than offline detection accuracy from Study 1 (F1 = 0.59), a finding attributable to handling of missing data. We discuss our next steps towards developing gaze-based attention-aware learning technologies to increase engagement and learning by combating mind wandering in classroom contexts

Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual perception.

We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious perception. This effect, however, was not associated with better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates conscious perception in OSM

Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent wrongdoing

Judgments of blame for others are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others’ mental control, people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (N = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared to a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility

The impact of error-consequence severity on cue processing in importance-biased prospective memory

Prospective memory (PM) enables people to remember to complete important tasks in the future. Failing to do so can result in consequences of varying severity. Here, we investigated how PM error-consequence severity impacts the neural processing of relevant cues for triggering PM and the ramification of that processing on the associated prospective task performance. Participants role-played a cafeteria worker serving lunches to fictitious students and had to remember to deliver an alternative lunch to students (as PM cues) who would otherwise experience a moderate or severe aversive reaction. Scalp-recorded, event-related potential (ERP) measures showed that the early-latency frontal positivity, reflecting the perception-based neural responses to previously learned stimuli, did not differ between the severe versus moderate PM cues. In contrast, the longer-latency parietal positivity, thought to reflect full PM cue recognition and post retrieval processes, was elicited earlier by the severe than the moderate PM cues. This faster instantiation of the parietal positivity to the severe-consequence PM cues was then followed by faster and more accurate behavioral responses. These findings indicate how the relative importance of a PM can be neurally instantiated in the form of enhanced and faster PM cue recognition and processing and culminate into better PM

Can the Mind Wander Intentionally?

Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent category. Solving this puzzle is critical for advancing theoretical frameworks of mind wandering

The Scientific Study of Passive Thinking: The Methodology of Mind Wandering Research

In this chapter, we survey methodological challenges in the empirical study of mind wandering and provide a metaphysical framework that begins to address these challenges. We argue that mind wandering is a passive manifestation of agency—passive because people cannot mind wander on command and a manifestation of agency because the onset, progression, and content of mind wandering often exhibits direct sensitivity to personal concerns and plans. To measure passive thinking, researchers must ask, “Is your mind wandering?” Worries about this self-report methodology have encouraged researchers to develop “objective” measures of mind wandering through eye tracking and machine learning techniques. These “objective” measures, however, are validated in terms of how well they predict self-reports, which means that purportedly objective measures of mind wandering retain a subjective core. To assuage worries about self-report (and, ultimately, vindicate objective measures of mind wandering), we offer a metaphysical account of mind wandering that generates several predictions about its causes and consequences. This account also justifies different methods for measuring mind wandering

Eye-tracking mental simulation during retrospective causal reasoning

There are conflicting theories about how people reason through cause and effect. A key distinction between two prominent accounts pertains to whether, in judging an event’s causal relevance, people preferentially consider what actually happened (as predicted by process theories) or whether they also consider what could have happened under different conditions (as predicted by counterfactual theories). Toward adjudicating between these theories, the current work used eye tracking and Gaussian Process modeling to investigate how people form causal judgments retrospectively and in the absence of ongoing visual input. Participants played a virtual ball-shooting game: after choosing to move left or right, they encoded a video of the actual outcome and then were prompted to mentally simulate either (a) what actually happened, (b) what could have happened, or (c) what caused the outcome to happen while looking at a blank screen. During causal judgment, we found evidence that participants visually mentally simulated counterfactual possibilities: they moved their eyes in similar patterns as when they imagined a counterfactual alternative. Altogether, these results favor counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how visual mental simulation can support this reasoning, and provide a novel methodological approach for using eye movements to investigate causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking more broadly