149 research outputs found
The Solution of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2 : Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates
The Solution of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2:Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates
Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach.
A simple auction-theoretic framewoek is used to examine symmetric litigation environmentswhere the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems.AUCTIONS ; ENVIRONMENT ; LEGAL SYSTEM
The Herodotus Paradox
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete information, and in so doing identify what we call the "Herodotus Paradox"
It takes two to tango: Equilibria in a model of sales
We show that the Varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria: a unique symmetric equilibrium, and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In contrast, the 2-firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric. For the n-firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. This enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric
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